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Dear Member

**Humberside Fire Authority - Agenda 30 October 2020 - Urgent Item**

Further to the agenda for the above meeting, please find enclosed an additional report for the meeting of HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY on FRIDAY, 30 OCTOBER 2020 at 10.30AM.

Item No.	Agenda Item
11(i)	Grenfell Tower Public Inquiry Phase 1 Report - Gap Analysis and Action Plan

It was agreed by the Chairperson for this item to be treated as urgent in order that it coincides with the first anniversary of the Grenfell Tower Phase 1 Public Inquiry report being published (30<sup>th</sup> October 2020).

If you have any queries or require any further information, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Yours sincerely

**Mathew Buckley**  
**Monitoring Officer & Secretary to Fire Authority**

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## **GRENFELL TOWER PUBLIC INQUIRY PHASE 1 REPORT - GAP ANALYSIS AND ACTION PLAN**

### **SUMMARY**

1. This paper provides an overview of work undertaken by the Service in response to the tragic events that occurred on the 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017 at the Grenfell Tower.
2. In the immediate aftermath, a Building Safety Group was established undertaking several workstreams including the coordinating of immediate inspections of high-rise residential buildings in the Humberside area.
3. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 (GTIP1) report was published on Wednesday 30 October 2019. Following an initial assessment, HFRS appointed a Temporary Area Manager (AM Kirby) to undertake a gap analysis of the report recommendations and produce an action plan to close any identified gaps.
4. An interim report presented to the Strategic Leadership Team (SLT) in June (SLT June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2020, Item 4.1) resulted in the approval to establish a Grenfell Project Team to progress workstreams in key areas identified through the gap analysis.
5. A further report presented to SLT in October (SLT October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2020, Item 4.3) introduced a completed gap analysis of the HFRS position versus the recommendations and an associated action plan to close the identified gaps, mitigating any risk to the Service.
6. Due to the protracted nature of national workstreams, SLT has agreed that HFRS should continue to make progress against the locally developed gap analysis and action plan whilst monitoring the progress of the national workstreams.
7. Phase 2 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry commenced on the 27<sup>th</sup> January 2020 and examines the causes of the events, including how Grenfell Tower came to be in a condition which allowed the fire to spread in the way identified in Phase 1. Phase 2 has been subject to several delays due to the impact of COVID-19. The Grenfell Project team will continue to monitor the progress of Phase 2, providing updates to SLT and HFA as appropriate.

### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

8. That Members take assurance that the required actions and risks to the Service from the GTIP1 report are being managed effectively.

### **REPORT DETAIL**

9. In the early hours of Wednesday 14 June 2017, a fire broke out in the kitchen of Flat 16 Grenfell Tower, a high-rise residential building in North Kensington, West London. A major fire ensued which seriously damaged the building and, resulted in the deaths of 72 of the 293 people who were believed to be in the 129-flat tower that night.

10. The then Prime Minister, Teresa May, ordered a public inquiry the following day subsequently announcing, on 29 June 2017, that the inquiry would be chaired by retired judge Sir Martin Moore-Bick, with the immediate priority 'to establish the facts of what happened at Grenfell Tower in order to take the necessary action to prevent a similar tragedy from happening again.'
11. In the immediate aftermath of the Grenfell Tower Fire HFRS set up a Building Safety Group to coordinate the HFRS response. The group co-ordinated immediate inspections across all high-rise residential buildings and NHS Building stock in the HFRS area. In addition, the group also provided support to stakeholders assisting them to provide timely and accurate responses to information being sought from lead Government departments, and specifically, the Fire sector coordinated through NFCC. The building safety group was stood down in November 2017 following the completion of the required inspections and coordination of the immediate response. Grenfell related workstreams have since continued within the Public Safety Central Support Team.
12. Through 2018 and 2019 district exercise programs included an increased focus on residential high-rise buildings. This reinforced and refreshed firefighter knowledge of our existing procedures, the visual presence and actions of firefighters also served to inspire community confidence in the HFRS response. Operational Pre-Plans were developed during the same period for all 27 residential high-rise buildings within the HFRS area.
13. A local HFRS high-rise working group has been in place for many years and has recently contributed to the development of the Operational Pre-Plans and high-rise exercise program. The group currently meets on a six-monthly basis and focuses on ensuring existing procedures are effectively embedded.
14. The Chair of the Public Inquiry, Sir Martin Moore-Bick issued the first part of his report, GTIP1 on Wednesday 30 October 2019. Following an initial assessment of the GTIP1 Report, HFRS appointed a Temporary Area Manager (AM Kirby) to undertake a gap analysis of the report recommendations and produce an action plan to close any identified gaps.
15. Progress on the gap analysis work was impacted by the operational response to the protracted flooding experienced in late February to early March and the ongoing impact of the Services contribution to the multi-agency response to COVID-19.
16. An interim report presented to SLT in June (SLT June 15<sup>th</sup>, 2020, Item 4.1) resulted in the approval to establish a Grenfell Project Team to progress workstreams in the following areas:-
  - a. High-rise cladding fire knowledge;
  - b. Training related to 7.2.d visits;
  - c. High-rise evacuation planning and operational pre-plans;
  - d. Prevalence of combustible cladding & building risk information;
  - e. Fire survival guidance;
  - f. High-rise procedures.
17. Work is progressing well in all areas with an eLearning module on Cladding and External Fire spread produced and delivered to Operational Staff and revisions to Operation Pre-Plans nearing completion. The building risk review is underway and

fundamental reviews of high rise and fire survival guidance procedures have commenced.

18. A further report presented to SLT in October (SLT October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2020, Item 4.3) introduced a completed gap analysis of the HFRS position versus the recommendations and an associated action plan to close the identified gaps, mitigating any risk to the Service. Key areas, covering several recommendations include:-
  - a. Review of incident ground communications policy, training, and guidance;
  - b. Replacement of the CFRMIS system;
  - c. Replacement of incident command software;
  - d. Review of the control, management, and deployment of resources on the fireground;
  - e. Review of skills and competencies in relation to fire protection.
19. Several of the GTIP1 report recommendations are reliant upon the introduction of new legislation. The Fire Safety Bill, currently at the consultation stage, will provide the vehicle for new legislation to be introduced. The Grenfell Project Team will continue to monitor its passage through the Parliamentary process.
20. The gap analysis has also identified that many of the recommendations may have an impact on demand for our protection teams, particularly around compliance and enforcement of new requirements for high rise building owners. There is also likely to be a greater expectation of FRSS in terms of the additional information they receive and therefore a subsequent need to increase the level of skills and expertise to interpret such information.
21. A Regional Grenfell Group has been established and continues to meet every month to share good practice and knowledge taking forward workstreams in a collaborative way wherever possible.
22. Nationally work is also underway through several NFCC committees, the Protection Board, and MHCLG. Whilst this work is starting to deliver some outcomes many of the timescales are protracted and will not be delivered to well into 2021 and beyond. HFRS is linked to national Work through AM Dave Teggart (WYFRS) who represents the region on the NFCC Tall Buildings Group.
23. Due to the protracted nature of the national workstreams, SLT has agreed that HFRS should continue to make progress against the locally developed gap analysis and action plan whilst monitoring the progress of the national workstreams. This way local work can be aligned to national workstreams as closely as possible so that when national guidance becomes available any deviation can be accommodated with minimal impact.
24. Phase 2 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry commenced on the 27<sup>th</sup> January 2020 and examines the causes of the events, including how Grenfell Tower came to be in a condition which allowed the fire to spread in the way identified in Phase 1. The Inquiry is currently in Module 1 of Phase 2, following a 3 ½ month suspension of proceedings due to COVID-19. Module 1 focuses on the refurbishment of Grenfell Tower.

25. The Fire and Rescue Service is likely to be subject to further scrutiny in Module 3 (compliance with Fire Safety Order 2005) scheduled for February to May 2021 and, Module 5 (Firefighting) scheduled for July to October 2021.
26. The hearing of all evidence for Phase 2 is scheduled to be complete by the end of December 2021. Considering timescales from Phase 1 of the inquiry to the publication of the GTIP1 report, it is expected that a Phase 2 report will be published no earlier than the Autumn of 2022.
27. The Grenfell Project team will continue to monitor the progress of Phase 2, providing updates to SLT and HFA as appropriate.

### **STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY**

28. The contents of this report directly support the Strategic Plan, particularly concerning how we: - Respond quickly and effectively to emergency incidents and; Prevent the loss of life, injuries, and impact on communities caused by emergency incidents.

### **FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS**

29. The Protection Fund announced by Lord Greenhalgh in his letter of the 29th April 2020 identifies Approximately £175k of additional funding for HFRS in the financial year 2020/21. The government view is that this should be used to deliver the wider high-rise building risk review programme and to support the improvement in protection work and its delivery in line with locally agreed integrated risk management plans and risk-based inspection programmes.
30. HFRS has been notified of further additional funding, the new 20210/21 infrastructure fund provided to '*...support delivery of the lessons and relevant recommendations on the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 report.*'. The HFRS allocation from the fund is £124,606.57. A letter from Lord Greenhalgh identifies that the funding should enable FRSs to put in place a Grenfell Inquiry recommendations coordination function which will help co-ordinate local activity and support the national work led by the NFCC; drive progress on local improvements, and ensure FRSs have funding for smoke-hoods and other technical investments.
31. Beyond HFRSs allocation of the Grenfell Infrastructure fund, an additional £1.6m has been allocated nationally to support the introduction of Multi-Agency Incident Transfer (MAIT), implementation of an Airwave announcement talk group, and updating of nationally provided Fire Survival Guidance. Whilst this predominantly supports national workstreams it also enables several actions identified through our local gap analysis and action plan.
32. The Grenfell project team is led by a Station Manager and is expected to be in place for 12 months, as this is an over-established position (albeit temporarily) this represents an additional cost of around £55k (including on-costs). This cost will be borne out of the Grenfell Infrastructure fund. Additional team members seconded to the team are being funded through existing section budgets (no backfill).

### **LEGAL IMPLICATIONS**

33. The report seeks to address several recommendations made in a public inquiry. The recommendations impact several relevant areas of legislation including the

Regulatory Reform Order, Building Regulations Approved Document B, Building Safety Bill, and the Fire Safety Bill currently working its way through parliament.

### **EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS**

34. Recommendations in the GTIP1 report seek to improve the safety of all residents in high-rise and multi-occupied residential buildings. As such they have a positive impact concerning several protected characteristics including Race & Ethnicity, Disability, Age, and Pregnancy & Maternity.
35. The Grenfell Tower fire had a disproportionate impact on the BAME community - Legal submissions made to the inquiry explain there were four visitors to the tower among the 72 dead and also stillborn Baby Logan Gomes and then adds: "Of the remaining 67, 57 were from BAME (black, Asian and other ethnic minority) communities. Furthermore, the English Housing Survey 2017-2018 found that 40% of those living in high-rise buildings in the social rented sector are black, Asian, or other. This, compared to the percent of the population (14%), is high.

### **CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS**

36. Failure to implement change following the publication of the GTIP1 Report would have a significant impact on the Services Reputation should:-
  - a. HFRS experience an incident of a similar nature in its area;
  - b. HMICFRS undertake a themed inspection of HFRS relating to progress against the GTIP1 Report.
37. Awaiting the publication of national guidance before taking any action would put HFRS at a similar level of risk identified in 1 should any of the above scenarios occur in the interim period.

### **HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS**

38. The gap analysis and action plan identified in this report seek to improve our procedures and ensure that we continue to keep our communities and firefighters safe.

### **COMMUNICATIONS ACTIONS ARISING**

39. Monthly staff update via PageTiger.
40. Monthly reporting on progress to SLT (3<sup>rd</sup> week of the month).
41. HFA Member Day updates 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2019 & 10<sup>th</sup> July 2020.

### **DETAILS OF CONSULTATION AND/OR COLLABORATION**

42. Staff and representative bodies have been encouraged to feedback to the Grenfell Project Team. The team has and continues to engage with staff and representative bodies as they implement the actions from the report. Opportunities to consult and feedback through the monthly PageTiger update have been undertaken.
43. AM Kirby has been working with a regional group of officers, linking in through the Yorkshire and Humber Operational Resilience Group (YHORG) arrangements. There is the opportunity and desire to continue to develop these areas on a regional basis, designing documents and processes that are mirrored across Yorkshire and

the Humber. The regional group is also represented at the National level on the NFCC Tall Buildings Group through AM Dave Teggart (WYFRS).

#### **BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS**

- 44. SLT June 15th, 2020 Item 4.1 Interim Report – Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Recommendations.
- 45. SLT October 5<sup>th</sup>, 2020 Item 4.3 - Grenfell Tower Inquiry Phase 1 Report, Gap Analysis, and Action Plan.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED**

- 46. That Members take assurance that the required actions and risks to the Service from the GTIP1 report are being managed effectively.

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JK/HFA/10/2020