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Literature review of regeneration scheme evaluations

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Executive Summary

Regeneration is back on the political agenda, with the announcement of the Stronger Towns Fund and work to set up a Shared Prosperity Fund to replace targeted EU funding made while Theresa May was Prime Minister. There is recognition at a policy level that the 'proceeds of growth' are unequally distributed.

This shift in policy debate presents an opportunity to rediscover the role of targeted funding, and the part housing-related activity can play in uplifting 'left-behind' neighbourhoods. Importantly, it also presents an opportunity to learn from three decades of experience within the UK and internationally.

Key issues highlighted in previous learning include how much should be spent; how the spend should be targeted; how it should link with mainstream public spending; how need should be defined; how long a programme should last; what geographical focus is appropriate; and what outcomes and impacts should be expected. This report addresses summarises key learning on outcomes, value for money, determining factors and lessons learned.

a) Outcomes achieved

Part 4.2 of this report highlights outcomes achieved on housing issues including neighbourhood renewal, housing improvement and housing supply. Part 4.3 deals with local economic outcomes such as business growth and skills investment.

Outcomes and value for money need to be treated with some caution, but there is overarching evidence that targeted regeneration spend, when it supplements strong mainstream public service provision, can make a difference - particularly in terms of physical development, quality of life and addressing crime and antisocial behaviour.

However, neighbourhood based approaches to regeneration need to be understood within a wider context of delivering economic growth in the weaker economies of the United Kingdom. This is where the Local Enterprise Partnerships and Combined Authorities, working with a commitment from central government to genuinely rebalance the economy, have a key role to play. It is at these larger spatial scales that improvements to people-based outcomes can be achieved. Without this there is an inherent risk that the gains of regeneration to neighbourhoods will be lost.

b) Value for money

Parts 3 and 5 of this review focuses on an assessment of regeneration outcomes and Benefit Cost Ratios (BCRs). It notes both the extensive evaluation of programmes prior to the change of government in 2010 and the absence of effective monitoring and evaluation since. We have reviewed this material, drawing especially on the 2010 report, Valuing the Benefits of Regeneration, and updated the logic chains and information on regeneration spend and BCRs presented in that report, outlining the theories of change that currently inform government policy in England.

Updated material on logic chains and theories of change is presented in Part 3. Part 5 goes into the detail of how regeneration outcomes may be valued.

The values we present are based largely on updating the values derived from pre-2010 evaluations. However, they show that even the relatively limited spend since 2010 will have wider societal benefits which we estimate to be worth between 2.3 and 3.5 times the programme spend.

c) Determining factors

Two sets of determining factors stand out from the material available. These are considered in Part 4.4. The first is that direct investment in mainstream services such as housing produces a range of additional regeneration impacts. Welfare spending, for example, supports rental payments and sustains tenancies, underpinning stable and cohesive neighbourhoods. In turn, this enables social landlords to fund their community investment work.

The second set of determining factors regard the processes of establishing partnerships and involving residents. Support for these ‘softer’ aspects of local development is a recurring theme in regeneration evaluations. These are seen as foundational to successes (such as the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund) and their absence is a key factor in successes not being realised, or being obscured by controversy (for example, the Housing Market Renewal programme). The process of participating in regeneration activity can be of value in itself for those involved, irrespective of other outcomes.

d) Lessons learned

From the evaluation material, the following key learning is highlighted in Part 4.5 and Part 6:

- Place-based programmes dealing with housing, the environment, community development and crime tend to be more successful than people-based programmes to improve education, health and employment.
- Successful change takes time - in devising and setting up programmes, in building partnerships and delivery mechanisms, and in translating outputs into outcomes.
- There is a tension between ambition and clarity: grand objectives are not only difficult to achieve but causal links between programmes and outcomes are difficult to evidence.
- Relationships between partners, clear governance and accountability are essential.

Introduction

1

The brief for this project was to produce a literature review of regeneration scheme evaluations to inform a call for a post-Brexit Regeneration Fund. It arises out of a context in which regeneration is reappearing on the political agenda. On 4 March 2019 the prime minister, Theresa May, announced the launch of a £1.6 billion 'Stronger Towns Fund' targeted at places 'that have not shared in the proceeds of growth in the same way as more prosperous parts of the country'.

At the time of writing it is unclear whether the bulk of this money will come from the post-Brexit Shared Prosperity Fund and follow the pattern of current EU funding to address regional economic disparities (allocations have currently only been made to 'NUTS1' level regions (North East, North West etc.). However, it also includes £600m to be allocated according to a competitive bidding process, echoing 1990s schemes such as City Challenge and the Single Regeneration Budget.

How the money will be channelled is still unclear. An initial focus on Local Enterprise Partnerships has been dropped and the emphasis is on 'towns' rather than cities. However, there is no current indication of a fundamental shift from overall approach since 2010. The focus on place encapsulated in the ambition of the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal that no-one should be seriously disadvantaged by where they lived has been replaced with a focus on creating the conditions for investment through upgrading education and skills, supporting business development and growing industrial sectors, providing physical infrastructure to attract investment and housebuilding, mostly via private developers.

1.1. Defining regeneration

Regeneration is used in different ways. Its use and focus has varies both over time and across countries. We take a broad starting point from the 3Rs guidance (ODPM 2004) that regeneration is a *holistic process of reversing economic, social and physical decay in areas where it has reached a stage when market forces alone will not suffice*[1]. The Coalition Government in the UK confirmed a commitment that emphasised that *regeneration can help us make the best of our assets and our people. It can help areas adapt to new roles, and improve the distribution of wealth and opportunity. It can restore social justice, and reduce community tensions. And as the country adapts to a smaller state, regeneration can play a vital role for communities, by fostering a sense of solidarity and hope*." (Ministerial statement at

[1] '£1.6bn Stronger Towns Fund launched', https://www.gov.uk/government/news/16-billion-stronger-towns-fund-launched

[1] ODPM (2004) Assessing the Impacts of Spatial Interventions Regeneration, Renewal and Regional Development
'The 3Rs guidance'. Accessed from the internet on 8.3.2019 from:
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/191509/Regeneration__renewal_and_regional_deveopment.pdf

the National Regeneration Summit, 14 July, 2010). Most recently of all the Stronger Towns fund will *be targeted at places that have not shared in the proceeds of growth in the same way as more prosperous areas*.

The What Works Centre for Local Growth, in its review of estate based initiatives, defined regeneration as area based programmes that improve the housing stock, the business environment and other local amenities with the aim of improving outcomes for local residents (WWC for Local Growth 2015, 5).[2] The rationale for public expenditure, as set out in the HM Treasury Green Book, is heavily influenced by the need to overcome market failure and the achievement of equity objectives (HM Treasury 2011 51).[3]

In this report we consider how 'regeneration' objectives have been articulated and funded, focusing mainly on the three decades of policy and programmes in the UK since the advent of City Challenge in 1991. We outline the logics and scale of regeneration spending and examine how spending has been allocated between different programmes. From the available literature we then examine the outcomes and impacts that can be attributed to pre-2010 and post-2010 regeneration spending. We focus on regeneration outcomes; value for money; determining factors; and lessons learned. In our summary and conclusions we consider the development of new regeneration programmes in a post-Brexit environment and note the key learning points that should inform policy and practice.

As Tyler et al (2017) show British towns and cities have been following quite divergent growth trajectories over the last 30 years. These seem to have amplified over the last ten years. As these authors show the trajectories tend to show that the south and in particular London, is growing faster than the north of England, south Wales and Scotland. There are exceptions and outliers to this. The growth trajectories of large cities show some, but not conclusive evidence, of being different to towns. Nonetheless, towns in former industrial areas and seaside towns - particularly with weak communications links, have tended to fare worse than larger better connected localities. At a smaller geographic scale there is also evidence of growing concentrations of persistent disadvantage (Lupton and Fitzgerald 2015).

It is important at the outset to make a distinction between what Crisp et al (2014) describe as 'material' and 'non-material' deprivation - the latter encompassing the 'negative experiences of living in poor areas'. Studies that seek to isolate quantifiable differences in material deprivation - such as growth in GDP per capita or effects on household spending - may miss the differences in non-material deprivation that impact on the quality of life enjoyed by individuals in disadvantaged neighbourhoods or that derive from an improved sense of agency or satisfaction with where they live.

1.2. Common issues

Our consideration of regeneration over three decades raises a series of issues for reflection:

- How are resources allocated? The traditional routes have been through some combination of needs based allocation (such as the National Strategy for

[2] What Works Centre for Local Growth (2015) Evidence Review 5: Estate Renewal. Accessed from the internet on 8.3.2019 from: https://whatworksgrowth.org/public/files/Policy_Reviews/15-01-26-Estate-Renewal-Full-Review.pdf
[3] HM Treasury (2013) The Green Book: appraisal and evaluation in central government. Accessed from the internet of 8.3.2019 from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/685903/The_Green_Book.pdf

Neighbourhood Renewal allocations to 88 local authorities in the 2000s) or some form of competition based process (such as City Challenge).

- If a needs based approach is used, what criteria are used? The starting point for allocations is normally the Index of Multiple Deprivation although as the NSNR found compensations may need to be made because of the way the IMD domains are comprised.
- The level of geographical targeting? Approaches such as NDC and the Single Regeneration focused on relatively tightly defined areas using either established jurisdictional boundaries (such as wards), statistical units (such as super output areas) or more natural geographies (such as a housing estate). Programmes such as Housing Market Renewal focused on a much wider geography often spanning local authority areas.
- The focus of the programme? As one of the definitions above notes regeneration has often tried to provide holistic support across policy domains (housing, crime, education, employment and health) to varying extents.
- Commitment from other agencies? Regeneration expenditure typically only represents a small (but significant) proportion of total public expenditure in a place.
- How long do regeneration programmes last? NDC was a ten year programme as part of a wider government commitment - the National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal. Other programmes have been shorter in duration. What is clear though is that regeneration of many of the poorest places is a long term endeavour.
- Should the focus be on process or outcome? All programmes largely attempt to achieve the latter - an improvement of a place and the outcomes of people resident in that place. However, approaches such as NDC placed a strong emphasis on community involvement and empowerment. Although this approach has waned from mainstream expenditure it has been taken forward through initiatives around community led housing.

Methodology and approach to literature review

2

The focus of analysis for this report has been on providing an assessment of regeneration outcomes and the estimation of Benefit Cost Ratios (BCRs). We have attempted to provide central and cautious estimates of these. However, these are averages and as such there will be considerable variation across the regions of England. These will be shaped by a range of factors, some of which are known and controllable - such as the value of local property and land, whilst others will be less controllable - such as the performance of the local economy.

In providing estimates of outcomes and BCRs, we have not looked at:

- comparing the benefits of regeneration with benefits from other initiatives;
- establishing the fiscal costs and benefits from regeneration;
- the impact of regeneration alongside wider flows of public expenditure.

Regeneration programmes prior to 2010 were extensively evaluated and there is a wealth of literature assessing their successes and drawbacks. Assessing the regeneration record of the three administrations since 2010, however, presents challenges, not least of which is the dearth of formal evaluation. Very few of the funding schemes since 2010 have been independently evaluated, although a number of been the focus of House of Commons Public Accounts Committee inquiries. These, and investigations by the National Audit Office, form the bulk of our source material for this period. Assessing value for money in terms of regeneration impacts (rather than in terms of homes built or jobs created) is consequently an imprecise science. For the period prior to 2010 we draw especially on the summary evaluations of the New Deal for Communities programme (Batty et al, 2010), the Single Regeneration Budget (Rhodes et al, 2007), the Housing Market Renewal programme (Leather et al, 2009) and the 'Valuing Regeneration' synthesis reports (Tyler et al, 2010).

Our aim in this report has been to provide, on the best evidence available, an assessment of the targeting and impact of regeneration funds. Our findings are informed by the much greater wealth of material available relating to pre-2010 schemes in the UK. Using these as our foundation, we have updated the logics developed in the report Valuing the Benefits of Regeneration (Tyler et al, 2010) and considered how a post-Brexit model of regeneration funding might operate.

We have supplemented the pre-2010 literature by considering the schemes and programmes initiated under the Coalition government of 2010-2015, the Conservative administration of 2015-2017, and the current Conservative government. From the literature covering these schemes we identified the prevailing logics and theories of change in operation during the current climate of austerity and public spending cuts. We also identified the scale of spending on regeneration-related programmes.

We focus here on nationally-instituted schemes, but note that in an era of supposedly localist policies, there has been no attempted oversight or synthesis of the initiatives undertaken at local level. However, all local investment since 2010 has taken place within a context of severe overall reductions in place-based funding to local authorities and people-based funding through welfare benefits. The overarching objective of national schemes since 2010 has been 'growth' and tackling disadvantage, when it featured, was a secondary priority. Indeed the word 'regeneration' only featured in the titles of two sets of programmes during the entire 2010-2019 period: the estate regeneration fund and its successor, the estate regeneration national strategy; and the Coalfields Regeneration Trust.

We also considered the evaluation literature covering post-2010 regeneration spending in the light of pre-2010 evaluations. Because formal evaluation has not been a priority for the last nine years there is little published material available. We have relied heavily on reports produced by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office; while these do not concern themselves with broader regeneration impacts they do offer some indications both of what has been achieved and of the key challenges encountered. Considering these in the light of the extensive evaluations of pre-2010 programmes, it is possible to identify lessons for the future.

Regeneration logic chains in 2019

3

3.1. Introduction

One by-product of the 2016 referendum vote to leave the European Union, and subsequent Brexit debates and preparations, has been the return of regeneration to the political agenda. This has taken the form of a focus on 'left-behind' places and an implicit acknowledgement that the declared ambition of rebalancing the economy (HM Government, 2010) has not been achieved despite record levels of employment.

England is already seeing a cautious return to the era of place-based initiatives. Small place-based programmes such as the Coastal Communities Fund and the Coalfields Regeneration Trust have persisted in the post 2010 environment. More recently, the £675m Future High Streets fund (announced in December 2018) has adopted a place-based funding approach in recognition of the uneven impacts of structural changes in (and beyond) the retail sector, while the £1.6bn Stronger Towns Fund is expected to reinforce the return to a 'worst first' philosophy.

The overarching approach to regeneration-related funding between 2010 and 2019, however, has been thematic rather than geographic. Two major priorities have dominated. One has been to promote economic growth in order to 'rebalance' the economy in areas that have been dependent on public sector jobs and to encourage economic diversification away from financial services, with particular support for manufacturing. The second priority has been housebuilding in order to meet housing demand and promote home ownership.

Alongside this agenda has been one of localism and devolution, promoted through the community rights enshrined in the Localism Act 2011 and a series of devolution deals agreed first with major city-regions and subsequently with other unitary combined authorities. Localism and devolution have been viewed as enabling mechanisms in pursuit of economic growth: neighbourhood planning, for example, is designed to encourage rather than obstruct new development. Devolution deals have focused on transport infrastructure, skills development and business support.

From our analysis of post-2010 policies we have identified the logic chains governing the sets of policies adopted over the last nine years. Below we outline the logic chains in operation for housing investment and for business development, the two key planks of the growth agenda. We have included devolution in the second category: although it is an end in itself from a local government perspective, it has been used instrumentally by central government to advance its own priorities in seeking to achieve growth.

It is noteworthy that climate change and decarbonisation, despite ostensibly being a national priority and an international commitment, plays no significant role either in influencing approaches to housing investment or in informing local growth and devolution priorities.

Over the following pages we outline the logics behind different types of intervention and provide an assessment of the quality of recent evaluation evidence. We have focused on two of the main investment logics (around housing, and around business, employment and skills). Evidence on other approaches (such as community involvement or environmental improvement) since 2010 is very limited.

3.2. Housing logics

We outline the prevailing logic on housing investment here but with the caveat that this is not a 'regeneration' logic in the way outlined in the 2010 report on Valuing the Benefits of Regeneration (Tyler et al, 2010). Figure 3.1 below replicates the logic of housing investment observed in that report. It shows a belief that investment in problematic estates or pockets of housing will have wider neighbourhood effects in terms of quality of life, social cohesion, neighbourhood satisfaction and crime reduction, for example.

This approach has been largely abandoned over the past nine years. It is noteworthy that the only neighbourhood-based housing programme since 2010, the Estate Regeneration Fund, was premised on the notion of removing concentrations of social housing and rebuilding estates - particularly in London - at higher density and overwhelmingly for the private market. This risks repeating concerns expressed regarding the HOPE VI programme in the United States (see section 3.4).

The prevailing post-2010 logic is outlined below, more to illustrate the current retreat from housing-led regeneration than to propose a model for future practice.

Context: A 'broken housing market' (Housing White Paper, 2017) with declining levels of home ownership and affordability, dominance of housebuilding by 8-10 large companies, and need for up to 300,000 additional homes per year.

Rationale and objectives: Rationale for intervention is market failure: not enough homes being built to satisfy demand; concern over excessive costs and poor quality. Objectives focus on target of 1m net additional homes by 2020. Secondary objective to increase home ownership.

Theory of change: A variety of supply-side and demand-side tools will increase the number of homes built and speed of delivery, subsidising housebuilding and house purchase and removing barriers to development. Strong emphasis on role of private sector in providing homes for sale and rent and on easing access to markets for new builders and providers.

Inputs: Grant and loan funding to (a) assemble sites and provide infrastructure; (b) build new homes and convert existing property; (c) subsidise purchases. Regulatory intervention to remove planning restrictions and speed up development.

Activities: Housebuilding by private firms, housing associations and LAs. Loans to purchasers and providers. Redevelopment of large social housing estates.

Outputs: Increase in housing stock (220,000 additional homes in England in 2017/18). Homes built or converted. Planning permissions granted.

Outcomes: Increased level of home ownership. Improved affordability for house buyers. Diversification of housebuilding sector and increased turnover/contracts awarded to small building firms. Replacement of large social housing estates with high density mixed tenure developments. Creation of new settlements in areas of high housing demand.

Regeneration impacts: Little articulation of expected regeneration impacts except the transformation of 'run-down neighbourhoods' through the Estate Regeneration Fund.

What is the value of the regeneration impact? Little monitoring or evaluation of regeneration impacts beyond housing supply to date.

Figure 3.1: Example Logic Chain for Housing Interventions



3.3. Business development, skills and worklessness logics

The logics of investment in business growth and skills since 2010 are place-based insofar as they have been channelled through ‘regional’ and ‘local’ growth funds, primarily through LEPs, and via devolution deals to local government. However, the focus on business and skills dilutes the geographical focus. Once again the ‘regeneration’ impacts need to be treated with caution, if regeneration is conceived as an intervention within a defined geographical area. While clear conclusions about place-based effects cannot be drawn from the evaluation material available, one should expect some dilution of the impact on specific places due to the effects of subsequent job moves by individuals benefiting from upgraded skills. Similarly, both the likely longevity of start-ups and the location decisions of business investors militate against the duration of place-based impacts of business investment.

The post-2010 growth logic is outlined below.

Context: An objective of ‘rebalancing the economy’ from public sector spend to private sector growth was established in the Local Growth white paper of 2010. Spending has focused on creating the conditions for private investment and growth through provision of infrastructure, support for skills, and targeted support for emerging or successful industrial sectors.

Rationale and objectives: Twin objectives of encouraging economic growth and reducing dependence on direct public spending. Support channelled through LEPs and devolution deals. Objectives ‘to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth that is more evenly shared across the country and between industries’ (Local Growth white paper, 2010).

Theory of change: By channelling funds through private sector-led LEPs and devolution deals government will incentivise commercial activity, focusing on infrastructure (including transport) and skills in areas of skill shortages. This will create jobs and business opportunities in areas previously considered to be overly dependent on public sector jobs.

Inputs: Changed governance arrangements (LEPs, devolution deals); loans for infrastructure investment; grants for business support including apprenticeships and skills development.

Activities: Strategic sectors identified, businesses funded, devolution deals agreed, investment in infrastructure, Enterprise Zones.

Outputs: Number of businesses funded; jobs created or safeguarded; qualifications achieved; miles of road built; number of new homes enabled through infrastructure investment.

Outcomes: Shift from public to private sector employment; levels of business investment; degree of economic ‘rebalancing’.

Regeneration impacts: Local economic growth (if achieved); increased employment (if attributable).

What is the value of the regeneration impact? Cost per job created or safeguarded; costs and benefits of additional investment through infrastructure & other business support.

3.4. International Evidence

The approach to regeneration in England needs to be considered in the context of very different policies both in the other nations of the UK and internationally.

Lankelly Chase's historical overview of place-based initiatives (2017) highlights the importance of national as well as local context, noting how the federal government system within the US facilitates a wide diversity of approaches (which brings its own challenges to evaluators) while European programmes and those of the devolved Welsh and Scottish governments allow the state a much stronger role than has been the case in England.

There is not space in this summary to undertake a comprehensive analysis of international evidence. However, some of the most salient learning from international and devolved UK experience is highlighted below.

The HOPE VI programme - United States

HOPE VI is one of the most prominent and ambitious regeneration programmes in recent US history, costing $5 billion and focusing on the redevelopment of public housing projects and their replacement with mixed-income communities in 166 cities. Because of its strong housing component it is particularly relevant to regeneration schemes in the UK involving the remodelling of urban neighbourhoods where housing conditions may be associated with wider neighbourhood challenges of deprivation, worklessness and crime.

Popkin et al (2004), analysing a decade of interventions involving the demolition of more than 63,000 homes, highlight the difficulty of judging success or failure across a multidimensional programme working within widely differing local contexts. Among their key findings are that there was a lack of 'meaningful resident participation' and that original residents have not always benefited from redevelopment. Schemes have been successful at leveraging public and private funding, attracting higher-income residents and providing better quality housing. But there is little information concerning outcomes for more than 49,000 residents displaced by the programme.

Neighbourhood effects were positive, with one evaluation (Holin et al 2003) reporting declining crime rates and improved perceptions of desirability post-intervention. However, it is difficult to gauge how far these effects have been skewed by the removal of many original residents. Similarly, improvements in income and education at HOPE VI sites (US General Accounting Office, 2003) may not be attributable to the effects of HOPE VI investments. Criticisms of gentrification and displacement have been widespread. Overall, evaluations highlight the problems with approaches that change a neighbourhood by changing its population - issues echoed in some of the experiences of the Housing Market Renewal programme in England.

European regional economic programmes

Housing has been much less prominent within EU-funded interventions which have predominantly focused on economic uplift. The What Works Centre report on Area Based Initiatives (2016) considered 1,300 publications evaluating EU area-based policies and programmes, although it focused on only 18 that met its criteria for evaluating before-and-after effects and effectively comparing intervention and non-intervention areas. Overall, the report emphasises the difficulties in constructing evaluations of initiatives that work across multiple domains. Its selection process inevitably excludes the nuanced, context-specific findings of qualitative and case-study approaches in an attempt to identify what is generalisable.

From the reports examined, it found that in 6 out of 11 evaluations that considered GDP effects, EU programmes had a positive effect on regional GDP per capita. Out of four studies that examined employment effects, two showed a positive jobs benefit from EU support. Evidence on other outcomes was mixed, with only one study per outcome. As the What Works Centre observed (p15): 'Evaluating the economic effects of area based initiatives is challenging: they potentially affect multiple economic outcomes in ways that are hard for researchers to disentangle.'

Devolved UK administrations

Scotland and Wales have both witnessed a strong government commitment to regeneration and place-based initiatives, albeit in a context of diminishing resources. The Scottish Government has made more concerted efforts to consider the impacts of regeneration initiatives and some key learning is noted here.

Dodds (2011) highlights the complexity of evaluating multi-dimensional regeneration initiatives and observes that 'it is difficult to come to firm conclusions about long-lasting social and economic change as a result of regeneration in Scotland'. In doing so she chimes with the findings of Popkin et al on HOPE VI and the What Works Centre on area-based initiatives.

Key lessons from previous initiatives in Scotland are that more time needs to be allowed for benefits to be realised; the importance of community engagement; and the need to improve the skills of regeneration professionals. Dodds notes that recent studies have called for a holistic focus on 'placemaking' rather than on purely physical development. She also notes the lack of success of regeneration initiatives in addressing worklessness.

Fyfe (2009) also highlights the difficulties in evaluating programmes effectively, but calls for future programmes to focus on the most disadvantaged areas and use community planning and outcome agreements to align mainstream spending with regeneration objectives. Campbell's (2011) review of community-led regeneration highlights the contested and ambiguous character of community leadership or participation and the complexity of governance issues. It emphasises the holistic and often intangible nature of regeneration benefits, the importance of partnerships and the need for sensitivity to local context.

3.5. Lessons Learned

The findings below summarise what can be gleaned from the relevant material that is available. Some of this evidence is overarching rather than relating to particular programmes. The absence of monitoring and evaluation since 2010, particularly in relation to the local growth and devolution agendas, is striking. On housing, while the National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee have kept an eye on the overarching agenda of supply and demand, there is little investigation of individual programmes. There has been no published evaluation of the Estates Regeneration Fund.

Evaluations of programmes prior to 2010 provide a comprehensive overview of the achievements and difficulties of regeneration programmes. Strong overall themes include:

- Place-based programmes dealing with housing, the environment, community development and crime tend to be more successful than people-based programmes to improve education, health and employment.

- Successful change takes time - in devising and setting up programmes, in building partnerships and delivery mechanisms, and in translating outputs into outcomes.
- There is a tension between ambition and clarity: grand objectives are not only difficult to achieve but causal links between programmes and outcomes are difficult to evidence.
- Relationships between partners, clear governance and accountability are essential.

Key themes from post-2010 regeneration activity include:

- On both housing and business development, achievements fall short of ambitions.
- There is a lack of strategic oversight and clear objective setting.
- Governance and accountability are major worries, leading to an inability to conclude whether or not value for money is being achieved.
- There are concerns about the absence of monitoring and evaluation in almost all programmes.

The question of 'lessons learned' must therefore be treated with some caution as it is not evident that the learning from regeneration experience has informed subsequent policy. The major lesson is that more rigorous evidence collection and evaluation is a priority. However, a comparison of pre- and post-2010 evidence from regeneration initiatives reinforces some of the key points arising from previous evaluation activity.

Overall, it is important to emphasise that the scale of regeneration investment, even in the 'boom' years between 1998 and 2010, is small compared with mainstream funding resources. The seminal work on local public expenditure was undertaken by Bramley et al for DETR in 1998[4]. Foden et al[5] repeated the methodology developed by Bramley et al and applied this to NDC, looking specifically at Bradford NDC partnership. For the year 2005/06 Foden et al estimated that total public expenditure in this neighbourhood was around £4,700 per resident. Just under half of this was in the form of various benefits. By contrast NDC expenditure amounted to around £530 per resident in the same year. Public expenditure in an area such as Bradford NDC partnership will have changed greatly since 2005, not least due to welfare reform and more broadly public expenditure cuts.

Alignment of places, programmes and intended outcomes is always imprecise: the concentration of an issue in a particular locality cannot always be remedied by intervention within that locality. Rae et al (2016) highlight the phenomenon of 'double disconnection': 387 inner urban areas in their study were disconnected both from local housing and local labour markets, resulting in concentrations of poverty and precarity. Where housing interventions are used to change the make-up of a neighbourhood, as happened at scale through the Housing Market Renewal programme, improvement of a locality may be achieved by displacing a population

[4] Bramley, G. Evans, M. and Atkins, J. (1998), Where Does Public Expenditure Go? Report of a Pilot Study to Analyse the Flows of Public Expenditure into Local Areas, for the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. London: DETR.
Bramley, G. and Evans, M. (2000), Getting the smaller picture: small-area analysis of public expenditure incidence and deprivation in three English cities, Fiscal Studies, 21:2, pp. 231–268.
Bramley, G. Evans, M. and Noble, M. (2005), Mainstream Public Services and their Impact on Neighbourhood Deprivation. London: ODPM
[5] Foden, M., Wells, P., and Wilson, I. (2010) Assessing neighbourhood level regeneration and *public expenditure*. London: Communities and Local Government.

whose problems, at an individual or household scale, may continue but in a new location. To do regeneration well is not impossible, but is complex and demanding.

Regeneration outcomes

4

4.1. Introduction

This section is divided into two broad themes, of housing and neighbourhoods and local economies. This reflects the twin priorities of housing and growth of post-2010 governments, but encapsulates the broader pre-2010 agendas of neighbourhood renewal and worklessness.

4.2. Housing-related outcomes

Neighbourhood renewal

The neighbourhood renewal agenda was aimed at tackling place-based disadvantage (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001) encompassing a broad range of interventions to improve housing and the environment; community development; crime and safety; health inequalities; education; and worklessness and skills. Since 2010 it has ceased to feature in national policy.

Neighbourhood renewal was conceived as a cross-cutting approach to address disadvantage, and was supported by nearly £3bn of funding between 2001 and 2008 targeted at the most deprived neighbourhoods through the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund and, from 2007, the Working Neighbourhoods Fund. Funds went to 88 local authorities, reducing to 65 after the establishment of the Working Neighbourhoods Fund (Amion, 2010). A similar cross-cutting approach was adopted by the New Deal for Communities, in which 39 deprived estates were each allocated £50m over ten years, overseen by partnership boards designed to give local communities a strong say in setting priorities and determining activities (Beatty et al, 2010). Among the results reported by the final evaluation were 13,012 homes built or improved, 562,000 school students benefiting from measures to improve attainment, 18,822 premises protected against crime and 221 new health facilities. The most significant outcomes included improved neighbourhood satisfaction and better mental health, but between 2002 and 2008 NDC areas saw an improvement in 32 of 36 core indicators spanning crime, education, health, worklessness, community and housing and the physical environment (Batty et al, 2010).

Lupton et al (2013) found that across the range of neighbourhood-based programmes initiated between 1997 and 2010, regeneration initiatives succeeded in closing the gaps between the most deprived and least deprived areas in terms of physical environments, cancer and heart disease, school attainment and worklessness. However, life expectancy and neighbourhood satisfaction discrepancies remained did not improve, and gaps in all domains remained large. Their examination of Coalition programmes between 2010 and 2015 found that impacts ‘fell well below expectations’ and deprived neighbourhoods remain vulnerable (Lupton & Fitzgerald, 2015).

Housing Improvement

A second set of policies focused much more directly on housing interventions. Some, such as the Decent Homes programme, focused on improvements to existing housing. Estate-focused programmes, including some of the New Deal for Communities projects, sought to remodel to various degrees estates with concentrations of poverty and social problems. These measures included physical improvements, demolition and redevelopment, and mixing tenures within communities. The most radical of the programmes, Housing Market Renewal, sought to change housing markets at a sub-regional level through extensive demolition and rebuilding, removing housing deemed obsolete or unsaleable and attracting developers and private buyers into rebuilt neighbourhoods. Estate renewal programmes have continued in a modest way under the Coalition and 2015-2017 Conservative governments.

The **Decent Homes programme** improved more than one million social homes between 2001 and 2010: tenants and residents benefited from 810,000 new kitchens, 610,000 new bathrooms and 1.1 million new central heating systems (House of Commons, 2010). However MPs examining the scheme warned of the risk of future maintenance backlogs which would erode the benefits achieved. While wider regeneration impacts from the Decent Homes programme have not been reported, the achievement of bringing 90 percent of social housing up to a decent standard, with associated wellbeing impacts for residents, should not be underestimated (Lupton et al, 2013).

Estate renewal initiatives have a long history and mixed outcomes. The Estates Renewal Challenge Fund, which ran between 1998 and 2000 and involved the transfer of 45,000 homes to new landlords, achieved successes in transforming run-down neighbourhoods and 'reviving community spirit'; evaluators reported that it 'broke new ground in relation to resident involvement in shaping area renewal and engaging local people in long-term plans for their neighbourhood' (Pawson et al, 2005, p5). However, an international study by the What Works Centre for Local Growth (2015) reported that although there were positive impacts in terms of homes built or improved and quality of place from the evaluations examined, as well as positive effects on property prices and rents, there were limited local impacts on crime, health, wellbeing and education. It also reported very limited economic impacts on jobs, wages, and poverty. This supports Crisp et al's finding (2014) that place-based interventions (addressing housing, crime, and environment) are more effective than people-based approaches (addressing health, education, and participation). However, the What Works Centre's conclusions should be considered in the light of its very specific remit and the limited literature reviewed: in its quest to consider only the highest standards of quantitative evidence, it excluded the more nuanced and context-specific findings emerging from numerous qualitative studies.

Recent estate renewal initiatives under the Coalition and 2015-2017 Conservative governments have used estate redevelopment as a means of replacing social housing with high-density private estates. The focus of these schemes has been to increase housing supply and to remove neighbourhoods described as run-down; while they have not been formally evaluated, they have attracted opposition because of the displacement of residents and the minimal levels of affordable housing included in new schemes.

The **Housing Market Renewal** programme ran from 2002 until its abrupt cancellation in 2011, with more than £2bn allocated to turn around 'failing' housing markets characterised by low-value, low-demand social and private housing. In extreme cases areas such as St Hilda's in Middlesbrough were suffering extensive abandonment. Nine large intervention areas were chosen, most spanning more than one local authority and with average populations of around 200,000 people (Leather et al, 2009). The programme proved politically controversial, with strong community objections to displacement and redevelopment. By 2007 more than ten thousand properties had been demolished, 37,500 properties had been improved, and plans had been formulated for new build to replace demolished homes. The 2009 evaluation set out plans for further demolition and replacement of more than 47,000 properties over the following decade. In many areas housing markets were successfully revitalised, but the programme's successes were overshadowed by its adoption as a symbol of insensitive top-down policy. Community engagement programmes in some areas failed to address local concerns (National Audit Office, 2007). The programme's cancellation raised risks of further long-term decline in some locations (Lupton & Fitzgerald, 2015).

The evaluations considered do not examine the general impact of mainstream social housing. Indications of impact can be found in Dayson et al's work for the Northern Housing Consortium (2013). This found that housing organisations' community investment work in the north of England was worth £121.4m and benefited 695,300 people in 2011/12. A total of 81% of housing organisations' £6.5bn income stays in the north. Housing organisations added £4.6bn GVA to the northern economy in 2011/12, generating 116,900 FTE jobs and supporting 1.8 FTE jobs per employee. Similarly, the Great Places literature review (National Housing Federation, 2018) noted macro-economic benefits to GVA from housing activity through consumption, as well as micro-economic benefits in terms of labour mobility and economic competitiveness. The financial impact of an additional 100,000 homes was calculated at £19.5bn, with 430,000 jobs supported. Drawing on estimates by the real estate agent Savills, it noted that land values could be enhanced by affordable housing by up to 25%.

Housing Supply

The third strand of housing interventions relate to housing supply, both through the provision of new social and affordable housing and through private housebuilding and renovation. Since 2010 this has been the main thrust of housing policy, skewed heavily towards private development and encouragement for home-ownership. Evaluations have not addressed wider regeneration effects. However they have noted that government assumptions of impact (in the case of the New Homes Bonus) are unreliable and monitoring can be inadequate (National Audit Office, 2013). DCLG ambitions of one million new homes in five years 'do not even come close' to meeting housing demand for 225,000-275,000 homes per year (Public Accounts Committee, 2016), while the number of families in temporary accommodation rose from 50,000 in 2011/12 to 72,000 in 2015/16, with 120,000 children affected. The 'broken housing market' remains, with ten firms accounting for 60% of new homes, and 29% of private rented homes and 14% of social housing failing to meet Decent Homes standards.

Table 4.1: Housing growth and improvement – main types of benefit and disbenefit

	Activity Type		
	New build	**Acquisition, demolition and new build**	**Housing improvement (existing stock)**
Key consumption benefits			
Value uplift (private consumption benefits) from new or improved housing	Planning permission for new housing increases land values – the stream of private consumption benefits from housing (shelter, warmth etc) are capitalised in the asset value.		Improvement to houses will tend to increase the asset value reflecting a gain in private consumption benefits
Consumption benefits or disbenefits (society) from gain or loss of amenity	Change in land use (e.g. from greenfield to housing) results in a loss of amenity value to society as a whole	Removal of derelict properties results in an amenity gain to society as a whole; however, where properties are empty and awaiting demolition there are further amenity losses	N/A
Consumption benefits (society) from reduced carbon emissions	Regeneration interventions may support new homes with reduced level of CO_2 emissions compared to market delivery	Potential energy efficiency gains for replacement stock if this is more energy efficient than the stock it replaces	Potential reduction in CO_2 emissions from improved energy efficiency if this is a component of the refurbishment activity.
Consumption benefits (private) from improved security, health and warmth	N/A – no material gain, except material differences through additionality relating to security (and potentially long term care via Lifetime Homes)	Potential gain where inferior stock is replaced with modern housing stock	Gain for refurbished stock (e.g. Decent Homes or other retrofit activity)
Key production benefits			
Production benefit to the economy – employment enabled by new housing and associated transport infrastructure	Particularly in housing growth areas (but also applicable to all new housing activity) supporting employment growth through increase in labour supply.	Potential gain where replacement stock seeks to deliberately reprofile housing choice (quality, type, tenure) to support economic development	Less likely, but potential gain where material improvement in quality, type or tenure explicitly to support economic development.

4.3. Local economic outcomes

In this section we briefly set out some of the wider economic outcomes of regeneration policies before and since 2010 that have not been covered above. It should be noted that much of the literature deals with cross-cutting approaches such as neighbourhood renewal and the New Deal for Communities, rather than specifically with housing interventions, and in these cases it is not possible to disaggregate the wider economic impacts of the housing and non-housing interventions. It is important to note, however, that even where wider economic impacts are perceived to be minimal (e.g. What Works Centre for Local Growth, 2015) there is an intrinsic value to housing activity that improves neighbourhoods and has positive impacts on rents and property prices.

What kind of impacts should be expected?

At a neighbourhood scale, small economic impacts can make a difference. Crisp et al (2014) report improvements in 'non-material' poverty, with improved environments and reduced crime. Worklessness programmes assist individual residents, even if their impact on overall levels of worklessness is insignificant.

Lupton et al (2013) found that neighbourhood renewal programmes between 1998 and 2010 attracted investment from public and private sources, with a return on investment from New Deal for Communities of between three and five times the regeneration programme spend, and a fivefold return on investment from the £312m invested in Neighbourhood Renewal Fund programmes to counter worklessness.

Rhodes et al's evaluation of the Single Regeneration Budget (2007) found that public investment of £5.7 billion over the six years of the programme generated additional spend totalling £26 billion. They pointed out that these benefits would not have been obtained without intervention, observing: 'The notion that the operation of market forces on their own will regenerate run-down areas within an acceptable timescale is misguided. Trickle-down effects are often weak or non-existent' (p xxv).

However, Rhodes et al make the point that value for money is a limited way of understanding impact. Understanding the nature of the problems being addressed, the processes of creating and sustaining partnerships and engaging communities, and developing innovation are all important regeneration objectives. These extend beyond traditional outcome measures and the limited quantifiable measures analysed in the What Works Centre reports (What Works Centre, 2015; 2017).

Since 2010 the focus of national government intervention has been on policies predicated on the benefits of trickle-down effects. Beginning with the Regional Growth Fund established in 2010 and the creation of Local Enterprise Partnerships to replace Regional Development Agencies, the emphasis has been on business and skills investment to generate growth. Devolution deals transferring powers to city-regions and local authorities have also focused on generating economic growth through investment in housebuilding, transport infrastructure and skills development.

What can we learn from evaluation?

There has been little evaluation of these initiatives. An international study of area-based initiatives, including European Union funds, by the What Works Centre for Local Economic Growth (2016) shows moderate evidence of impact in terms of improving GDP per capita. This study should be viewed in the light of its specific objective of quantifying before-and-after impacts and the limited body of literature that met its review standards. Half the studies they examined showed positive employment effects, but positive impacts were greater in more developed regions. Enterprise zones had positive effects on businesses and unemployment, with moderate evidence of positive employment effects within EZs.

Within the UK most examinations of regional and local growth policies have been by the Housing of Commons Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office, which focus on process, governance and value for money at a broad scale rather than outcomes and impact. Nevertheless two important themes emerge from these reports.

The first is that overall **spending has fallen** - from £11.2 billion through regional development agencies in 2005-10 to a projected £6.2 billion in 2010-15 through the Regional Growth Fund, devolution deals and LEPs (NAO, 2013). Jobs created through enterprise zones were scaled back from a forecast 54,000 in 2010 to less than 5,000 in 2014 (NAO, 2013; PAC, 2014). Money is also taking too long to reach beneficiaries (Public Accounts Committee, 2012; 2014). The cost per job created through the Regional Growth Fund rose from £30,400 in round one to £52,300 in round 4.

The second is the **absence of monitoring and evaluation**, coupled with **poor governance and oversight**. LEPs had no clear plans to measure outcomes and evaluate performance (NAO, 2013) and were 'not meeting basic standards of governance and transparency' (PAC, 2016). City Deals were not properly monitored (PAC, 2015) which made it difficult to ascertain their impacts on growth. A similar lack of transparency was observed in the programme to sell public land for housebuilding (PAC, 2016b).

While the impact of national programmes has been unclear, there is some evidence of modest benefits from local, community-led regeneration efforts. Crisp et al (2016), in their study of community-led approaches to reducing poverty in neighbourhoods, note that small numbers of residents benefit from a range of material and non-material outcomes. Voluntary action has positive impacts on wellbeing. Community enterprises create jobs and community organising challenges factors that entrench poverty (such as the prevalence of payday lenders). Community-based housing provides affordable accommodation. Credit unions, community assets and community currencies all have small positive material and non-material impacts.

Table 4.2: Business support, infrastructure and devolution – main types of benefit and disbenefit

	Activity Type		
	Business support (targeted funds, LEPS, etc	**Infrastructure investment (land remediation, site acquisition, transport)**	**Devolution deals**
Key consumption benefits /disbenefits			
Private consumption benefits from investments	Household spend through job creation and wage increases or employment safeguarding	N/A	Local economic activity and household spending through greater control of local spending (e.g. health and welfare)
Consumption benefits or disbenefits (society) from gain or loss of amenity	Local spend on goods and services by new/expanding businesses	Change in land use (e.g. from greenfield to infrastructure) results in a loss of amenity value to society as a whole	N/A
Key production benefits /disbenefits			
Production benefit to the economy – infrastructure and investment	New businesses in Enterprise Zones or other target areas (though displacement effects may apply). Improved R&D capacity.	Improved access to markets through transport infrastructure. Potential displacement effects.	Improved local transport and housing site development.
Production benefit to the economy – employment	New jobs created through business investment and industrial strategies.	Jobs created through infrastructure creation, site preparation and business premises development	Community wealth creation through local procurement and targeted public service spend

4.4. Determining factors

Scale

At the risk of stating the obvious, the scale and targeting of public investment is itself a determining factor in outcomes, as the reports referenced above (Bramley et al, 1998; Foden et al, 2010) make clear. Lupton et al (2013) point out the degree to which targeted regeneration spend through New Deal for Communities and the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund drew in additional public and private investment; Rhodes et al (2007) make a similar point about the Single Regeneration Budget, finding that public investment of £5.7 billion over generated additional spend totalling £26 billion.

Conversely, the Public Accounts Committee (2014) observes how funding for local growth fell dramatically following the change of government in 2010 and had not yet matched previous investment through Regional Development Agencies, and criticises the long delays between the allocation of funding and funds reaching beneficiaries.

Problems often persist because of the scale of the challenges regeneration programmes are seeking to address with limited resources relative to mainstream spending. As Lupton et al point out (2013, p15):

> *At its peak in 2007/8, NRF [neighbourhood renewal fund] made up less than 1% (0.8%) of the total funds distributed to local authorities by central government to provide services (Aggregate External Finance or AEF), and was worth on average between £66 and £120 per head in the neighbourhoods affected. By way of contrast, central government health spending per head per year in England amounted to £1,631 in 2007/8.*

Additionality

Direct investment in mainstream services such as housing produces a range of additional regeneration impacts. Dayson et al (2013) highlight the role of welfare spending in supporting rental payments and sustaining tenancies, underpinning stable and cohesive neighbourhoods. In turn, this enables social landlords to fund their community investment work, helping to build and sustain local social capital and creating local employment. Wadhams (2011) highlights housing associations' ability to incubate community enterprises and provide premises for local voluntary and community organisations.

Support for these 'softer' aspects of local development is a recurring theme in regeneration evaluations. The evaluation of the Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (Pawson et al, 2005) highlights innovation in resident involvement as a factor in the fund's success. Conversely, the failure of resident consultation in some Housing Market Renewal schemes was highlighted by the National Audit Office (2007). Crisp et al (2016) point to the need for local leadership and highlight that the process of participating in regeneration activity is of value in itself for those involved.

Capacity

Rhodes et al (2007) emphasise the importance of inclusive partnerships in the success of Single Regeneration Budget projects. Partnership working and relationship building between regeneration schemes and local authorities were crucial in the success of New Deal for Communities initiatives (Batty et al, 2010). The value of capacity building is stressed in Lankelly Chase's historical overview of place-based initiatives (2017).

The need to devote sufficient time to build relationships at the start of a programme, set clear objectives and have clear lines of accountability is a recurring feature of evaluation reports, going back to the evaluation of SRB (Rhodes et al, 2007). Telfer (2013) reports on the negative effects of local confusion over the purpose of Joseph Rowntree Foundation's direct investment in projects in Bradford; Crisp et al (2016) emphasise the importance of building local leadership. More recent reports have highlighted the dangers of poor governance and the lack of transparency within Local Enterprise Partnerships (Public Accounts Committee, 2016).

Complexity

On the negative side, evaluators highlight complexity and the intertwined problems of 'isolate' areas that are disconnected from both housing and labour markets (Rae et al, 2016). Entrenched structural problems of industrial change, loss of housing value, crime and antisocial behaviour, health and educational inequalities combine to present regeneration programmes with huge challenges.

4.5. Lessons learned

The lessons of regeneration initiatives are familiar, although there is little indication from the last nine years of UK government initiatives that they have had a significant impact on policy. An exception, which is not within the scope of this review, is the work of the Big Lottery Fund (now the National Lottery Community Fund), particularly through the Power to Change programme to support community enterprise and the Local Trust's £150m investments in small-scale community-building activities in 'forgotten' neighbourhoods.

Duration

A primary lesson is that successful regeneration initiatives take time: time to establish aims and objectives, time to build capacity to deliver, time to form partnerships and relationships (Rhodes et al, 2007; Batty et al, 2010; Pattison et al, 2016). The importance of sufficient time to establish objectives and partnerships at the start of the process is reinforced over two decades of evaluation, and has been fundamental to Local Trust's work in the Big Local scheme. But it may conflict with political and policy imperatives of making a visible impact quickly. Regeneration is not amenable to political cycles: successful initiatives may take many years and in that period the overarching context will also change (Lankelly Chase, 2017).

Clarity

Second, the aims and objectives of programmes need to be clear and based on an understanding of the local context (Lankelly Chase, 2017; Pattison et al, 2016; Rae et al, 2016; Rhodes et al, 2007). If addressing market failure is the reason for intervention, there needs to be clarity about what the intervention will achieve and what potential unintended consequences might arise (Pattison et al, 2016). However, it needs to be recognised that precision is not possible in a changing context influenced by multiple variables.

Evaluation

Third, monitoring and evaluation need to be built into programmes from the start. The absence of evaluation has been particularly criticised within post-2010 programmes (Public Accounts Committee, 2012; 2013; 2015; 2016; What Works Centre, 2016). The need for evaluation is particularly important given the context-dependent nature of regeneration schemes: the objective should be to understand the relationships between contexts, mechanisms and outcomes (Pawson & Tilley, 1997).

Capacity building

Fourth, resident involvement and community capacity need to be built carefully and sensitively within place-based initiatives and local leadership supported (Rhodes et al, 2007; Batty et al, 2010; Leather et al, 2007; Pattison et al, 2016; Crisp et al, 2016). Again, this is a perennial theme in regeneration evaluations. In the context of continuing austerity, additional support may be required to sustain volunteers' commitment (Crisp et al, 2016).

Connections

A fifth key lesson is that regeneration programmes should be aware of the links between target areas and adjacent localities or neighbourhoods, and aware of the links between regeneration programmes and mainstream spending (Rhodes et al, 2007; Batty et al, 2010). Targeted spending can have unintended consequences in non-target areas and can be used as a substitute rather than as a supplement to mainstream spending.

Legacy

Sixth, careful thought needs to be given to legacy (Batty et al, 2010). Programmes need to devised so that their benefits are sustained after targeted funding runs out. This is more likely to happen when programmes are long-term and continue beyond electoral cycles. Again, this demands an approach that is both strategic and flexible, continuously revising the 'challenge of understanding what sustainability might look like' (Lankelly Chase, 2017).

5

Valuing the Benefits of Regeneration

5.1. Introduction

In this section we turn to estimating the value of regeneration. This updates our previous work CLG (Tyler et al. 2010) and attempts to assess the value of regeneration since 2010. The overall framework for valuing the benefits of regeneration is set out on the following page.

5.2. Measurement Issues

In the report Valuing the Benefits of Regeneration (Tyler et al. CLG 2010) we set out in detail a range of measurement issues which are important both in terms of estimating regeneration outcomes but also can serve to help develop new regeneration programmes. The main measurement issues are as follows:

- **Regeneration Process or Outcomes**. Our report here, as in 2010, does not focus on process issues (community involvement, governance, delivery models etc) per se but we do recognise that these are important to shaping outcomes.
- **Defining Pathways.** The focus in this report is on setting out the benefits of regeneration at a top level. The research we undertook in 2010 provides individual logic chains (linking inputs to activities, outputs, outcomes, impact and values) in much more detail. We have included an example of such a logic chain below (Figure 5.1) by way of example.
- **Establishment of direct and indirect benefits.** Our focus is on defining a and measuring regeneration inputs (public expenditure) and additional outcomes. We are also aware and have sought to measure indirect outcomes (for instance, an improvement in the neighbourhood environment improves resident mental health).
- **Who benefits?** Defining the geographic jurisdiction of a regeneration programme - its focus - is essential for estimating which target and other groups have benefited.
- **Additionality.** This is perhaps the most crucial step in establishing the net impact a programme makes. This is normally established through some form of counter-factual measure.
- **Distributional impacts.** Policy makers may choose to place greater emphasis on regeneration reaching particular groups (by income, gender, ethnicity, disability and geography). In estimating BCRs we would apply distributional weights to for example place great value on benefits to lower income groups

Figure 5.1: Framework for Valuing Regeneration Benefits



Source: Tyler et al (2010

- Duration, durability and time Regeneration, typically involving physical change to buildings and neighbourhoods can be anticipated to bring benefits over many years. Where this is the case we are clear on the duration of the benefits and the discounting of future outcomes to a net present value.

There are a couple of valuation issues which are important to reading BCRs:

- Societal benefits. Our focus is on the wider societal benefit of regeneration and not on the narrow measure of exchequer savings. The latter can be undertaken but essentially exchequer benefits are a subset of wider societal benefits.
- Market and non-market based valuation. Where possible we apply market based valuation techniques rather than non-market valuation. This is more straightforward in areas such as property markets and employment, than in say environmental improvements.

5.3. Estimated Annual Expenditure

The 2010 study (Tyler et al) provided estimates of regeneration expenditure for the years 2009/10 and 2010/11. This was undertaken through an analysis of departmental expenditure and programme specific expenditure. The benefit of focusing on the latter is that it is assumed to additional expenditure. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present the data by broad intervention area and by programme name respectively.

Table 5.1: Estimate of annual core regeneration expenditure by activity (based on 2009/10 and 2010/11)

Regeneration Theme and Activity Category	£m p.a.	%
Theme 1. Worklessness, skills and business development	1894	18.8%
Worklessness, skills and training	629	6.2%
Enterprise and business development	1266	12.5%
Theme 2. Industrial and commercial property and infrastructure	1143	11.3%
Industrial and commercial property	761	7.5%
Infrastructure	382	3.8%
Theme 3. Homes, communities and the environment	7052	69.9%
Housing growth and improvement	6479	64.2%
Community development	35	0.3%
Environmental improvement	430	4.3%
Neighbourhood renewal	109	1.1%
Total	10,090	100.0%
NB Please note that due to rounding some figures may not sum exactly to the stated totals		

Table 5.2: Estimated 'core' regeneration programmes delivered by DCLG, the Homes and Communities Agency and the Regional Development Agencies*

Delivery body	Estimated expenditure	
	2009/10 (£m)	2010/11 (£m)
DCLG		
Working Neighbourhoods Fund (WNF)	508	508
Local Enterprise Growth Initiative (LEGI)	99	100
Coalfields Regeneration Trust (CRT)	18	18
New Deal for Communities (NDC)	179	65
Renewing Neighbourhoods (Neighbourhood Management Pathfinders and Groundwork)	18	21
Homes and Communities Agency		
National Affordable Housing Programme	3248	2480
National Affordable Housing Programme (Housing Pledge)	375	381
Property and regeneration	406	211
Growth funding	278	190
Thames Gateway	79	79
Community Infrastructure Fund	132	160
Places of Change	24	23
Social Housing Efficiency Programme	3	2
Gypsy and Traveller Site Grant	32	32
Decent Homes - Gap Funding	100	80
Housing Market Renewal	346	311
Homes and Communities Agency Academy	6	6
New Communities Fund	3	10
Other	9	9
Kickstart housing (Housing Stimulus Package)	320	80
Kickstart Housing (Housing Pledge)	252	252
Local Authority Build (grant) (Housing Stimulus Package)	15	35
Local Authority Build (grant and borrowing) (Housing Pledge)	36	204
Housing Environment (Housing Stimulus)	75	29
Public Land (Housing Pledge)	0	16
Arms Length Management Organisations	909	609
Housing Private Finance Initiative Credits	950	925
Housing Stimulus Local Authority Build (Borrowing)	15	35
Regional Development Agencies*		
Regional Development Agency single budget	2260	1762
Regional Development Agency management of European Regional Development Fund	494	467
TOTAL	**11189**	**9100**

* This includes some inward investment and trade development expenditure which falls outside our definition of 'core' regeneration programmes.

The landscape for regeneration has significantly changed since 2010. Large scale programmes have, until the Stronger Towns Fund, largely been absent from the agenda. Initiatives such as the Local Growth Deals and Regional Growth Fund have also introduced greater flexibility in funding models making assignment to particular logic chains for national estimates more difficult. Various devolution and growth deals have also often pooled resources from across government departments and provided combined authorities with greater freedoms and flexibilities as to how these resources are spent. They may not necessarily have represented net additional expenditure on regeneration.

Working with the data contained within DCLG/MHCLG accounts we have tried to estimate expenditure going towards regeneration related activities. It is not possible however to determine the extent to which this is focused on the poorest places or represents additional expenditure on regeneration.

Our focus has been on Housing and Planning (previously 'Neighbourhoods' up to 2016/17), and Decentralisation and Local Growth ('Local Economies, Regeneration and European Programmes' before 2016/17). Taking the example of MHCLG spending allocations related to the New Homes Bonus, this funding is likely to have been 'spatially regressive', with the bulk generally going to the already growing parts of England. Thus, in the current financial year just under half (46 per cent) of this CLG expenditure of nearly £1billion has been earmarked for local authority areas in London and its surrounding commuter belt (CLG 2018)[6]. This compares with an allocation of just over a quarter of the total (27 per cent) to the 66 most deprived local authority districts in England according to the 2015 Index of Deprivation.

We have also taken a more programme specific approach drawing on the work of the National Audit Office studies into devolution and specific funding programmes although these cover an array of activities. These financial allocations also have not necessarily favoured the least favoured parts of the UK economy. The extent to which this funding is consistent with our earlier definition of regeneration is questionable.

[6] See MHCLG (2018) New Homes Bonus Financial Allocations for 2018 to 2019. Accessed from the internet on 08.03.2018 from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/new-homes-bonus-final-allocations-2018-to-2019

Table 5.3: Government Expenditure on Regeneration-Related Activities, 2010-11 to 2017-18

		£million							
Heading	Expenditure Type	2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15	2015-16	2016-17	2017-18
MHCLG Housing and Planning	Capital	£5,970	£2,912	£1,457	£2,374	£2,658	£2,128	£3,024	£5,083
	Resource	-£169	-£173	£659	£960	£1,249	£1,499	£1,953	£1,906
	NET TOTAL	£5,801	£2,739	£2,116	£3,334	£3,907	£3,627	£4,977	£6,989
MHCLG Decentralisation and Local Growth	Capital	£834	£911	£93	£494	£864	£1,323	£1,779	£1,451
	Resource	£866	£486	£74	£172	£234	£76	£139	£113
	NET TOTAL	£1,700	£1,397	£167	£666	£1,098	£1,399	£1,918	£1,564

NOTES

1. 'Housing and Planning' was known as 'Neighbourhoods' prior to the 2016-17 financial year.

2. 'Decentralisation and Local Growth' was known as 'Local Economies, Regeneration and European Programmes' prior to the 2016-17 financial year.

SOURCES

DCLG *Annual Reports and Accounts* (2009-10 to 2016-17)

MHCLG *Annual Report and Accounts 2017-18*

Table 5.4: Expenditure on Local and Regional Growth Programmes, 2010-11 to 2014-15

		£million				
		2010-11	2011-12	2012-13	2013-14	2014-15
Devolution Deals		£0	£33	£118	£72	N/A
Local Enterprise Partnerships		£0	£6	£6	£21	£21
Regional Growth Fund		£0	£465	£160	£529	£1,393
Growing Places Fund		£0	£730	£0	£0	£0
Enterprise Zones		£0	£0	£4	£66	£230
City Deals		£0	£0	£33	£118	£72
RDAs carry over		£1,461	£815	£66	£23	£5
Local growth programmes	**TOTAL**	**£1,461**	**£2,049**	**£387**	**£829**	**£1,721**
SOURCES						
House of Commons Public Accounts Committee (2014) *Promoting economic growth locally*						

5.4. Benefit Cost Ratios

We have applied the valuation assumptions set out at the start of this section to value the net additional outputs and their associated benefits. These benefits have been discounted to a Present Value using HM Treasury's Social Time Preference Rate of 3.5 per cent. The Present Value of benefits can then be divided by the annual public expenditure that generated the benefits to calculate a Benefit Cost Ratio. Table 5.5 brings together the Benefit Cost Ratios for each of the activities, drawing on the methods and evidence set out in Sections 4 to 7 of this report. The results are based on average unit costs. A lower unit cost would generate more net additional outputs and lead to a higher Benefit Cost Ratio. The opposite would be true of a higher unit cost.

Table 5.5: Benefit Cost Ratios by Activity Type – central and cautious valuation applied to outputs derived using average unit costs

Activity type	Valuation basis	Central valuation	Cautious valuation
Theme 1: Worklessness, skills and business development			
Tackling worklessness	Consumption benefits (earnings) plus indirect crime and health benefits	1.04	1.04
Skills and training	Production benefit - Earnings uplift arising from skills enhancement	2.2	1.6
General business support	Production benefit - GVA	8.7	6.0
Start-up and spin-outs	"	9.3	6.8
Business enterprise research & development	"	2.5	1.8
Theme 2: Industrial and commercial property			
Industrial and commercial property	Production benefit - GVA	10.0	5.8
Theme 3: Homes, communities and environment			
New build housing	Consumption (property betterment) and production benefits (GVA)	2.6	1.7
Housing improvement	Consumption benefits - property betterment and social benefits	2.0	1.3
Acquisition, demolition and new build	Consumption benefits - property betterment and visual amenity enhancement	5.5	3.7
Communities: Volunteering	Shadow price of volunteer inputs - minimum wage	1.1	1.1
Communities: investing in community organisations	Shadow price of social enterprise 'GVA'	1.8	1.3
Environmental: open space	Consumption benefits - Willingness to pay	2.7	1.8
Environmental: public realm	Consumption benefits - Willingness To Pay	1.4	0.9
Neighbourhood renewal	Consumption benefits - value transfer from NDC evaluation which adopted shadow pricing approach	3.0	3.0
All Activity Types (real resource)		3.5	2.3

5.5. Outcome Values

In the 2010 study we provided a series of estimates of the values per net additional outcome from regeneration expenditure. We have uplifted these by making adjustments for inflation to provide figures in 2019 prices. Following HM Treasury guidance we have used CPI as the measure of inflation. We present a central (average) and a cautious view of the like values together with figures on the duration of benefits (the length a benefit will be sustained over). It would be possible to apply the Treasury discount rate to estimate a total value over the duration of the benefit.

It is important to stress that these values are estimated using evaluation evidence produced prior to 2010. These values essentially provide an indication of what can be achieved from regeneration but should not be used to make specific judgements around what can be achieved from specific programmes operating in a different context.

Table 5.6: Uprated values per net additional output from regeneration, 2019

		Central view		Cautious view	
Activity	**Output measure**	**Value per annum**	**Duration (years)**	**Value per annum**	**Duration (years)**
Tackling worklessness	Person entering employment	£16,914	1	£16,914	1
Skills and training	Person achieving NVQ2+	£7,157	3	£7,157	2
General business support	New employee	£42,856	3	£40,407	2
Support to start-ups and spin-outs	New employee	£36,733	3	£36,733	2
Support for business R&D	New employee	£42,856	3	£40,407	2
Industrial and commercial property	New employee	£42,856	10	£40,407	5
New build housing - consumption	Dwelling unit	£35,704	1	£35,704	1
New build housing - production	Dwelling unit	£11,325	30	£10,678	15
Housing improvement	Dwelling unit	£3,570	1	£3,570	1
Acquisition, demolition and new build - consumption	Dwelling unit	£35,704	1	£35,704	1
Acquisition, demolition and new build - production	Dwelling unit	£39,427	30	£39,427	15
Community volunteering	Person volunteering	£1,250	1	£1,250	1
Investing in community organisations	Existing social enterprise	£5,785	3	£5,785	2
Investing in community organisations	New social enterprise	£19,093	3	£19,093	2
Environmental improvement	Hectare open space improved	£20,938	30	£20,938	15
Environmental improvement	Hectare public realm amenity	£140,444	30	£140,444	15

5.6. Overall Value of Regeneration

The 2010 study derived overall BCRs of 2.3 (cautious view) and 3.5 (central view). We have applied these to overall departmental expenditure on regeneration and data obtained on specific programmes in NAO reports. We have made some judgements around ascribing departmental expenditure, which means that the resulting figures are for illustrative purposes only, and for the reasons stated above should be interpreted with extreme caution. We have also added a more 'pessimistic' scenario based on the argument that the majority of current housing-related investment is seeking to bolster the mainstream commercial sector rather than improve access for disadvantaged households. The main underlying assumptions for MHCLG Housing and Planning expenditure are based on the geographical distribution of New Homes Bonus (NHB) funding. Spatial analysis of funding allocations since 2014/15 by local authority district indicate that the most deprived 20 per cent[7] have received 28 per cent of the total. We have applied this percentage to Housing and Planning expenditure as broadly 'regeneration-relevant'. However, it is unclear whether these monies are benefitting areas of need or areas of affluence within these local authorities. To cover this we have run a much more pessimistic scenario, based on the proportion of NHB funding which has supported affordable housing under the Affordable Homes Premium across England as a whole. This amounts to around 1.5 per cent of the total.

For the Decentralisation and Local Growth expenditure strand we have assumed that this is geared more strongly to regeneration-related activities, though not exclusively so. As a rule of thumb we have applied a percentage of 66 per cent to our 'central' and 'cautious' estimates, and 50 per cent to the pessimistic estimates, with the latter also incorporating the 'cautious' BCR. Bearing all those caveats in mind, Table 5.7 then sets out the range of possible values of regeneration benefits accruing from MHCLG expenditure in the two spheres of activity. For 2017/18 this produces a cautious value of around £5 billion, and a pessimistic estimate of £2 billion.

We have more confidence in the data from the NAO reports. As an example we would venture a cautious estimate that the £1.7 billion spent in 2014/15 will generate wider societal value of almost £4 billion.

These estimates of current and recent government expenditure on regeneration-related activity can be contrasted with the much higher values generated by the regeneration-specific programmes running at the end of the 2000s (Table 5.9). This suggests that dedicated and targeted expenditure could potentially have four to five times the impact of the current policy model.

[7] Defined as containing the highest percentages of Lower Super Ouput Areas (LSOAs) in the most deprived 10 per cent nationally.

Table 5.7: Estimated value of regeneration benefits from relevant MHCLG expenditure, 2010 to 2018

		£million							
	View	**2010-11**	**2011-12**	**2012-13**	**2013-14**	**2014-15**	**2015-16**	**2016-17**	**2017-18**
MHCLG Housing and Planning	Central	£3,736	£1,764	£1,363	£2,147	£2,516	£2,336	£3,205	£4,501
	Cautious	£2,436	£1,150	£889	£1,400	£1,641	£1,523	£2,090	£2,935
	Pessimistic	£131	£62	£48	£75	£88	£82	£112	£157
MHCLG Decentralisation and Local Growth	Central	£3,927	£3,227	£386	£1,538	£2,536	£3,232	£4,431	£3,613
	Cautious	£2,581	£2,121	£254	£1,011	£1,667	£2,124	£2,912	£2,374
	Pessimistic	£1,955	£1,607	£192	£766	£1,263	£1,609	£2,206	£1,799

Table 5.8: Estimated value of regeneration benefits from local and regional growth programmes, 2010 to 2015

		£million				
	View	**2010-11**	**2011-12**	**2012-13**	**2013-14**	**2014-15**
Local and regional growth programmes	Central	£5,114	£7,172	£1,355	£2,902	£6,024
	Cautious	£3,360	£4,713	£890	£1,907	£3,958

Table 5.9: Estimated value of regeneration benefits from core regeneration expenditure, 2009/10 and 2010/11

		£million	
	View	**2009-10**	**2010-11**
Local and regional growth programmes	Central	£39,162	£31,850
	Cautious	£25,735	£20,930

Conclusion

6

The long history of targeted, area-based initiatives yields consistent messages about the value that regeneration can provide, but also about the challenges there are in evidencing it.

These challenges can be addressed both through the way regeneration programmes are devised and managed, and through the way they are monitored and evaluated.

Programme management needs to pay attention to:

- The need to lay careful foundations, building partnership capacity and resident involvement.
- The need to build on existing evidence, showing how the programme has been informed by the learning from previous initiatives.
- The need to set realistic and achievable aims and objectives, with clarity both about what kind of change is desired and why, and the means by which change is expected to be achieved.
- The need for transparent and effective governance and oversight.
- The need for political commitment and continuous investment stretching across and beyond political cycles.
- The need to balance clear targets with an approach that can adapt to changing circumstances.

Programme monitoring and evaluation needs to pay attention to:

- The need to establish a clear baseline, showing the circumstances prevailing at the start of the programme and building up a credible theory of change.
- The effect of complementary and competing investments through mainstream services and private sector activities.
- The need for causal clarity, demonstrating the links between outputs, outcomes and impact.
- The possibilities of displacement and drop-off, with impacts falling away over time or negative impacts on adjacent areas.
- The opportunities for learning and feedback: any new regeneration programme needs mechanisms to respond to emerging evidence and to share learning among participants.

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A1

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