HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY

Fire & Rescue Service Headquarters Summergroves Way Kingston upon Hull HU4 7BB

Telephone 01482 565333

To: Members of the Fire Authority	**Enquiries to:** Gareth Naidoo **Email:** gareth.naidoo@eastriding.gov.uk **Tel. Direct:** (01482) 393206 **Date:** 28 November 2019

Dear Member

I hereby give you notice that a meeting of **HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY** will be held on **FRIDAY, 6 DECEMBER 2019 2019 at 10.30AM** at HUMBERSIDE FIRE & RESCUE SERVICE HEADQUARTERS, SUMMERGROVES WAY, KINGSTON UPON HULL, HU4 7BB.

The business to be transacted is set out below.

Yours sincerely

Mathew Buckley
Monitoring Officer & Secretary to Fire Authority

Enc.

A G E N D A

Business	Page Number	Lead	Primary Action Requested
1. Apologies for absence	-	Monitoring Officer/ Secretary	To record
2. Declarations of Interest (Members and Officers)	-	Monitoring Officer/ Secretary	To declare and withdraw if pecuniary
3. Minutes of meeting of the Authority held on 25 October 2019	(pages 1 - 4)	Chairperson	To approve
4. Questions by Members	-	Monitoring Officer/ Secretary	To receive
5. Petitions and Deputations	-	Monitoring Officer/ Secretary	To receive
6. Communications	-	Chairperson and Monitoring Officer/ Secretary	To receive
7. Draft Minutes of Governance, Audit and Scrutiny Committee - 11 November 2019	(pages 5 -11)	Chairperson of Committee	To receive

Business	Page Number	Lead	Primary Action Requested
8. Treasury Management Mid-Year Report 2019/20*1	(pages 12 - 19)	Executive Director of Corporate Services & S.151 Officer	To receive
9. Financial Planning 2020/21 Onwards	(pages 20 - 29)	Executive Director of Corporate Services & S.151 Officer	To receive
10. Capital Programme 2020/21 Onwards - Vehicles, Estates and Information Communications and Technology (ICT)	(pages 30 - 34)	Director of Service Delivery Support	To approve
11. Service Performance and Risk Report - End of the 2nd Quarter 2019 - 2020 (1 July 2019 - 30 September 2019)*1	(pages 35 - 45)	Director of Service Improvement	To receive
12. Health, Safety and Environmental Quarterly Report - 2nd Quarter 2019/20 (July - September 2019)*1	(pages 46 - 55)	Director of Service Improvement	To receive
13. Operational Assurance Report - 2nd Quarter 2019/20 (July - September 2019)*1	(pages 56 - 68)	Director of Service Improvement	To receive
14. Staff Pay Awards - Annual Update	(pages 69 - 71)	Director of People and Development	To receive
15. Absence Management Report*	(pages 72 - 76)	Director of People and Development	To receive
16. Workforce Plan	(pages 77 - 84)	Director of People and Development	To approve
17. Integrated Risk Management Plan (IRMP) 2018-21 Consultation Outcomes*2	(pages 85 - 90)	Director of Service Improvement	To approve
18. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services (HMICFRS) Consultation Response	(pages 91 - 94)	Director of Service Improvement	To approve
19. Service Improvement Plan (SIP)	Verbal	Director of Service Improvement	To receive
20. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry - November 2019	(pages 95 - 110)	Director of Service Delivery Support	To receive
21. East Coast and Hertfordshire Control Room (ECHCR) Project Update	Verbal	Director of Service Improvement	To receive
B EXEMPT BUSINESS			
The Authority is asked to consider excluding the press and public from the meeting during consideration of the following item on the grounds that it is likely to involve the disclosure of exempt information as defined in paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972. In making its decision, the Fire Authority is asked to confirm that, having regard to all circumstances, it is satisfied that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information.			
22. EU Exit update	Verbal	Chief Fire Officer & Chief Executive	To receive

Under the Openness of Local Government Bodies Regulations 2014 members of the public may film, record, take photographs or use social networking during Authority and committee meetings that are open to the public. *The Monitoring Officer/Secretary kindly requests advance warning from anyone wishing to film, record or take photographs during open meetings so that suitable provision can be made.*

*1 - Paper previously before Governance, Audit and Scrutiny Committee or Pension Board
*2 - Further details are accessible via an electronic link alongside the agenda papers on the Fire Authority's website (www.humbersidefire.gov.uk/fire-authority/fire-authority-documents)

HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY

25 OCTOBER 2019

PRESENT:

Representing East Riding of Yorkshire Council:

Councillors Bryan, Chadwick, Fox, Green, Jefferson, Smith and West

Representing Hull City Council:

Councillors Chambers, Dad and Randall

Representing North East Lincolnshire Council:

Councillors Barfield, James, Shepherd and Swinburn

Representing North Lincolnshire Council:

Councillors Briggs (*Chairperson*), Grant and Sherwood

Officers of Humberside Fire & Rescue Service

Chris Blacksell - Chief Fire Officer & Chief Executive, Phil Shillito - Deputy Chief Fire Officer/Executive Director Service Delivery, Kevin Wilson - Executive Director of Corporate Services/Section 151 Officer, Steve Topham - Director of Service Delivery Support, Niall McKiniry - Director of Service Improvement, Miriam Heppell - Director of People and Development, Mathew Buckley - Monitoring Officer/Secretary and Samm Campbell - Committee Manager.

Independent Co-opted Members of the Governance, Audit and Scrutiny Committee

Doug Chapman, Andrew Smith, Mandy Thomlinson and Clive Vertigans were in attendance as observers.

The meeting was held at the Humberside Fire and Rescue Service Headquarters.

The meeting commenced at 10.30am.

76/19 APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE - Apologies for absence were submitted from Councillors Davison, McMurray, Mumby-Croft, Nicola and Singh, and from Keith Hunter - Police and Crime Commissioner.

77/19 DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST - There were no declarations.

78/19 MINUTES - Resolved - That the minutes of the meeting of the Authority held on 30 September 2019 be received as a correct record and signed by the Chairperson.

79/19 QUESTIONS BY MEMBERS - There were no questions.

80/19 PETITIONS AND DEPUTATIONS - No petitions or requests for a deputation had been received.

81/19 COMMUNICATIONS - The following communications were received:

(i) Pilot Inspection(s) of the Fire and Rescue Authority Corporate Governance Arrangements - A letter from the Chair of Humberside Fire Authority to Zoë Billingham (of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services) dated 16 October 2019 was tabled. The letter detailed the Fire Authority's offer to participate in

pilot inspections of governance arrangements. A letter of acknowledgement from Zoë Billingham dated 22 October 2019 was also tabled.

(ii) Discount Rate for Unfunded Public-sector Pensions - A letter from the Chair of Humberside Fire Authority to Kit Malthouse MP (Minister of State for Crime, Policing and the Fire Service) dated 8 October 2019 was tabled. The letter sought assurance that the full grant relating to the Fire Fighters' Pension Scheme would be received by the Service in the 2020/21 financial year.

(iii) Local Government Finance Settlement 2020-21: Technical Consultation - The Service's response to the Local Government Finance Settlement 2020-21: Technical Consultation was tabled.

82/19 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTS 2019/20 - PERIOD ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 2019 - The Executive Director of Corporate Services/S.151 Officer submitted a report highlighting the current financial position of the Service based on information to 30 September 2019.

The end of year projections were set out for the revenue budget, the capital programme and the pensions account.

The summary estimated outturn position for the current financial year based on information to 30 September 2019 was as follows:

CATEGORY	2019/20 OUTTURN PROJECTION	
HFA		
Revenue Budget	£215k	overspend
Capital Programme	£4.49m	expenditure against £6.608m allocation
Pensions Account	£11.271m	deficit

Any significant in-year financial issues that arose between the reporting periods would be reported on an urgent basis as required to Members. Members took assurance from the report and the Authority's financial position for the period ending 30 September 2019.

Further details on all areas are available electronically alongside the agenda papers on the Fire Authority's website at www.humbersidefire.gov.uk/fire-authority.

Resolved - (a) That the report be received, and

(b) that a Members' Day be held in relation to the Service's budgets.

83/19 HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY AND POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONER FINANCE COLLABORATION - The Chief Fire Office/Chief Executive submitted a report that outlined the proposal for the collaboration of Humberside Fire Authority (HFA) and Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) Finance.

At the last meeting of the Authority (30 September 2019) a report was submitted that set out a proposed timetable for the collaboration of Humberside Fire Authority (HFA) and Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) Finance. This report outlined the proposal in more detail and sought approval from the Authority to commence the collaboration over the coming months, with a "go-live" date of 1 January 2020 subject to there being a vacancy in the PCC's Office for the Section 151 Officer role.

The decision to proceed with an HFA and PCC Finance collaboration would require agreements to be put in place. The first of those would be an overarching agreement between HFA and PCC that set out the broad intention to collaborate on Finance.

The second would be a three-way agreement between the individual postholder and the two organisations, essentially secondment agreements for the Executive Director of Corporate

Services/S.151 for the Authority and the PCC, and the Head of Finance for the Authority and the PCC.

There could not be more than one employer per employee under one contract of employment, so under this arrangement, the Authority's Section 151 Officer and Head of Finance would remain employed by the Authority and be effectively "loaned out" to the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC) to fulfil the OPCC's Section 151 Officer role.

The financial contribution received from the OPCC for the 0.4 Whole Time Equivalent (WTE) of the Head of Finance would be used as a cost envelope to strengthen the Authority's Finance team to ensure continuity and resilience. This was the arrangement that worked very successfully earlier in the year when the Authority's Head of Finance was seconded to the OPCC from 1 February 2019 to 31 July 2019 to assist with the production of the PCC's and Chief Constable's financial statements.

The annual cost to the PCC (subject to inflationary uplifts) would be circa £85,000 in order to cover the salary and oncost of 0.4 of the Authority's Section 151 Officer and 0.4 of the Authority's Head of Finance. Approximately £32,000 a year of the £85,000 received by the Authority from the PCC would be used to backfill and strengthen the arrangements in HFA's Finance Team.

In order to move the proposal to the next stage, subject to approval by the Authority and the PCC, the following timescales were anticipated, subject to the retirement date of the PCC's current Section 151 Officer:

- 28 November 2019 - The Police and Crime Panel meet to consider this proposal for the delivery of the PCC's Section 151 Officer role;

- 1 December 2019 - The Authority's Section 151 Officer and Deputy Section 151 Officer shadow the outgoing Chief Finance Officer at the OPCC;

- 1 January 2020 - The Authority's Section 151 Officer and Deputy Section 151 Officer formally take on the PCC Section 151 Officer and Deputy Section 151 Officer roles.

Resolved - (a) That the proposal for the collaboration of Humberside Fire Authority (HFA) and Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) Finance be approved, and

(b) that the decision be reviewed by the Fire Authority at the end of each financial year.

84/19 SERVICE IMPROVEMENT PLAN (SIP) - The Director of Service Improvement submitted a verbal report in relation to the Service Improvement Plan.

During its inspection, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services (HMICFRS) had rated the Service 'good' for Effectiveness, 'good' for Efficiency and 'requires improvement' for People and had identified 17 areas for improvement. The Service had developed an improvement plan (SIP) that accounted for all 17 areas identified by HMICFRS and another 13 identified by the Service itself in line with organisational health checks and its strategic direction. HMICFRS would not monitor the Service for improvement between inspections because no areas of concern had been identified during its inspection. Progress in relation to the SIP would be monitored by ongoing performance management processes, the Strategic Leadership Team (SLT), the Governance, Audit and Scrutiny (GAS) Committee and the Fire Authority.

HMICFRS had recently consulted on how it would operate its inspection programme for fire and rescue services, having inspected all services for the first time in three tranches. It would maintain its existing framework, which included ratings ranging from 'inadequate' to 'outstanding' in relation to a series of criteria. However, HMICFRS had indicated that it had received a good deal of feedback about how it had gathered information during its inspections and that it would amend its approach.

Of the 17 areas identified for improvement by HMICFRS, some were relatively simple to address and others, such as those relating to organisational culture, would require more time and

effort. For example, the Service had good welfare provision for staff, but HMICFRS had observed that some members of staff were unaware of what was available to them. This area for improvement had been quickly addressed through a corporate communications strategy including the distribution of business cards containing details of how staff could seek help.

Another point raised by HMICFRS was the burden of call-outs to false automatic alarm signals. The Service had adopted more robust procedures to monitor and challenge false alarms and had successfully reduced the number of attendances by between two and six per day. This would result in an overall reduction of between 30 and 40 percent.

HMICFRS had identified a need to engage more actively with local communities around risk assessment. Previous consultations in relation to this had yielded few responses but, more recently, nearly 1,000 responses had been received.

Significant work had gone into improving mental health provision for the Service's employees and assessing whether the right provision was available in the right places. A new programme had recently been established, offering psychotherapy to help employees living with mental health issues, such as trauma. Mental health provision remained subject to ongoing review, but progress in recent months had been positive.

The Chief Fire Officer & Chief Executive explained to the Authority that part of HMICFRS' attention during future inspections would be focussed on whether services, all of which would necessarily need to continue to work more efficiently, had been able to do so without compromising on the quality of service they delivered. The Service had been rated 'good' in relation to its efficiency, but finances remained challenging. The Service had, therefore, adopted a holistic approach in seeking to identify potential efficiency savings rather than reviewing areas of the service in isolation.

Resolved - (a) That the updated be received, and

(b) that Craig Drinkald of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services be thanked for his work with the Service during the inspection process.

Meeting closed at 11.45 am.

HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY

GOVERNANCE, AUDIT AND SCRUTINY COMMITTEE

11 NOVEMBER 2019

PRESENT: Independent Co-opted Members Mr D Chapman (Chairperson), Mr J Doyle, Mrs P Jackson, Mr A Smith, Mrs M Thomlinson and Mr C Vertigans

Councillors Briggs attended as an observer.

Miriam Heppell - Director of People and Development, Paul McCourt - Director of Service Delivery, Niall McKiniry - Director of Service Improvement, Martyn Ransom - Head of Finance, Simon Rhodes - Head of Corporate Assurance, Mathew Buckley - Monitoring Officer/Secretary, Samm Campbell - Committee Manager, Andrew McCulloch - Internal Audit (TIAA) and Ross Woodley - External Audit (Mazars) were also present.

The meeting was held at the Humberside Fire and Rescue Service Headquarters, Kingston upon Hull. Meeting commenced at 10.00 a.m.

PROCEDURAL

47/19 APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE - Apologies for absence were received from Mr M Allingham.

48/19 DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST - There were no declarations of interest.

49/19 MINUTES - ***Resolved*** - That the minutes of the meeting of the Committee held on 19 September 2019 be confirmed as a correct record.

50/19 MATTERS ARISING FROM THE MINUTES, OTHER THAN ON THE AGENDA - There were no matters arising from the minutes.

GOVERNANCE

51/19 UPDATE: MATTERS ARISING/FEEDBACK FROM FIRE AUTHORITY - The Monitoring Officer/Secretary provided a verbal update summarising the consideration given by the Authority at its meeting on 30 September 2019 to the draft minutes of the meeting of the Committee held on 19 September 2019 and also provided feedback on other items considered by the Fire Authority at its meetings of 30 September and 25 October 2019.

Resolved - That the report be received.

AUDIT

52/19 EXTERNAL AUDIT PROGRESS REPORT - Ross Woodley (Mazars) presented a report summarising the progress made in relation to external audit for 2019/20.

Of the seven national publications summarised in the report, three referred to the future of external audit in local authorities and fire and rescue services. In 2018/19, 40 percent of audit opinions had been submitted late as a result of financial uncertainty. The Service's own audit had, however, not been submitted late due to its proactive and cooperative approach.

Mazars was in the process of planning the 2019/20 audit, which would commence with on-site work in December 2019. The Audit Strategy Memorandum was due to be presented to the Committee at its meeting of 24 January 2020.

***Resolved* -** That the update be received.

53/19 INTERNAL AUDIT PROGRESS UPDATE - Andrew McCulluch (TIAA) submitted a report summarising the progress of TIAA's internal audit 2019/20.

Some audit activity had been delayed, but TIAA remained confident that it would complete its audit plan by the end of the year. An audit of the Service's fleet management had been undertaken and a judgement of 'reasonable assurance' had been achieved. TIAA had arrived at five recommendations following its audit of fleet management. The Committee queried the target implementation date, 31 December 2020, in relation to the recommendation to establish performance measurement thresholds. It seemed to the Committee that the date was not ambitious and that it did not align with the expressed intention to measure and manage performance from the beginning of the 2020/21 financial year. Andrew McCulloch agreed to revisit the implementation date with Service managers.

Resolved - (a) That the update be received,

(b) that the implementation date, 31 December 2020, in relation to the recommendation to establish performance measuring thresholds within fleet management be reviewed.

PERFORMANCE, RISK AND PROGRAMME MANAGEMENT

54/19 PERFORMANCE AND RISK REPORT (SECOND QUARTER 2019) - The Director of Service Improvement submitted a report summarising the Service's performance in the second quarter of 2019/20.

Prevention Performance	
Accidental Dwelling Fires	5.4% below 3 year average.
Other Accidental Fires (exc. Vehicles)	25.8% above 3 year average.
Deliberate Primary Fires	4.7% above 3 year average.
Deliberate Secondary Fires	1.8% above 3 year average.
Automatic Fire Alarms	5.3% below 3 year average.
Fatalities	0 fatalities (aspirational target 0)
Injuries	14 injuries (aspirational target 0)
Response Performance	
First engine response	7.54% better than target
Second engine response	11.13% better than target

Accidental dwelling fires remained lower than the three-year average. This was particularly positive as it was, statistically, one of the most life-threatening categories of fire. The 'other accidental fires' category had increased in relation to the three year average, but the number of incidents remained low and, following investigations, the underlying causes revealed no concerning trends. Deliberate vehicle fires had increased as a result of the ongoing issues around county-lines drug dealing.

In relation to the East Coast and Hertfordshire Control Room Project (ECHCR), operational tests were due to commence in the afternoon of 11 November 2019. The Project was a complex and critical piece of work, with the potential to achieve significant improvements and efficiencies. If tests were successful, it was possible that the ECHCR would be implemented within the following few weeks.

The Committee asked whether the days around 5 November 2019 (Bonfire Night) had resulted in a heightened number of incidents. The number of incidents on and around 5 November was significantly lower than in previous years. While inclement weather was likely to have been a contributing factor, a good deal of preparatory work had been undertaken by the Service and partner agencies (such as Humberside Police and the four local authorities), including clearing away potential bonfire material.

The Service had introduced a new rota and availability system which would allow it to manage individual employees' availability to populate rotas. This would make a labour-intensive process more efficient. A five-year contract had been awarded.

Resolved - That the report be received.

55/19 HEALTH AND SAFETY EXECUTIVE REPORT (SECOND QUARTER 2019) - The Director of Service Improvement submitted a report summarising the health and safety data for the second quarter of 2019/20.

During the second quarter of 2019/20, 21 incidents were reported that resulted in personal injury, compared to 29 during the same period in the previous year. As well as representing a 28 percent decrease in incidents from the previous year, this was also below the three-year average (26.3) for the same period. Of the incidents reported, 62 percent related to full-time firefighters, which was representative of the Service's employment profile and the nature of the work undertaken by operational staff. Near-miss reporting had reduced by 37 percent but, with 31 reported near-misses, still remained above the number of reported incidents. This was a positive indicator of improvements to the Service's safety culture.

Resolved - (a) That the report be received, and

(b) that an update on road-traffic collisions be received at a future meeting.

56/19 OPERATIONAL ASSURANCE REPORT (SECOND QUARTER 2019) - The Director of Service Improvement submitted a report summarising the operational assurance data for the second quarter of 2019/20.

Operational assurance was reported according to three areas: safety critical, areas of concern, and exceptional practice. Safety critical reports had reduced from nine in the first quarter to five in the second (45 percent reduction); areas of concern reports had reduced from 100 to 54 (46 percent reduction); and exceptional practice reports had risen from 130 to 202 (55 percent increase). The reduction in safety critical reports and the increase in exceptional practice reports indicated that the Service was performing well operationally. However, the Service would continue to highlight the importance of reporting safety critical practice as well as exceptional practice as they were equally important to the improvement of firefighter safety.

Resolved - That the report be received.

57/19 ABSENCE MANAGEMENT REPORT (SECOND QUARTER 2019) - The Director of People and Development presented a report summarising absence management data for the second quarter of 2019/20.

The Service had recently appointed a Head of Health and Wellbeing. The highest rate of absence had been in the Control Room due to a number of long-term sickness absences. Attendance had continued to improve among full-time firefighters, with an

attendance rate of 95.69 percent. Absence and attendance rates were summarised as follows:

	Sum of Days Lost	Establishment	Average Duty Days Lost per person	2019/20 annual target per person	YTD (annual divided by 12 x current month number
Control	317	29.5	10.75	8.70	4.35
Fire Staff	1175.43	174.82	6.72	10.00	5.00
On Call	556.20	343	1.62	7.00	3.5
Full Time	1846	468	3.94	7.00	3.5
total	**3894.63**	**1015.32**	**3.84**		

	2nd Quarter	2nd Quarter	2nd Quarter	Target attendance
	2017/18	**2018/19**	**2019/20**	
Full time	95.86%	96.55%	95.69%	95%
Control	90.71%	97.75%	88.26%	95%
Fire Staff	94.21%	96.53%	94.85%	97%

Mental health remained a priority and a concern for the Service, particularly in relation to non-operational staff. A psychotherapy service had been established on a trial basis. The number of long-term sickness absences was higher than during the same period in the previous year, but the issue was being addressed.

Resolved - That the report be received.

58/19 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTS PERIOD ENDING 30 SEPTEMBER 2019 - The Head of Finance provided a report summarising the management accounts for the period ending 30 September 2019.

The management accounts were summarised as follows:

CATEGORY	2019/20 OUTTURN PROJECTION
HFA	
Revenue Budget	£215k overspend
Capital Programme	£4.49m expenditure against £6.608m allocation
Pensions Account	£11.271m deficit

Budgetary pressures had persisted due to the fact that there had been fewer retirements than expected. The personal protection equipment (PPE) used by firefighters was due to be replaced as part of the Capital Programme. The contract for the PPE replacement was undergoing a competitive tendering process. There had been some significant slippage in relation to other Capital projects as they had been re-evaluated in the light of the estates partnership with Humberside Police. The Pensions Account had a budgeted deficit of £11.271m, which would be funded by the Home Office.

Resolved - That the report be received.

59/19 TREASURY MANAGEMENT HALF YEAR REPORT 2019/20 - The Head of Finance provided a report summarising treasury management for the first half of the 2019/20 financial year.

Treasury Management was defined in the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIFPA) Code of Practice 2009 as:

''The management of the organisation's investments and cash-flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions, the effective control of the risks associated with those activities and the pursuit of the optimum performance consistent with those risks.''

The Service had recovered more interest on its investments that expected:

Interest Earned April to September 2019	**Rate of return April to September 2019**	**Benchmark return at 30 September 2019***	**Difference (Favourable) April to September 2019**
£22k	0.63%	0.57%	(0.06%)

The Public Works Loans Board (PWLB) had recently taken a unilateral decision to increase its interest rates by one percent as a result of the high number of loans it was being asked to make.

Resolved - That the report be received.

60/19 FINAL ACCOUNTS TIMETABLE 2019/20 - The Head of Finance provided a report summarising the final accounts timetable for the 2019/20 financial year.

The process of finalising the accounts for 2019/20 was due to commence earlier than normal in order to assist the Authority's auditors. The timetable included regular meetings with the external auditor, Mazars, through to the completion of its audit activity in the summer of 2020.

Resolved - That the report be received.

61/19 HMICFRS INSPECTION UPDATE - The Head of Corporate Assurance provided the Committee with a verbal update in relation to Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Service's (HMICFRS).

HMICFRS had opened a consultation on its inspection framework for 2020. Following the consultation, it had been decided that it would continue to inspect fire and rescue services according to the same criteria with some changes of focus to the three pillars 'effectiveness', 'efficiency' and 'people'. The Service had posted a link to the consultation on its website (www.humbersidefire.gov.uk).

Resolved - That the update be received.

62/19 TRAINING, PROMOTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF OPERATIONAL AND NON-OPERATIONAL STAFF - The Director of People and Development submitted a report in response to the item, 'Training, Promotion and Development of Operation and Non-operational Staff', on the Committee's Scrutiny Programme 2019/20.

During HMICFRS' recent inspection of the Service, concerns about the equity of learning and development provision across different staff groups had been identified. In

addition, some staff members expressed concern through HMICFRS' survey about the promotion process for operational staff. The Committee had previously resolved to scrutinise this topic in order to provide challenge and assurance to the Service and the Fire Authority.

While the Service had been working to implement long-term changes in its staffing processes, progress had been hindered by the need to recruit to vacant posts under the Director of People and Development. These posts had recently been filled; the final post to have been filled was that of the Head of Health and Wellbeing.

Fundamentally, the issue with training and development had not been equity between operational and non-operational staff groups, but consistency. The Service would always need to prioritise training for operational staff due to the critical and dangerous nature of their roles (in relation to both themselves and residents of the Humberside area). However, as HMICFRS had observed, there was a need to ensure that training and development for non-operational staff was more structured and consistent.

The consistent use of performance development reviews (PDRs) had also been highlighted as an issue. In 2018, the Service had worked to ensure that PDRs were being used meaningfully. Some staff had not known how PDRs should be used and the completion rate had risen from 67 percent to 97 percent in 2019/20. However, research had shown that the quality of the conversations taking place in PDRs was significantly more important than the rate of completion. For this reason, the Service was working to ensure that line-managers were trained to conduct high quality PDRs. The current process was labour-intensive in relation to the administrative aspects of PDRs and the Service was working to automate as much of the administrative process as possible. PDRs had been moved to take place during the fourth quarter of each year to coincide with other end-of-year processes.

Since its inspection by HMICFRS, the Service had implemented a tiered Core Skills Framework. The first tier accounted for the fact that certain knowledge and skills were expected in relation to every post within the Service. The second tier detailed the knowledge and skills needed for each individual post. Together, both elements of the Core Skills Framework could be used to identify training needs for staff. The Service was also developing person specifications for use during recruitment processes. As a result of these pieces of work, every member of staff would understand which skills they would need to develop in order to progress or move into other roles.

The Service was in the process of delivering a significant training programme for senior and middle managers, having started with the Strategic Leadership Team (SLT). This would be followed by a programme of maintenance training on a quarterly basis.

There had been some differences in between the promotion processes used for operational and non-operational staff groups. While non-operational staff had been subject to a relatively standard approach to promotion, whereby roles were advertised and applied for, the operational staff group had made use of a variety of methods including promotion pools. The variety of methods used for operational roles had led to the submission of some grievances due to lack of clarity around the process. The Service would, therefore, use a standard, professional recruitment process in relation to both operational and non-operational roles. The Fire Brigade Union had agreed with this approach.

The Committee asked whether the Service encouraged the progression of high performing members of staff. The Service did not yet have a model in place, but the SLT had begun to consider its approach to talent management. The Service had been using the Apprenticeship Levy to help employees to develop their skills and knowledge, but the process had proven to be problematic and, often, more expensive than alternative training programmes.

The Committee considered that the ongoing work to address the recommendations made by HMICFRS during its inspection of the Service was promising and was keen to remain up-to-date on its progress.

Resolved - (a) That the report be received;

(b) that the Committee be updated with regard to progress against HMICFRS' recommendations relating to training, promotion and PDRs, and

(c) that the Committee consider whether to scrutinise this item again as part of its Scrutiny Programme 2020/21.

63/19 GAS COMMITTEE SCRUTINY PROGRAMME 2019/20 - The Committee Manager submitted a report summarising the Committee's Scrutiny Programme for 2019/20.

Resolved - That the Scrutiny Work Programme be received.

64/19 EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS/PUBLIC - Resolved - That the press and public be excluded from the meeting for consideration of the following item on the grounds that it involves the likely disclosure of exempt information as defined in paragraph 3 of Part 1 of Schedule 12A of the Local Government Act 1972.

In making its decision the Authority confirmed that having regard to all the circumstances it was satisfied that the public interest in maintaining the exemption outweighed the public interest in disclosing the information.

65/19 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COST RECOVERY MODEL FOR EMERGENCY MEDICAL RESPONSE - The Director of Service Improvement and the Service Delivery Manager presented a report in response to the Committee's revised scope for the scrutiny item 'Effectiveness of the Cost Recovery Model for Emergency Medical Response', including further details in relation to the Service's arrangements with East Midlands Ambulance Service.

Resolved - (a) That the report be received;

(b) that the Committee be updated in relation to the Service's review of its cost recovery model for Emergency Medical Response, and

(c) that the excellent and life-saving service offered as part of Emergency Medical Response be commended and supported.

Meeting closed at 12.30 pm.

Humberside Fire Authority
6 December 2019

Report by the Executive Director
Corporate Services & S.151 Officer

TREASURY MANAGEMENT MID-YEAR UPDATE REPORT 2019/20

SUMMARY

1. This report provides an update on the Authority's treasury management activities for the first half of the financial year 2019/20.

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. That Members consider the treasury management activities undertaken during the first half of 2019/20 and the Prudential Indicators as outlined in paragraphs 15 and 16 and detailed in Appendix 1.

BACKGROUND

3. Treasury Management, as defined by the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIFPA) Code of Practice 2009 is:

''The management of the organisation's investments and cash-flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions, the effective control of the risks associated with those activities and the pursuit of the optimum performance consistent with those risks.''

4. The Authority on 15 March 2019 approved the annual Treasury Management Policy Statement and agreed a range of Prudential Indicators aimed at ensuring effective treasury management and affordability of capital plans.

5. This report ensures compliance with recommended practice as outlined in the Code, by providing Members with an update on treasury management undertaken since the beginning of the financial year and highlighting key Prudential Indicator information.

INVESTMENT ACTIVITY

6. The Authority's temporary investments totalled £13.2m as at 30 September 2019, with a further £15k in the Authority's Special Interest Bearing Account (SIBA).

Table 1 – Investment income earned April to September 2019

Interest Earned April to September 2019	Rate of return April to September 2019	Benchmark return at 30 September 2019*	Difference (Favourable) April to September 2019
£22k	0.63%	0.57%	(0.06%)

* Benchmark set as 7 day compounded LIBID

7. The Authority's rate of return is in line with the benchmark return provided by Link Asset Services.

BORROWING

Short-Term Borrowing

8. The Authority has not taken any short-term borrowing in the first six months of the year. The Authority is unlikely to undertake short-term borrowing in the second half of the financial year.

Long-Term Borrowing

9. Long-term loans are taken out either to replace existing loans which have matured or to fund capital expenditure. Under the Prudential Regime there are no longer centrally imposed limits on borrowing, but individual Authorities are required to determine themselves what is a sustainable and affordable level of borrowing as an integral part of their Medium-Term Financial Planning processes.

10. The Authority's level of borrowing was £14.6m as at 30 September 2019, with an equated average rate of interest payable at 4.07%. An expected £635k of interest is projected to be payable on external debt for 2019/20.

11. The Authority has not undertaken any new long-term borrowing so far this financial year but this position will be reviewed in the second half of the financial year against the backdrop of interest rate changes and projections.

12. Limited opportunities for rescheduling of debt in order to secure savings in interest have been available given the prevailing market climate, thus no re-scheduling has been undertaken during the course of the financial year to date. The Authority continues to monitor the market in conjunction with its treasury management advisors with a view to capitalising on opportunities should they arise during the remainder of the year.

PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS

13. Appendix 1 details the Prudential Indicators agreed by Members at the Fire Authority on 15 March 2019 and shows for comparison the actual figures as at 30 September 2019.

14. During the period April to September 2019, the Authority operated wholly within the limits approved.

Capital Expenditure

15. The S.151 Officer considers the current capital programme to be affordable and sustainable with the revenue effects of capital investment built into the Medium-Term Financial Plan. Through the Medium-Term Financial Planning Process the Authority has ensured alignment of its capital resources to key strategic priorities.

Treasury Management

16. External debt is currently £15.6m below the agreed authorised limit for 2019/20 and the maturity structure for both borrowing and investments remain within the approved upper and lower limits. Subsequent borrowing or re-scheduling will take in to account prevailing interest rates on offer from the Public Works Loans Board, the current

maturity structure of loans, balanced with the need to reduce capital risk by maintaining prudently low levels of cash-balances.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

17. Treasury management is an integral part of the financial management of the Authority. Utilising approved borrowing and investment strategies will maximise investment income whilst minimising exposure to liquidity and market risks.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

18. The Authority's approach to investment of surplus funds is designed to further mitigate against potential losses as a consequence of counterparty failure and reflects a prudent approach to treasury management activity.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

19. The Authority must comply with the requirements of the CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management and the Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2008. This report ensures such compliance.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

20. No direct issues arise from this report.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

21. The application of and regular monitoring thereafter of a prudent Treasury Management Policy and related Prudential Indicators ensures that the Authority effectively manages financial risks such as exposure to interest rate changes, liquidity and market risk whilst minimising borrowing costs and maximising investment income. As an integral part of the financial planning process, it ensures that the financial plans upon which the Authority's Strategic Plan is based are effective and robust.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

22. No issues arising.

COMMUNICATIONS ACTIONS ARISING

23. No direct issues arising.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION

24. The Authority's current approved Treasury Management Strategy reflects guidance and market information supplied by the Authority's treasury management advisors.

BACKGROUND PAPERS

25. 'Treasury Management and Capital Expenditure Prudential Indicators, Treasury Management Policy Statement 2019/20 and Minimum Revenue Provision for 2019/20' – Report to Fire Authority 15 March 2019.
CIPFA Code of Practice on Treasury Management 2009
CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance - March 2009

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

26. That Members consider the treasury management activities undertaken during the first half of 2019/20 and the Prudential Indicators as outlined in paragraphs 15 and 16 and detailed in Appendix 1.

K WILSON

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Executive Director Corporate Services & S.151 Officer

Humberside Fire & Rescue Service Headquarters
Summergroves Way
Kingston upon Hull

SE/JP
27 November 2019

Appendix 1

Prudential Indicators as at 30 September 2019

Indicator 1 - Capital Expenditure

The actual capital expenditure for the current year compared to the original estimate and revised budget, together with estimates of expenditure to be incurred in future years are shown below:

	2018/19 Actual £k	2019/20 Budget £k	2019/20 Revised £k	2020/21 Estimate £k	2021/22 Estimate £k	2022/23 Estimate £k
Total Capital expenditure	2,971	6,608	4,490	1,473	3,579	3,410

The revised 2019/20 figure reflects the latest estimate of spend, as reported to members in the monthly 'Management Accounts' report in September 2019.

Indicator 2 - Capital Financing Requirement

The capital financing requirement for 2019/20 and estimates for future years are as follows:-

	Actual 31/03/19 £k	Estimate 31/03/20 £k	Estimate 31/03/21 £k	Estimate 31/03/22 £k	Estimate 31/03/23 £k
Capital Financing Requirement	15,851	18,545	19,260	20,245	20,945
Lease - Integrated Care Centre*	979	966	951	936	919
Total CFR	16,830	19,511	20,211	21,181	21,864

*This has been revised to reflect the accounting treatment of the ICC lease

The capital financing requirement measures the Authority's need to borrow for capital purposes. In accordance with best professional practice, the Humberside Fire Authority does not associate borrowing with particular items or types of expenditure. The Authority has, at any point in time, a number of cash flows both positive and negative, and manages its treasury position in terms of its borrowings and investments in accordance with its approved Strategy. In day to day cash management, no distinction can be made between revenue cash and capital cash. External borrowing arises as a consequence of all the financial transactions of the authority and not simply those arising from capital spending. In contrast, the capital financing requirement reflects the Authority's underlying need to borrow for a capital purpose.

A key indicator of prudence under the Prudential Code is: -

"In order to ensure that over the medium term net borrowing will only be for a capital purpose, the local authority should ensure that net external borrowing does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the capital financing requirement in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional capital financing requirement for the current and next two financial years".

The S151 Officer reports that the Authority has had no difficulty meeting this requirement during the course of this financial year and no difficulties are envisaged in future years. This takes into account current commitments, existing plans and the proposals contained in the Medium Term-Financial Plan.

Indicator 3 – Core Funds and Expected Investment Balances

The table below shows the estimates of the year-end balances for each resource and anticipated day-to-day cash flow balances.

	2019/20 Original £k	2019/20 Revised £k	2020/21 Estimate £k	2021/22 Estimate £k	2022/23 Estimate £k
Fund Balances / Reserves	9,778	9,961	9,221	8,569	7,955
Capital Receipts	30	30	30	30	30
Total Core Funds	**9,808**	**9,991**	**9,251**	**8,599**	**7,985**
Working Capital	(4,000)	(4,000)	(4,000)	(4,000)	(4,000)
(Under)/Over Borrowing	(3,955)	(4,016)	(2,565)	(3,487)	(4,195)
Expected Investments	**1,853**	**1,975**	**2,686**	**1,112**	**(210)**

The actual total investments held as at 30th September 2019 is £13.2m. This is higher than the expected investments due to the Pensions grant of which 80% was received in July 2019 which is drawn upon each month.

Indicator 4 - Operational Boundary for External Debt

The proposed operational boundary for external debt is based on the same estimates as the authorised limit but reflects directly the S151 Officer's estimate of the most likely, prudent but not worst case scenario, without the additional headroom included within the authorised limit to allow for example for unusual cash movements, and equates to the maximum of external debt projected by this estimate. The operational boundary represents a key management tool for in year monitoring by the S151 Officer.

	2019/20 Boundary £k	Actual As at 30/09/19 £k	2020/21 Boundary £k	2021/22 Boundary £k	2022/23 Boundary £k
Borrowing	21,600	14,574	21,600	21,600	21,600
Other Long Term Liabilities	3,500	972	3,500	3,500	3,500
	25,100	15,546	25,100	25,100	25,100

The S151.Officer confirms that borrowing in the year has not exceeded the operational boundary at any point within the year to date and is not expected to do so over the course of the next period based on information currently available.

Indicator 5 - Authorised Limit for External Debt

The table below shows the Authorised limit for External Debt for 2018/19 and subsequent three year period as approved by Members, compared to the actual level of borrowing as at 30 September 2019.

	2018/19 Limit £k	Actual as at 30/09/19 £k	2019/20 Limit £k	2020/21 Limit £k	2021/22 Limit £k
Borrowing	27,600	14,574	27,600	27,600	27,600
Other Long Term Liabilities	3,500	972	3,500	3,500	3,500
	31,100	15,546	31,100	31,100	31,100

The Authorised Limit reflects the Authority's projected long and short term borrowing requirements, together with any other long-term liabilities it may have. The figures are based on the estimate of most likely, prudent but not worst case scenario, with sufficient headroom over and above this to allow for operational management of, for example unusual cash movements.

The S151 Officer confirms that the Authorised Limit has not been approached at any point during the first half of the year, nor is it likely to during the remaining six months of 2019/20.

Indicator 6 - Ratio of Capital Financing Costs to Net Revenue Stream

The ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream for the current year and estimates for future years are as follows: -

	2018/19 Actual %	2019/20 Original %	2019/20 Revised %	2020/21 Estimate %	2021/22 Estimate %	2022/23 Estimate %
Ratio of Financial Costs to Net Revenue Stream	5.63	5.71	5.58	6.27	6.25	6.43

These ratios indicate the proportion of the net budget of the Authority that is required to finance the costs of capital expenditure in any year. Estimates of financing costs include current commitments and the proposals contained in the capital programme of the Authority.

In calculating the ratio, Net Revenue Streams in any year have been taken to exclude any element of the net budget requirement that is intended to provide reserves for the Authority.

The projected increase in the ratio over the period reflects the increase in capital financing costs resulting from the capital allocations approved as part of the medium-term financial plan.

Indicator 7 – Upper and Lower Limits for the maturity structure of borrowings

This indicator seeks to ensure the Authority controls its exposure to the risk of interest rate changes by limiting the proportion of debt maturing in any single period. Ordinarily debt is replaced on maturity and therefore it is important that the Authority is not forced to replace a large proportion of loans at a time of relatively high interest rates.

"The Authority will set for the forthcoming financial year both upper and lower limits with respect to the maturity structure of its borrowings. The prudential indicators will be referred to as the upper and lower limits respectively for the maturity structure of borrowing and shall be calculated as follows:

Amount of projected borrowing that is fixed rate maturing in each period expressed as a percentage of total projected borrowing that is fixed rate;

Where the periods in question are:

- Under 12 months
- 12 months and within 24 months
- 24 months and within 5 years
- 5 years and within 10 years
- 10 years and above"

	Actual as at 30/09/19	Upper Limit	Lower Limit
	%	%	%
Under 12 Months	7.16	15	0
12 months and within 24 months	4.35	15	0
24 months and within 5 years	22.14	30	0
5 years and within 10 years	32.04	60	0
10 years and above	34.31	80	0

The S151. Officer confirms that the maturity structure of external debt as at 30/09/19 is within the upper and lower limits approved by the Authority.

Agenda Item No. 9

Humberside Fire Authority
6 December 2019

Report by the Executive Director
Corporate Services/S.151 Officer

FINANCIAL PLANNING 2020/21 ONWARDS

SUMMARY

1. This report considers the Authority's Revenue Budget for the period 2020/21 onwards.

2. The current financial position of the Authority is sound but there will continue to be significant challenges to this in the medium-term from what is now a very uncertain financial planning environment.

3. The report sets out the Service's financial planning through to 2023/24 and the assumptions applied to arrive at the position shown.

4. The requirement to make some further efficiencies will continue into the medium-term.

5. The report also sets out the likely timescales for the precept/council tax consultation for 2020/21.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. That Members note the report and the financial challenges for the period 2020/21 onwards and that the precept/council tax report be considered at the February 2020 Authority meeting.

2020/21 ONWARDS

7. Appendix 1 of this report sets out the latest position on the Authority's Revenue Budget for 2020/21 onwards.

8. The key assumptions that have been incorporated into the budget are included in the table below.

Table 1
Assumptions applied to the Medium-Term Financial Plan 2020/21 to 2023/24

	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24
Pay Awards	2%	2%	2%	2%
Council Tax *	1.95%	1.95%	1.95%	1.95%
Taxbase	Estimated	1.35%	1.35%	1.35%
Business Rates	3%	3%	3%	3%
External Grant	+1.6%	0%	0%	0%
Non-pay inflation				
- Rates	3%	3%	3%	3%
- Fuel	5%	5%	5%	5%
- Insurance	5%	5%	5%	5%

* As a planning assumption for the years beyond 2020/21, an increase on the precept/council tax has been assumed of 1.95%. The final decision on council tax for 2020/21 will be taken by Members at the 10 February 2020 Fire Authority meeting.

9. Appendix 1 sets out a broadly balanced budget over the medium-term to 2023/24 but there are some important assumptions applied and points to note as part of this as follows:-

Pay awards

Annual increases in pay of 2% have been assumed as part of the financial model. Members will be aware that a 17% increase in pay for firefighter roles has been tabled by the Employee Side as part of ongoing discussions. Clearly any pay award above the 2% annual increase level that is not funded by Government will require further efficiencies to be made by the Service.

Employer Pension Contributions

Some Members will recall the discussion from the October 2018 HFA meeting on the issue of a significant increase in employer pension contributions to the Firefighters' Pension Scheme.

The arrangements for 2019/20 have meant that 90% of the £2.79m increase has been funded by Government via grant. The Service has continued to actively lobby on this issue for 2020/21 and have written to the Minister of State for Crime, Policing and the Fire Service, Kit Malthouse, to seek reassurance on the arrangement for 2020/21.

Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) 2020

The CSR 2020 announced in September 2019 covers only one year (2020/21).

The Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) announcement indicated an inflationary uplift in Government grant to FRAs (which is anticipated to be 1.6%) and a precept increase ceiling of 2% for 2020/21.

More immediately, the Provisional Local Government Finance Settlement for 2020/21 is anticipated in December 2019, or maybe even in early January 2020. Members will be updated at the 6 December 2019 HFA meeting on the outcome, if an announcement has been made by that point.

Fire Funding Formula Review

The Government has announced a review of the grant mechanism that is used to distribute funding from Government to Fire and Rescue Services. No further details are known at this stage but the current understanding is that any new formula will not be introduced until 2021/22 at the earliest.

EU Exit

Two aspects may impact here with a possible deterioration in public finances at a national level and also an increase in supplier costs for certain items and commodities.

PRECEPT/COUNCIL TAX CONSULTATION 2020/21

10. The assumption is that the 2% level will be in place for 2019/20 so after the release of the Provisional Local Government Finance Settlement in December or early January we will commence a council tax/precept consultation for 2020/21.

12. The consultation will be web-based with articles in the local press and on social media to highlight the process.

CONCLUSION

13. In summary therefore, the key dates between now and budget setting in February 2020 are as follows:-

- **December 2019 Or early January 2020** - Provisional Local Government Finance Settlement 2020/21
- **6 December 2019** - HFA meeting will consider MTFP update and headlines from the December provisional Local Government Finance Settlement (if an announcement has been made).
- **Early January 2020** - Council Tax consultation commences
- **Late January 2020** - Council Tax consultation closes
- **Early February 2020** - Final Local Government Finance Settlement 2020/21
- **10 February 2020** - Budget and Precept 2020/21 including Council Tax consultation feedback – Report to HFA

14. The Authority's financial position remains sound, however significant challenges will occur in the period 2020 to 2024 and to that end it is essential that the Authority continues to carefully identify efficiencies and maximise its funding wherever possible

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

15. The Authority's Medium-Term Financial Plan dovetails with the Strategic Plan and IRMP.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

16. The position for the medium-term will be kept under continuous review with regular reports from the Authority's S.151 Officer.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

17. Statutorily the Authority must set a balanced budget. Part of this process also requires the S.151 Officer to comment on the 'robustness of the estimates', 'the adequacy of reserves' and the 'in-year budget monitoring arrangements'.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

18. The Authority has always maintained that compulsory redundancy will be an absolute last resort and this will continue to be the position throughout the oncoming period.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

19. Setting a sustainable and prudent budget for the Authority is fundamental in mitigating one of the key risks in the Strategic Risk Register.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

20. No direct issues arising.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

21. Key messages on the Authority's financial position that were outlined at the September and October 2019 Fire Authority have been communicated to all staff.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION AND/OR COLLABORATION

22. The key messages within this report have been discussed at SLT as a backdrop for future service planning.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

23. Budget and MTFP reports to September and October HFA meetings.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

24. That Members note the report and the financial challenges for the period 2020/21 onwards and that the precept/council tax report be considered at the February 2020 Authority meeting.

K WILSON

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Humberside Fire & Rescue Service
Summergroves Way
Kingston upon Hull

HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY
REVENUE ESTIMATES 2020/21
ESTIMATE SUMMARY 1.949% PRECEPT INCREASE

	Budget Proposal 2020/21 £	Budget Proposal 2021/22 £	Budget Proposal 2022/23 £	Budget Proposal 2023/24 £
Community Fire Safety	3,212,929	3,271,850	3,318,602	3,379,936
Fire Fighting & Rescue Operations	28,734,103	28,906,377	29,625,607	30,191,719
Management & Support Services	11,864,953	12,060,082	12,146,571	12,515,439
Corporate & Democratic Core				
Democratic Representation & Management	154,019	155,398	156,790	158,197
Corporate Management	39,104	39,495	39,890	40,288
Net Cost of Service	**44,005,108**	**44,433,202**	**45,287,460**	**46,285,579**
Interest Payable and Similar Charges	661,155	658,379	658,679	623,408
Less - Interest Receivable	(60,000)	(60,000)	(60,000)	(60,000)
Net Operating Expenditure	44,606,263	45,031,581	45,886,139	46,848,987
Amounts included in the Income & Expenditure Account but required by statute to be excluded when determining the Movement on the General Fund Balance for the year :				
Depreciation and Impairment of Fixed Assets	(1,958,844)	(1,958,844)	(1,958,844)	(1,958,844)
Grants & Contributions Deferred Amortisation	-	-	-	-
Amounts not included in the Income & Expenditure Account but required by statute to be included when determining the Movement on the General Fund Balance for the year :				
Minimum Revenue Provision	1,445,663	1,511,521	1,638,080	1,757,162
Revenue Contributions to Capital Outlay	600,000	1,000,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
Transfers to or from Fund Balances that are required to be taken into account when determining the Movement on the General Fund Balance				
Contribution to/(from) Earmarked Reserves	-	-	-	-
Contribution to/(from) General Reserve	70,235	79,384	27,355	(95,968)
Budget Requirement	44,763,317	45,663,642	46,592,730	47,551,337
Financed by :				
Grant Funding	17,098,828	17,098,828	17,098,828	17,098,828
Business Rates received from Local Authority	3,656,073	3,765,755	3,878,728	3,995,090
Business Rate Fund Surplus/(Deficit)	(50,000)	(50,000)	(50,000)	(50,000)
Collection Fund Surplus/(Deficit)	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000
Precept	23,758,416	24,549,059	25,365,174	26,207,419
	44,763,317	45,663,642	46,592,730	47,551,337

HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY
REVENUE ESTIMATES 2020/21
ESTIMATE SUMMARY 1.949% PRECEPT INCREASE

COMMUNITY FIRE SAFETY

	Budget Proposal 2020/21 £	Budget Proposal 2021/22 £	Budget Proposal 2022/23 £	Budget Proposal 2023/24 £
EXPENDITURE				
Employees				
Wholetime	614,477	626,755	639,293	652,078
Retained	12,799	13,055	13,316	13,583
Non-Operational	2,370,357	2,417,764	2,466,119	2,515,441
Indirect Employees	47,500	47,500	47,500	47,500
Premises				
Repairs & Maintenance	-	-	-	-
Transport				
Direct Transport Costs	-	-	-	-
Contract Hire & Operating Leases	-	-	-	-
Supplies & Services				
Equipment, Furniture & Materials	221,923	221,923	221,923	221,923
Catering	2,945	2,945	2,945	2,945
Printing, Stationery & General Office Expenses	2,334	2,334	2,334	2,334
Services	9,500	9,500	9,500	9,500
Communications & Computing	4,098	4,098	4,098	4,098
Expenses	14,392	14,392	14,392	14,392
Grants & Subscriptions	1,605	1,605	1,605	1,605
Miscellaneous	10,654	10,654	10,654	10,654
Support Services				
Management & Support Services	-	-	-	-
Non Pay Efficiency Savings	(8,024)	(8,024)	(21,396)	(21,396)
Capital Charges	10,349	10,349	10,349	10,349
Total Expenditure	3,314,909	3,374,850	3,422,632	3,485,006
INCOME				
Government Grants	-	-	-	-
Other Grants & Contributions	-	-	-	-
Customer & Client Receipts				
Fees & Charges	(101,980)	(103,000)	(104,030)	(105,070)
Total Income	(101,980)	(103,000)	(104,030)	(105,070)
Net Expenditure	**3,212,929**	**3,271,850**	**3,318,602**	**3,379,936**

HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY
REVENUE ESTIMATES 2020/21
ESTIMATE SUMMARY 1.949% PRECEPT INCREASE

FIRE FIGHTING & RESCUE OPERATIONS

	Budget Proposal 2020/21 £	Budget Proposal 2021/22 £	Budget Proposal 2022/23 £	Budget Proposal 2023/24 £
EXPENDITURE				
Employees				
Wholetime	19,836,266	19,913,018	20,496,187	20,906,112
Retained	4,767,606	4,862,958	4,960,217	5,059,421
Control	1,254,038	1,279,097	1,304,679	1,330,773
Non-Operational	141,653	144,486	147,375	150,323
Indirect Employees	71,306	72,732	74,187	75,671
Premises				
Repairs & Maintenance	-	-	-	-
Energy Costs	-	-	-	-
Rent, Rates & Water	754,906	777,553	800,880	824,906
Transport				
Operating leases	-	-	-	-
Car Allowances & Public Transport	-	-	-	-
Supplies & Services				
Equipment, Furniture & Materials	211,301	213,506	215,821	218,252
Catering	140	140	140	140
Clothing, Uniforms & Laundry	-	-	-	-
Printing, Stationery & General Office Expenses	190	190	190	190
Services	-	-	-	-
Communications	810,464	756,464	790,464	790,464
Expenses	8,037	8,037	8,037	8,037
Grant & Subscriptions	475	475	475	475
Miscellaneous	190	190	190	190
Support Services				
Management & Support Services	-	-	-	-
Non Pay Efficiency Savings	(35,485)	(35,485)	(86,251)	(86,251)
Capital Charges	1,497,016	1,497,016	1,497,016	1,497,016
Total Expenditure	29,318,103	29,490,377	30,209,607	30,775,719
INCOME				
Government Grants	(114,000)	(114,000)	(114,000)	(114,000)
Other Grants & Contributions	(370,000)	(370,000)	(370,000)	(370,000)
Customer & Client Receipts				
Fees & Charges	-	-	-	-
Rents	(100,000)	(100,000)	(100,000)	(100,000)
Total Income	(584,000)	(584,000)	(584,000)	(584,000)
Net Expenditure	**28,734,103**	**28,906,377**	**29,625,607**	**30,191,719**

HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY
REVENUE ESTIMATES 2020/21
ESTIMATE SUMMARY 1.949% PRECEPT INCREASE

FIRE SERVICE EMERGENCY PLANNING

EXPENDITURE				
Employees				
Indirect Employees	-	-	-	-
Supplies & Services				
Equipment, Furniture & Materials	-	-	-	-
	-	-	-	-
INCOME				
Government Grants	-	-	-	-
Net Expenditure	-	-	-	-

HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY
REVENUE ESTIMATES 2020/21
ESTIMATE SUMMARY 1.949% PRECEPT INCREASE

MANAGEMENT & SUPPORT SERVICES

	Budget Proposal 2020/21 £	Budget Proposal 2021/22 £	Budget Proposal 2022/23 £	Budget Proposal 2023/24 £
EXPENDITURE				
Employees				
Wholetime	2,990,156	3,125,984	3,188,508	3,252,280
Non-Operational	4,237,444	4,315,632	4,395,365	4,476,674
Other Pension Costs	607,442	617,271	627,297	637,523
Indirect Employees inc. Training	622,437	624,408	626,420	628,472
Employee Related Insurances	196,350	206,167	216,476	227,300
Premises				
Repairs & Maintenance	1,584,473	1,661,273	1,741,732	1,826,397
Energy	-	-	-	-
Rent, Rates & Water	299,496	311,453	323,917	336,911
Other Premises Costs	28,748	28,748	28,748	28,748
Premises Insurance	76,103	79,908	83,903	88,098
Transport				
Direct Transport Costs	1,557,763	1,601,205	1,646,130	1,692,599
Contract Hire & Operating Leases	-	-	-	-
Car Allowances & Public Transport	82,878	82,878	82,878	82,878
Transport Insurance	131,250	137,813	144,704	151,939
Supplies & Services				
Equipment, Furniture & Materials	158,435	158,435	158,435	158,435
Catering	7,599	7,599	7,599	7,599
Clothing, Uniforms & Laundry	581,519	356,519	356,519	356,519
Printing, Stationery & General Office Expenses	2,370	2,370	2,370	2,370
Services	37,970	37,970	37,970	37,970
Communications & Computing	1,594,567	1,640,493	1,688,028	1,737,232
Expenses	37,550	37,550	37,550	37,550
Grants & Subscriptions	35,843	35,843	35,843	35,843
Miscellaneous	25,820	25,820	25,820	25,820
Support Services				
Support Services	199,381	199,381	199,381	199,381
Capital Charges	451,479	451,479	451,479	451,479
Non Pay Efficiency Savings	(129,849)	(129,849)	(400,196)	(400,196)
Contingency	-	-	-	-
Total Expenditure	15,417,224	15,616,350	15,706,876	16,079,821

	Budget Proposal 2020/21 £	Budget Proposal 2021/22 £	Budget Proposal 2022/23 £	Budget Proposal 2023/24 £
INCOME				
Government Grants	(3,152,579)	(3,152,579)	(3,152,579)	(3,152,579)
Customer & Client Receipts				
Sales	-	-	-	-
Fees & Charges	-	-	-	-
Rents	-	-	-	-
Other Grants and Contributions	(399,692)	(403,689)	(407,726)	(411,803)
Administration & Management recharge				
Administration & Management Recharge	-	-	-	-
Total Income	(3,552,271)	(3,556,268)	(3,560,305)	(3,564,382)
Net Expenditure	**11,864,953**	**12,060,082**	**12,146,571**	**12,515,439**

HUMBERSIDE FIRE AUTHORITY
REVENUE ESTIMATES 2020/21
ESTIMATE SUMMARY 1.949% PRECEPT INCREASE

CORPORATE & DEMOCRATIC CORE

	Budget Proposal 2020/21 £	Budget Proposal 2021/22 £	Budget Proposal 2022/23 £	Budget Proposal 2023/24 £
DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION & MANAGEMENT				
EXPENDITURE				
Transport				
Public Transport	249	249	249	249
Car Allowances	4,140	4,140	4,140	4,140
Supplies & Services				
Members Allowances	128,647	129,934	131,234	132,547
Travel & Subsistence	9,183	9,275	9,367	9,461
Grants & Subscriptions	11,800	11,800	11,800	11,800
Support Services				
Support Services	-	-	-	-
Departmental Administration				
Departmental Administration	-	-	-	-
Total Expenditure	**154,019**	**155,398**	**156,790**	**158,197**

CORPORATE MANAGEMENT

EXPENDITURE				
Supplies & Services				
Audit Fees	33,664	34,001	34,341	34,684
Support Services				
Support Services	5,440	5,494	5,549	5,604
Departmental Administration				
Departmental Administration	-	-	-	-
Total Expenditure	**39,104**	**39,495**	**39,890**	**40,288**

Humberside Fire Authority
06 December 2019

Report by the Director of Service Support Delivery

CAPITAL PROGRAMME 2020/21 ONWARDS - VEHICLES, ESTATES AND INFORMATION COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY (ICT)

SUMMARY

1. This report sets out for approval the proposed capital programme for vehicles, estates and ICT for 2020/21 onwards.

2. The programme has been approved by SLT at their meeting on 25th November 2019.

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. That Members approve the capital programme for Vehicles, Estates and ICT for 2020/21 onwards and that it is incorporated into the Medium-Term Financial Plan 2020/21 to 2023/24 to be considered at the 10th February 2020 Fire Authority meeting.

VEHICLE REPLACEMENT PROGRAMME 2020/21 ONWARDS

4. In the last 12 months, the Service has taken delivery of our 45m Aerial Ladder Platform (ALP), this was built by Bronto in Finland and the bodywork completed by Angloco in West Yorkshire, it was delivered and put into Service during November, after being showcased at this year's Emergency Services Show. We are also anticipating the delivery of 14 new FDS cars coming into Service during January 2020.

5. A detailed review of the vehicle replacement programmes, has seen £2.1m re allocated from 2022/23 into 2023/23 onwards. This reflects the Service's commitment to maximising the use of assets in keeping with our Strategic Plan and requirement under HMICFRS. This is mainly attributed to extending the life of frontline appliances, as well as the analysis of vehicle condition reports, these results have shown that Scania chassis are lasting longer than other chassis used in the past.

6. The rolling programme of vehicle replacement, equipment and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is summarised below.

   N.B. The £50k Operational Equipment for appliances, in previous year reports have been shown under Heavy Vehicles, these figures have now been moved into the Equipment/PPE section.

7. Further work is also being undertaken around carbon neutral vehicles; it is likely in the short/midterm this will result in an increase in capital funding against a longer-term saving. A specific report detailing the finding of this work will be submitted to the Authority in due course.

8. The Fleet and Equipment programme is as follows:

	2020/21 (£)	2021/22 (£)	2022/23 (£)	2023/24 (£)
Heavy Vehicles	0.07m	1.96m	0.14m	1.64m
Light vehicles	0.4m	0.222m	0.215m	0.309m
Equipment / PPE	0.177m	0.355m	0.042m	0.328m
Total **All vehicles & Equipment/PPE**	**0.647m**	**2.537m**	**0.397m**	**2.277m**

ESTATES 2020/21 ONWARDS

11. The Joint Estates Service (JES), formed by the merger of estates teams from Humberside Fire and Rescue Service (HFRS) and Humberside Police (HP) is now in its second year of operation. Although there was some initial slippage on the delivery of the estate's capital programme, detailed planning stages across the majority of schemes are now either complete or nearing completion with a number of schemes having now commenced on site or scheduled to do so early in the New Year.

12. Plans for the new Clough Road training facility, to be constructed on land adjacent to the station, were revisited due to tenders again exceeding the available budget. Revised plans have consequently been prepared, based closely on South Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service's Sheffield Parkway facility. Planning permission is in place for the updated scheme, following negotiation with Hull City Council to agree an amendment. Following a value engineering process, the 'design & build' contract was awarded in October. Preliminary design work on steelwork, foundation and services has commenced. There are anticipated delays in delivery of the concrete cladding panels, therefore, a revised programme is being finalised to reflect a start on site in the new year and completion in April 2020.

13. Detailed plans have been finalised for the programme of works to improve privacy and dignity provisions at Beverley, Market Weighton, Calvert Lane and Barton Stations. The first two stages of work are complete at Beverley, with tenders now received for the other three schemes. Tender evaluation has commenced with a programmed start on site in January and completion at the end of March (Market Weighton and Barton) and April for Calvert Lane.

14. Plans for the station refurbishment schemes at Bridlington and Scunthorpe have now been developed, signed off and due to go out to tender in early December. The key focus of the schemes is to improve dignity and privacy provisions on station, as well as overall modernisation works. Temporary logistics plans are being developed in conjunction with Station Managers with a view to works commencing in the second half of February on station.

15. The programme of improvement works to training facilities including SHQ Operational Training facility and Breathing Apparatus chambers at Bridlington, Scunthorpe and Grimsby was completed during the course of the year. Post-completion, some issues have arisen with the new heating installations which are currently being addressed in conjunction with the contractor and external specialist consultants. The installation is still within the defect liability period.

16. First stage plans have now been drawn up for the Goole Station refurbishment and are currently out for consultation with crews. The first phase of works is scheduled to commence during December, with subsequent phases to be scheduled in during the early part of 2020 to reduce the operational impact.

17. The revised programme of works at SHQ, including remedial works to the car park, provision of accessible W/C facilities on the ground floor and other minor improvement works has commenced on site. The overflow car park is now complete, with the other internal elements to be completed during the current financial year.

18. Design and specification work are now complete and works are out to tender for the SHQ and Beverley Boiler replacement scheme. Works will be scheduled for spring to avoid disruption to building users during the winter months.

19. JES has been continuing to work alongside operational teams from both HFRS, HP and Yorkshire Ambulance Service (YAS), to develop plans for two co-location schemes on fire station sites at Driffield and Pocklington. Legal proceedings to rectify the boundary issue at Pocklington are progressing. Detailed plans and specifications are currently being drawn up for both schemes, although the requirements for HP may need revisiting following the Government's announcements on additional policing. Feasibility work is also underway to explore the potential of utilising the vacant administrative block at Bransholme as a base for HP's local policing team and YAS's local response teams.

20. Options for Howden Fire Station aimed at resolving issues around dignity and condition were presented to SLT in August. Following consideration, SLT requested further feasibility work to be undertaken on the potential move to the HP site on Bellcross Lane. Depending on the outcomes of this work, which is due shortly, there may be a need to allocate additional funding to the project.

21. The block allocation for 2020/21 has been earmarked for essential condition survey works, to include roof replacements at Bridlington and Calvert Lane Fire Stations.

22. An additional allocation of £260k has been included within the programme to facilitate a number of 'spend to save' schemes, including replacement of inefficient boiler and heating systems across the estate and a lighting upgrade at SHQ. This reflects the Service's commitment to sustainability and the environment. Some additional funding for dignity related works may be required, in keeping with our commitment to equality and maintaining a healthy workplace, will be necessitated however at present the extent/scope of these works at Immingham East and Winterton cannot be confirmed.

23. The Capital programme for estates is as follows:

Scheme	**2020/21 £k**	**2021/22 £k**	**2022/23 £k**	**2023/24 £k**
Howden re-modelling	200			
Bridlington & Calvert Roof replacements	200			
Block Allocation	-	500	500	700
Spend to save schemes	260			
Total budget	**660**	**500**	**500**	**700**

ICT 2020/21 ONWARDS

24. The core ICT Replacement Programme has been brought together with the agile/flexible working programme to ensure that replacement equipment is agile ready. This means that the maximum use and value can be obtained from all ICT equipment. It should be noted that the move to hosted systems means that great pressure is placed on the revenue budget releasing pressure moving forward on the capital budget.

25. Emergency Services Network (ESN) is replacement for the Airwave radio scheme currently in use for operational communications. ESN will provide a range of voice and data capabilities not currently available through the existing Airwave system. Transitional funding is expected on a 'like for like' basis, but may fall short of the requirements necessary to leverage the full potential so it continues to be part of the ICT capital programme.

26. Data Centre and core network equipment will need to continue to be upgraded as part of a regular programme, particularly in response to cyber-security threats, the need for resilience and to ensure that there remains enough capacity for critical business processes. While hosting options for applications are now actively pursued, it will be essential to maintain some 'on premises' facilities.

27. A number of business applications are approaching the end of their useful life and need to be replaced to support different ways of working, which enable better efficiency. The ICT Capital Programme continues to set out such as will need to be replaced in the life of this ICT Capital Programme and so funding has been assigned to cover this cost.

28. The ICT Capital Programme is as follows:

	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24
Core ICT Replacement Programme	£175k	£250k	£250k	£250k
Emergency Services Network (ESN)	£100k	-	-	
Data Centre Hardware Upgrade	£150k	£150k	£100k	£100k
Information systems Upgrades and Development	£175k	£175k	£175k	£175k
Total	**£600k**	**£575k**	**£525k**	**£525k**

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

29. The capital replacement programme meets the Service's strategic objective of making the most of the resources that it has.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

30. The financial impact of the proposals is detailed in the report. Subject to approval of the recommendations contained within the report, the financial effect of the proposals will be incorporated into the Authority's revenue and capital plans for 2020/21 onwards that will be presented for consideration and final approval at the Fire Authority in February 2020.

31. The most appropriate method of financing the assets set out in this report will be determined on the basis of value for money and risk to the Authority. This will be undertaken prior to the start of the financial year in liaison with the Authority's Treasury Management advisors.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

32. Up to date, modern and fit for purpose vehicles, premises and ICT equipment are essential in order for the Authority to meet its legal responsibilities to both employees and its communities.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

33. Capital investment into the infrastructure will afford wide ranging benefits particularly linked to improvements in dignity arrangements highlighted within the estates capital programme. Appropriate Individual impact assessments are undertaken as necessary for each stand of work identified.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

34. It is essential that an ongoing programme of replacement is in place to ensure that assets are 'fit for purpose' and to mitigate against the risks of financial resources not being synchronised with service planning.

35. In determining an appropriate programme of replacement, due consideration has been given to expected asset life, planned operational requirements and financial implications with appropriate involvement from all key internal stakeholders.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

36. Health and Safety considerations and responsibilities are paramount and to that end the Authority aims to provide suitable and sufficient equipment and vehicles to ensure effective service delivery

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

37. A communication to all staff groups detailing the proposed investment in the capital programme will be circulated in due course.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION

38. This report has been developed in consultation with key stakeholders across the organisation. Consultation linked to individual schemes will be undertaken as necessary.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

39. Medium-Term Financial Plan for 2020/21 to 2023/24.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

40. That Members approve the capital programme for Vehicles, Estates and ICT for 2020/21 onwards and that it is incorporated into the Medium-Term Financial Plan 2020/21 to 2023/24 to be considered at the 10th February 2020 Fire Authority meeting.

S TOPHAM

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Director of Service Support

Humberside Fire & Rescue Service
Summergroves Way
Kingston upon Hull

ST
24 November 2018

Humberside Fire Authority
6 December 2019

Report by the Director of Service Improvement

SERVICE PERFORMANCE AND RISK REPORT
End of the 2nd QUARTER 2019 - 2020
1 July 2019 – 30 September 2019

SUMMARY

1. This report provides information relating to the Service's Performance and Risk Framework.

Report Highlight Summary Table

Prevention Performance				
Accidental Dwelling Fires	5.4% below 3 year average.			
Other Accidental Fires (exc. Vehicles)	25.8% above 3 year average.			
Deliberate Primary Fires	4.7% above 3 year average.			
Deliberate Secondary Fires	1.8% above 3 year average.			
Automatic Fire Alarms	5.3% below 3 year average.			
Fatalities	0 fatalities (aspirational target 0)			
Injuries	14 injuries (aspirational target 0)			
Response Performance				
First engine response	7.54% better than target			
Second engine response	11.13% better than target			
Projects Update				
• Infrastructure, ICT, Collaboration	Summary of progress is provided at Paragraph 9 within the body of this Report.			
Strategic Risks				**Level**
Reduction in external financial support	No change in risk. Scenario planning outcomes reported to HFA identifying efficiencies in medium term. CSR announced on 4 September with an inflationary grant increase for 2021 and a precept cap.			**Critical**
East Coast and Hertfordshire Control Room Project (ECHCR).	No change in risk. Go Live date is scheduled for 26 November.			**Critical**
Impact of Brexit	No change in risk. Service continues to support LRF and review Business Plans.			**Critical**
Complaints				
Quarter 2 Detail				
Driving related	3 Upheld		0 Not Upheld	
Conduct of employees	0 Upheld		1 Not Upheld	
Performance of employees	0 Upheld		0 Not Upheld	
Damage to property whilst responding to incidents	0 Upheld		0 Not Upheld	
Other	0 Upheld		0 Not Upheld	
Current and Previous Quarter for comparison				
	Current Quarter		Previous Quarter	
Totals	3 Upheld	1 Not Upheld	4 Upheld	4 Not Upheld
Compliments and Messages of Thanks				
29 compliments and messages of thanks were received and posted on our Website: Compliments and Messages of Thanks				

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. That Members consider the report's detail and take assurance from the Service's proactive approach to performance and risk management.

BACKGROUND

3. Regular performance and risk reviews are undertaken internally to jointly review any issues at Strategic Leadership Team (SLT), and Project level. SLT provide the oversight of Projects and therefore there are two levels of risk register; one for Strategic Risks and separate registers for individual projects.

4. The ownership of performance and risk is detailed below:-

Strategic Leadership Team	Strategic Objectives Strategic Risk Register
Directors	Director Workstream Objectives Directorate Risk Register
Heads of Function	Function Workstream Objectives Directorate Risk Register
Project Owners	Project risks and performance against project milestones

5. The Strategic Leadership Team in conjunction with the Tactical Leadership Team, Head of Corporate Assurance and GAS Committee provides an internal scrutiny function for Strategic Risks and Service Performance Indicators.

6. All performance and risk information is managed through automated systems which enable managers at all levels to have access to information which is as up to date as possible, and in many instances is live information.

7. The Strategic Risk Register is publicly accessible via the Service website Our-performance. Members can also view the Action Plans relating to any performance or identified risks electronically at meetings through the Corporate Information Portal.

PERFORMANCE ISSUES OF NOTE

8. A summary of all key performance can be seen at Appendix 1. The following performance issues of note have arisen during this reporting period.

a) Accidental Dwelling Fires (ADFs)

The number of accidental fires to the end of Quarter 2 is 5.4% below the 3-year average. It was 13.5% above the 3-year average for the same period last year. However, the number of incidents rated as high severity to the end of Quarter 2 was still low as can be seen in Appendix 2.

Intervention Activity Examples

- ✓ A problem profile has identified "Outlying Seniors" as the mosaic type most likely to be involved in an ADF in the East Riding. Goole and Bridlington operational crews are now delivering Safe and Well visits with households of this mosaic type as a Public Safety priority.

- ✓ Hull Community Safety Team are involved in a project to engage with letting agents and landlords to promote fire safety messages and to make us aware of any tenants who would fall into our high-risk profiles.

- ✓ Monthly updates and educational messages are shared with Grimsby Telegraph showing the types of incidents that have happened in dwellings for educational purposes. Occupiers are asked if they share their stories.

- ✓ We have expanded our use of the Blue Light Brigade volunteers, who carry out Safe and Well visits on our behalf, into North Lincolnshire.

b) Deliberate Secondary Fires

Deliberate secondary fires are 1.8% above the 3-year average. In Quarter 2 last year they were 31.6% higher than the 3-year average.

Intervention Activity Examples

- ✓ Close partnership working is ongoing with Humberside Police and other agencies to reduce arson. CCTV is being retrieved from appliances to assist the police where possible. We are sharing motorcycle arson data on a weekly basis to support the police with Operational Yellowfin and, in return, crews are to receive input on the retrieval of frame numbers from burned motorcycles.

- ✓ Joint work between Hull and East Riding Safety Teams and Operational Crews continued in the Orchard Park/Cottingham border to try and address the large number of incidents of arson.

- ✓ The demolition of flats in Immingham had been proving a hot spot for incidents involving youths. The youths have been identified through local PCSO patrols and incidents have since reduced in numbers.

- ✓ In North Lincolnshire, following multi-agency meetings, Humberside Police are performing visible patrols in evenings prior to waste collection days.

c) Deliberate Primary Fires

Deliberate Primary Fires are 4.7% above the 3-year average. In Quarter 2 last year they were 2.6% higher than the 3-year average.

Intervention Activity Examples

- ✓ During the summer months, we again experienced a number of incidents on farmland during Harvest season. A proactive media approach was taken along with partner working and high visibility with Humberside Police.

- ✓ Across the South Bank, Police are focussing on city drug dealers and intelligence sharing between the two organisations at TTCG is aiding this work.

- ✓ Operational Crews continue to directly refer abandoned vehicles to the Community Protection and Compliance teams within Local Councils. This continues and is showing positive outcomes.

d) Automatic Fire Alarm false alarm calls (AFA)

The number of false alarms in commercial premises is 5.3% below the 3-year average.

Intervention Activity Examples

- ✓ Whilst our non-attendance and charging position wasn't in place until 1 October, the proactive communication and media exposure on this matter appears to have had a positive effect on the occurrences of AFA's in the months leading up to go-live.

- ✓ The number of Unwanted Fire Signals, since adopting the new position as of 1 October 2019, have reduced compared to previous years. Call challenge has led to 37 non-attendance incidents as of 22 October. There have been no invoices raised against the criteria for charging during October.

e) Other Accidental Fires (excluding vehicles)

Other Accidental Fires (Excluding vehicles) are 25.8% above the 3-year average this quarter.

Intervention Activity Examples

- ✓ Faults in appliances and equipment account for a large percentage of Accidental Fires in Commercial Properties (44% in 2019 so far)

- ✓ The East Riding is currently rolling out an initial training programme for existing On-Call station public safety champions which will upskill them to carry out Business Safety engagements post-incident, supported by the Business Safety Team. Following a commercial incident, stations will be available to follow up, giving education to prevent repeat occurrences.

- ✓ During the summer months, we again experienced a number of incidents on farmland during the Harvest season. We continue to engage with the farming community as changes to their practices, including controlled burning, can lead to a number of incidents.

STRATEGIC PROJECTS

9. Notable developments in Strategic Projects:

a) East Coast and Hertfordshire Control Room Project

Final load testing is taking place in Hertfordshire FRS. Training on the telephone aspect is ongoing and technical migration plans are now in place and go-live date is currently scheduled for 26 November. Significant additional support and resilience arrangements are in place.

b) The Ark Flood Preparation and Response Centre

Engagement continues with Central Government and Ministers. A business case has been sent to DEFRA who are engaging with other Government Departments and communication has been initiated by the project team with DEFRA's lead civil servant. Project Board, Estates Group and Sponsors Board meetings have also taken place, with a number of actions arising from the discussions, including an action to progress the water strategy and ecological survey. Ongoing discussions are taking place to resolve outstanding issues and Patrick Parson has been commissioned to undertake the preliminary ecological survey.

c) Rota and Availability System

The introduction of a new Corporate Availability System will allow the Service to manage individual's availability and aggregate these details to populate rotas. Fire engine availability details need to flow into the CAPITA provided Command and Control System (soon to be Vision 4) and details of incidents extracted for pay purposes, to generate efficiencies in what is currently a labour intensive process. A briefing note was presented to July SLT meeting, the project team has been created and a business case was presented to the October SLT meeting to seek approval for the preferred supplier and proceed with procurement.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

10. This report supports the delivery of all of our Strategic Objectives in the most effective and efficient way and is a key part of the underpinning Governance Framework.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

11. Any area of improvement in performance without an increase in resources adds value for money and the proactive management of risks is important to ensure financial stability.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

12. None arising directly.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

13. None arising.

PERFORMANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

14. This report details the information for Members to provide assurance as to the proactive management of performance and risk by the Service. This report has previously been before the Governance Audit and Scrutiny Committee.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

15. Performance against the second engine response standard directly contributes to the Health and Safety of operational crews.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

16. None arising.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION AND/OR COLLABORATION

17. None applicable.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

18. None.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

19. That Members consider the report's detail and take assurance from the Service's proactive approach to performance and risk management.

N MCKINIRY

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Head of Corporate Assurance

Humberside Fire & Rescue Service
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SR
12 November 2019

Service Performance and Risk Report – 2nd Quarter 2019-20
1 April 2019 – 30 September 2019

Service Performance Indicators

• SPI 1 – Total Fatalities – 0 Fatalities	• SPI 1.1 – Total Casualties – 14 Casualties	• SPI 2.2 – Total Deliberate Primary Fires – 4.7% above three-year average
• SPI 2.3a – Total Accidental Dwelling Fires – 5.4% below three-year average	• SPI 2.3c – Total Other Accidental Fires (exc Vehicles) 25.8% above three-year average	• SPI 2.4 – Total Deliberate Secondary Fires – 1.8% above three-year average
• SPI 2.5 – Total Number of Automatic Fire Alarms – 5.3% below three-year average		

How are we doing?











SPI 1 – Total Fatalities
There have been no fatalities in the second quarter of 2019-20 compared to 1 in the same period of 2018-19

SPI 1.1 – Total Casualties
There have been 14 casualties in the second quarter of 2019-20 compared to 16 in the same period of 2018-19

Service Performance Indicators			
• SPI 2 – Standard of First Appliance in Attendance is met		• SPI 2.1 – Standard of Second Appliance in Attendance is met	
Actual – 97.54%	Objective – 90%	Actual – 91.13%	Objective – 80%

Average First Appliance attendance times for the Service	
2nd Quarter - Average 1st appliance attendance time – Dwellings	2nd Quarter - Average 1st appliance attendance time – RTC's
Actual – 5 Minutes 33 Seconds	Actual – 9 Minutes 33 Seconds

Average Second Appliance attendance times for the Service	
2nd Quarter - Average 2nd appliance attendance time – Dwellings	2nd Quarter - Average 2nd appliance attendance time – RTC's
Actual – 7 Minutes 12 Seconds	Actual – 11 Minutes 14 Seconds

Rescues

Between 1st April 2019 and 30th September 2019, the Service rescued 500 people in incidents across the Service area.
This table shows the number of people rescued and the type of incident, for the end of the 2nd quarter period July 2019 to September 2019.

RTCs	22	Other (e.g. assisting other agencies and suicides)	16
Effecting Entry/Exit (to children, elderly and medical cases)	77	Removal of objects from people / people from objects	32
Other Rescue/Release of Persons (e.g. from height, in machinery)	49	Rescue or Evacuation from water	5
Primary Fires	13	Other Transport Incidents (e.g. children locked in vehicles)	16
Lift Release (to children/elderly and medical cases)	11	Medical Incident – First Responder	11
Animal Assistance Incidents	1	**Total number of rescues**	253

Medical Intervention

This table details the 2nd quarter activity for First Responder incidents and Falls Team incidents attended, across the Service area.

	Period – 01/04/2019 – 30/09/2019	Period – 01/07/2019 – 30/09/2019
*Falls Incidents	422	198
Emergency First Responder calls attended	1000	464

*Please note that Falls Teams often attend Emergency First Responder Incidents also.

Accidental Dwelling Fires

The charts below show the severity level for Accidental Dwelling Fire incidents over the last 3 years. The number of incidents in quarter two was lower this year compared to last year in Hull and the East Riding but was higher in North and North East Lincolnshire. The trend for accidental dwelling fires in North East Lincolnshire has been upwards since quarter two of 2017/18 and the number of fires in quarter two of this year (30 fires) is the highest since quarter three of 2013/14. Of these 30 fires, 76% were of medium severity. North Lincolnshire also has an upward trend from quarter 2 of 2017/18, but this trend has started to reduce with lower incident numbers since quarter three of 2018/19.

The number of high severity dwelling fires this quarter was very low with only 2 of 101 incidents (2%).

Note: The charts show the number of accidental dwelling fires within each severity category for each quarter of 2016/17, 2017/18, 2018/19 and 2019/20 to Q2.




Total Accidental Dwelling Fires Compared to Severity in the East Riding of Yorkshire
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
0 2 0 2 3 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 0
19 14 24 12 13 12 17 14 16 16 20 13 7 16
8 12 9 7 11 10 16 18 9 12 12 10 9 10
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
16/17
17/18
18/19
19/20
Low
Medium
High
Total ADFs


Total Accidental Dwelling Fires Compared to Severity in North East Lincolnshire
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 1
19 18 13 7 11 10 12 14 17 16 15 14 15 23
4 8 6 9 4 2 2 6 6 7 3 6 5 6
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
16/17
17/18
18/19
19/20
Low
Medium
High
Total ADFs


Total Accidental Dwelling Fires Compared to Severity in North Lincolnshire
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
25
20
15
10
5
0
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2
16/17
17/18
18/19
19/20
Low
Medium
High
Total ADFs

Humberside Fire Authority
6 December 2019

Report by the Director of Service Improvement

HEALTH, SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUARTERLY REPORT 2nd QUARTER 2019/20

July - September 2019

SUMMARY

1. This is the 2nd Quarter 2019/20 report on Health, Safety and Environment. Appendix 1 provides a summary of the statistical data.

2. During the reporting period there were 21 incidents recorded (Figs 1 & 2) that resulted in some form of personal injury compared to 29 for the same period last year. This is a significant decrease of almost 28%. It is also well below the three-year rolling average of 26.3 for quarter two. Even more reassuringly, it is the lowest number of reported injuries or ill-health for quarter two in the last three years (Fig 3).

3. Due to the make-up of the workforce, the majority of the reported injuries, 62%, were incurred by full-time firefighters. This is representative of our employment profile and the more hazardous nature of the activities carried out by operational staff.

4. As can be seen from the three-year rolling average (Fig 3), the longer-term accident trend is falling. Training and routine activities make up the top two highest number of the total injuries reported with 8 and 7 respectively. Injuries arising from fire and physical training have reduced in comparison with last year's quarter 2, with those from special services remaining the same.

5. The only activity area showing an increase in reported injuries is RTC with a rise from zero to 1.

6. Near miss reporting has decreased by just over 37% but at 31 for the quarter it is still notably higher than the number of reported accidents (21), which in itself is a positive indicator of a proactive and responsible safety culture.

7. This report has previously been before the Governance, Audit and Scrutiny Committee.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. That the Committee considers this report and makes any recommendations to the Fire Authority as necessary.

BACKGROUND

9. Three of the reported injuries during training activities, were sustained at the external venue used for water rescue training; all caused by striking subsurface obstacles whilst navigating the water flow on different dates. One of these incidents was severe enough to cause a sickness absence for the individual concerned for a period of 27 days; necessitating reporting to the Health and Safety Executive under RIDOR 2013. The

other two did not result in any sickness absence. Incorrect technique was established as a contributory factor in two of these cases.

10. The other significant injury incurred whilst performing operational training was a burn during a breathing apparatus revalidation at the Immingham West Training Centre. This burn was severe enough to cause a sickness absence of seven days. A comprehensive investigation was carried out by the H, S and E team with subsequent recommendations produced for remedial action by the training section.

11. Two of the injuries sustained during routine activities were to children on organised visits at different fire stations. Although both minor in nature, a review of relevant risk assessments to quality assure their effectiveness was subsequently conducted remotely by the H, S and E team. The other five reported accidents were all similarly superficial with no resultant sickness absence.

12. The only other two accidents significant enough to cause injuries requiring sickness absence for the affected individuals were both sustained by Fulltime firefighters. One was due to a back injury whilst assisting the ambulance to move a casualty which required reporting under RIDOR 2013. The other was when a hydraulic cutting tool failed catastrophically and dropped onto the person holding the casualty protection inside a car. The subsequent investigation attributed this to an incorrect cut of a boron steel bolt.

13. During this quarter, there have been two RIDDOR events, the same as quarter two for the previous year. Both were reportable due to injuries causing individual sickness absence of more than seven days. They were comprehensively investigated with appropriate corrective and preventative measures implemented. The Service strives to reduce accidents and subsequent RIDDOR events to an aspirational target of zero.

14. Although near miss reports (Fig 6) have decreased by 37% in comparison with the same quarter for last year; they remain higher than the number of reported accidents. This is indicative of a positive safety culture within HFRS with the emphasis on reporting events that have the potential to cause injury before they actually do. As an area constantly promoted by the H, S and E team, near misses are treated with an equal degree of seriousness as accidents; once again being investigated accordingly to identify proactive control measures. Ongoing training and quality assurance within this area seeks to ensure near miss reports are appropriate and meet the necessary criteria for submission and analysis.

15. The H, S & E team continue to undertake research in several areas reflecting the Services proactive approach. These are detailed in the snap shot provided at Appendix 1.

16. Details of the Service's Health, Safety and Environmental outcomes for this Quarter 2019/20 are contained in Appendix 1.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

17. The monitoring of Health, Safety and Environmental information is a key part of the Strategic Plan to:

- Maintain a positive health and safety environment, compliant with legislation and provide operational assurance.
- Implement measures to ensure environmental sustainability.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

18. None.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

19. None.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

20. None.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

21. None.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

22. This report provides the opportunity for an additional level of scrutiny of Health and Safety information.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

23. None.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION AND/OR COLLABORATION

24. None.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

25. Health and Safety Policy Statement.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

26. That the Committee considers this report and makes any recommendations to the Fire Authority as necessary.

N McKINIRY

Officer Contact: Niall McKiniry ☎ 01482 567166
Director of Service Improvement

Humberside Fire & Rescue Service
Summergroves Way
Kingston upon Hull

NM
6 December 2019



Figure 1

The chart above shows the *role* of those involved in accidents, for this period (July – September 19) alongside a comparison for the same quarter from the previous year and a year to date total. The total number of reported accidents for the quarter (21) is 28% lower than the previous year (29). Four of the six categories show a reduction with one remaining the same. The exception to this general downward trend is accidents reported by Full-time firefighters which has increased by 18%.



Figure 2

The chart above relates to the activities undertaken at the time of the recorded accident. Reported injuries or ill-health during training are the most frequent with routine activities second which is the same as last year's second quarter. Positively, training accidents show a significant decrease of more than 27% in comparison.



Figure 3

Encouragingly, reported accidents (21) are more than 20% below well below the three-year rolling average (26.3) and at the lowest level for the previous three years' quarter 2 data. This indicates considerable and consistent health and safety performance improvement.


Cause of Injury due to Accident
Hit something fixed or stationary
Hit by a moving, flying or falling object
Exposed to fire or heat
Slipped, tripped or fell on the same level
Musculoskeletal
Injured while handling, lifting or carrying
Cut on / by sharp object
Exposed to, or in contact with, a harmful substance
Other kind of incident
Breathing Apparatus set malfunction or wearer distress
Hit by a moving vehicle
Injured by an animal
Fell from a height
5
1
5
4
3
4
8
3
3
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5
1
1
2
3
0
1
0
0
1
0
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1
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2
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
YTD
Jul - Sep 2018
Jul - Sep 2019

Figure 4

Figure 4, on the previous page shows the cause of accidents for this quarter compared against the same period from the previous year. The most common cause of injuries are "hit something fixed or stationary". Four out of the five injuries of this type were sustained by Full-time firefighters, three during training and one whilst carrying out routine ativities

N.B. Injured persons can record multiple causes on the initial reporting form; hence the cumulative total being more than 21.



Figure 5

During this quarter there have been two accidents reportable under RIDDOR 2013 due to them resulting in sickness absences of more than seven days for the two individuals concerned. Both were suffered by Full-time operational staff; one during training activities and the other whilst performing a special service assisting the ambulance. The required online reports to the Health and Safety Executive were made within the appropriate timescales and investigated accordingly. The Health, Safety and Environment team continue to react to such events by implementing modified and improved control measures wherever possible to try to reduce future incidents of this type.



Figure 6

Near miss reports are encouraged to proactively identify potentially harmful events before any injury is realised. Although they have decreased by just over 37% in comparison to the same period last year, there have still been more near miss reports (31) than accidents (21) for this quarter. This is indicative of a positive workplace safety and reporting culture.

Forward Look

Key current areas being addressed are:

- Implementation and development of the Joint Health and Safety Service (JHSS) in collaboration with Humberside Police.
- Recruitment drive for a new Operational Assurance Manager, JHSS Supervisor and two Advisors due to expansion and internal transfer.
- Procurement of suitable recepticles for dirty fire kit as a result of the research/recommendations of the Contamination Working Group.
- Production of new policy and guidance covering immediate fireground cleaning and procurement of cleansing wipes to reduce the risk in a timely manner.
- Media and internal campaign to highlight a recent spate of minor vehicle collisions.
- Review and alignment of policies and strategy with Humberside Police.
- Launch of 'Refill' campaign across the Service to encourage hydration and reduce single use plastics.
- Research environmentally sustainable options for drinking water at operational incidents and training environments.
- Joint Senior Executives IOSH training for HFRS and HP.

Agenda Item No. 13

Humberside Fire Authority
6 December 2019

Report by the Director of Service Improvement

OPERATIONAL ASSURANCE QUARTERLY REPORT 2nd QUARTER 2019/20

July – September 2019

SUMMARY

1. This is the 2nd Quarter 2019/20 report on Operational Assurance (OA). Appendix 1 provides a summary of the statistical data.

2. The quality of information gathered from all types of debriefs has improved significantly through increased education and awareness of assessors. This has enabled a much greater understanding of the importance of capturing learning in order to continually improve firefighter safety.

3. Each assessment undertaken is broken down into three key areas; safety critical, areas of concern and exceptional practice. Safety critical reporting reduced by 45% (9 to 5) and area of concern reporting reduced by 46% (100 to 54). Exceptional practice reporting saw the most dramatic change with a 55% increase in reporting (130 to 202). The reduction in safety critical and areas of concern along with an increase in exceptional practices would indicate that we are performing well operationally as an organisation. However, we must also consider that not all safety critical and areas of concern are reported, and that people are more likely to report when they have performed well than when they have potentially put themselves or others in danger. We must continue to highlight to our personnel that OA is a process that exists to promote learning and to improve firefighter safety. It is not designed to place them under heavy scrutiny or blame.

4. The utilisation of appliance CCTV to assure four operational incidents has highlighted an area of concern around the lessons learnt from “Beverley Road”, however, the majority of incidents have been managed in accordance with the principles of National Operational Guidance and HFRS standard operating procedures. A number of positive practices have been identified and support ongoing work in promoting best practice through the OA of incidents.

5. Over this reporting period, one thematic review concluded and collated. The correct PPE worn by appliance drivers review came to an end on the 31st of July. OA has been monitoring whether PPE is being donned within an appropriate timescale and is appropriate for the task being carried out at incidents and exercises. A total of 49 thematic review completions and 18 CCTV reviews taking the total activity to 67. There was a discrepancy in results prior to, and post FDS Officer arrival. In some cases, staff are not donning PPE appropriate for the task they are carrying out at the beginning of an incident.

6. As we strive to continually improve OA, therefore, firefighter safety, we plan to visit watches and stations in order to promote the OA process. The drivers PPE review results will be part of the agenda for these visits as we look to operational staff to ensure that procedures are being adhered to.

7. One of the most prominent learning outcomes from this review was the noticeable deficiency in exercise returns. Similarly, we must also reflect on the fact that the thematic review section was completed on only 49% of OA assessments. In order to rectify this, we will continue to communicate with responsible managers and operational staff through various pathways. This will include; OA notices on PDRPro, emails to operational staff and visiting stations to provide more information to crews on the work that is carried out by the OA section. A wider review of our approach to OA will be carried out over the coming months to ensure that we are operating in an effective way and making the best use of technology.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. That the Committee considers this report and makes any recommendations to the Fire Authority as necessary.

BACKGROUND

9. For further details on the 2nd quarters operational assurance assessment data please see the snapshot report at Appendix 1.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

10. The monitoring of operational assurance information is a key part of the Strategic Plan; Maintain a positive health and safety environment, compliant with legislation and provide operational assurance. We must also capture and share organisational learning as part of the strategic plan as well as ensuring firefighter competency is maintained (operational preparedness) and that we continue to work seamlessly with other emergency services (through multi-agency debriefs).

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

11. None.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

12. None.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

13. None.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

14. None.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

15. This report provides the opportunity for an additional level of scrutiny of Health and Safety information.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

16. None.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION AND/OR COLLABORATION

17. None.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

18. Operational Assurance policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

19. That Members take assurance from the Service's proactive management of Operational Assurance outcomes.

N McKINIRY

Officer Contact: Niall McKiniry ☎ 01482 567166
Director of Service Improvement

Humberside Fire & Rescue Service
Summergroves Way
Kingston upon Hull

NM
6 December 2019



Figure 1

The chart above shows the number of incidents and debriefs that have been assured, for this period (July - September 2019) alongside a comparison for the same quarter from the previous year. The total number of activities assured have decreased by 3% compared to last year's quarter. There has been a growth in exercises assured from last year's figures, from 4 to 18. CCTV on fire appliances has been utilised to monitor activities over this period and has shown areas of concern. The decrease in hot debriefs is a matter that we are looking to rectify. A hot debrief should be carried out after every single incident and exercise, therefore, there should be no disparity between the number of Operational Assurance assessments and hot debriefs. In most cases the hot debrief is taking place but the assessor is failing to report this on the return due to a lack of understanding of how to complete the Operational Assurance assessment. This is an area we will drive an improvement in as we visit stations and watches in the new year to provide educational information for operational personnel.



Figure 2

Assurance activities are broken down into three areas; safety critical concerns, areas of concern and exceptional practice. The number of safety critical concerns identified, and areas of concern reported have decreased. However, exceptional practices reporting has increased by 55% from 130 to 202. Once again, the vast majority of reports of areas of concern and exceptional practices have been highlighted through Service Control. The reduction in safety critical and areas of concern along with an increase in exceptional practices would indicate that we are performing well operationally as an organisation. However, we must also consider that not all safety critical and areas of concern are reported, and that people are more likely to report when they have performed well than when they have potentially put themselves or others in danger. We must continue to highlight to our personnel that operational assurance is a process that exists to promote learning and to improve firefighter safety. It is not designed to place them under heavy scrutiny or blame.



Figure 3

The safety critical concerns during this quarter related to Service Control reporting potential mobilisation issues due to a combination of backfill appliance cover arrangements, and separately an incident where there was a lack of a covering jet at a building fire.

Internal Learning

Operational Assurance Assessment Learning

I. RTC Inglemire Lane, Hull – This incident provided us with the operational assurance return that cited the use of a personnel holding area. This was put into a learning notice on PDRPro. Crews also raised concerns about being unsure when they could remove dust masks at this type of incident. RTC instructors were consulted and learning and guidance was provided to the watches involved.

II. Low Farm, Welton – This incident brought forth learning points for Service Control staff regarding the passing of important incident information to crews.

III. Humber Bridge – This incident highlighted the need to train certain crews on how to use rescue harnesses to perform quick rescues on the Humber bridge. This training has now taken place.

Posted Learning Notifications

The Operational Assurance Team have captured learning outcomes and communicated appropriate actions where necessary through notifications on the PDRPro competence recording system. This method provides an accountable record of understanding which every individual must confirm. The following examples highlighted the following areas;

I. Personnel Holding Area – This was recommended by a Group Manager who had been to an RTC incident where crews had utilised a, personnel holding area to prevent overcrowding of the risk area and to increase the awareness of the Incident Commander as to which personnel were available to be given a task. The learning notice cited this and suggested points on how to implement this at incidents. This area was highlighted via an Operational Assurance return on PDRPro. This is an idea that we will be submitting to NOL to promote learning on a national scale.

II. Carbon Monoxide (CO) from Hookah Pipes – This was shared by a Fire Chief from North America. It referred to an incident involving large amounts of CO being released by bongs and hookah pipes which was causing gas detection units to alarm. This was posted to give operational staff an awareness of this type of risk.

III. Fixing Loose Items – This notice was posted as a result of a number of near misses relating to helmets beginning to pyrolyse on the dashboard of appliances when OIC handlamps had been accidentally switched on. This post listed a number of recommendations including where to correctly stow all operational and personal kit on the fire engine.

External Learning

Winter Hill – We received the full report from the Winter Hill and Saddleworth Moor fires in Manchester and Lancashire last year. We have already begun implementing any changes or recommendations to our policies and procedures as a result of this report. These largely pertain to consideration being given to new pieces of equipment and command support pack forms as well as the introduction of an SSRI for the Moors in our area.

Workplace Learning

I. Water Tank Bacteria – Essex fire and rescue found that a harmful bacteria was present in their appliance water tanks throughout a year-long testing period. The bacteria have been found to be particularly harmful to those suffering burns. Our immediate emergency care (IEC) instructors have recently received training on how to treat burns and this training reiterated that appliance tank water is only to be used as a very last resort when cooling burns.

NOL Action Notes

I. Magnetic Door Lock Reactivation – An action note was issued concerning the risk of magnetic door locks at some care homes re-energising once alarm is silenced closing off certain areas and causing significant problems in evacuation. This has been communicated to our business safety team and they are deciding whether this requires further action or not.

II. Cross Border Communication Issues – This action note was regarding the switchover of some services to digital radios and the problems this was causing when attending incidents with services who still utilised analogue channels. As a service we were already aware of this issue and had communicated this to all operational staff.

III. Timber Framed Building Fires Case Study – The case study mentioned the difficulties in locating seats of fire and the hinderance of hidden fire spread at incidents with this type of building structure. A learning notice was sent out to all operational staff detailing the contents of this case.

CCTV Footage Reports

Appliance CCTV was utilised four times throughout this quarter and has raised some issues concerning operational practices. It would appear that in some cases we have still not learned the lessons of the “Beverley Road” incident. Viewing two separate domestic dwelling fire incidents reiterated that on occasion, crews are still siting the appliance directly in front of the property involved, omitting the charging of an appropriate covering jet, neglecting to utilise proper cordon control, and siting the Entry Control Board (ECB) within very close proximity to the entrance to the building. One instance also showcased inappropriate transitions between two ladders causing firefighters to take a greater risk.

CCTV footage has also highlighted a number of positive practices. These include good stabilisation of vehicles using Rescue Support Unit (RSU) equipment, quick and safe extrication of time critical casualties, and good hazard perception of emergency response drivers when en route to an incident. It was also encouraging to see that in all four cases that were reviewed, appliance drivers donned appropriate Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) as soon as reasonably practicable, a vast contrast to footage we have seen in previous quarters. This can be accredited to our recent poster campaign encouraging drivers to put on appropriate PPE as soon as reasonably practicable at operational incidents as well as the thematic review that studied this particular area.

In the near future, the Operational Assurance section will be visiting the watches and stations that have been subject to a CCTV review and discussing the potential improvements and good practices to promote self-evaluation in order to increase firefighter safety and encourage the learning process.

The use of CCTV footage continues to be an incredibly useful tool for the Operational Assurance team, allowing us to get an accurate view of how we are performing at incidents as a service. It is also very helpful as a visual aid when feeding back to the crews involved in the footage reviews.

Thematic Review

The Drivers' PPE thematic review has now been completed and the findings collated. Operational Assurance has been monitoring whether personal protective equipment (PPE) is being donned within an appropriate timescale and is suitable for the task being carried out at incidents and exercises. Data has been captured through operational assessments and exercises. Throughout the reporting period (April 26th – July 31st) a total of 49 responses were received via the OA process. Appliance CCTV was also utilised during this review by randomly "dip sampling" incidents. In total, 18 Incidents were reviewed by watching the CCTV, bringing the overall activities reviewed up to 67.

There was a discrepancy in results prior to, and post FDS arrival. Although drivers may be wearing correct PPE once the FDS officer has arrived, in many cases they are not donning PPE appropriate for the task they are carrying out at the beginning of an incident. This is an area of concern. The OA section will continue to monitor the correct donning of appropriate PPE through CCTV footage reviews. As we strive to continually improve Operational Assurance and therefore firefighter safety, we plan to visit watches and stations in order to promote the OA process. The drivers PPE review results will be part of the agenda for these visits as we look to operational staff to ensure that procedures are being adhered to. As previously mentioned, we have also started a poster campaign based on the results of the Drivers' PPE thematic review, providing guidance on this subject to all personnel.

One of the most prominent learning outcomes from this review was the noticeable deficiency in exercise returns. Similarly, we must also reflect on the fact that the thematic review section was completed on only 49% of OA assessments. In order to rectify this, we will continue to communicate with operational staff through various pathways. This will include; OA notices on PDRPro, emails to operational staff and visiting stations to provide more information to crews on the work that is carried out by the Operational Assurance section.

Forward Look

- The findings of the thematic review have been collated and a condensed version will soon be disseminated to crews along with recommendations for moving forward.

- A plan has been put together to visit all stations and watches in the new year along with Health and Safety. We will be providing crews with an update on what Operational Assurance (OA) is and does and how to best utilise it as well as embedding the need for near misses to be reported in order to improve firefighter safety. During these visits we will also reiterate the new thematic review and the need to complete an OA assessment for station exercises.

- We have created criteria for the peer assessment of exercises with a view to trial and implement in the new year. The idea is not only to assess the quality of the exercise but to also assess the standard of the Operational Assurance assessment carried out by the Station or Watch Manager. We can then provide feedback to the personnel involved. Hopefully, this will improve the standard of OA assessment returns which, in turn, will maximise the learning opportunities from operational exercises.

- NOL have begun to supply us with information notes as well as the action notes. These provide us with data surrounding operational concerns that are of a less urgent nature than the action notes. Nevertheless, we will be disseminating these to operational crews accordingly to increase the awareness of the relevant hazards and risks. We will also be publishing a learning action log which will present every piece of learning that we receive and what action we have taken based on the information we have received. This will be available to all personnel.

- Introduction of the new thematic review will be taking place shortly. This will be centred around the need for crews to wear hi-visibility surcoats when working in roadways.

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Agenda Item No. 14

Humberside Fire Authority
6th December 2019

Report by the Director of People and Development

STAFF PAY AWARDS – ANNUAL UPDATE

SUMMARY

1. This report is intended to give the Humberside Fire Authority an update report outlining the pay position of all of the staff groups it employs, including current arrangements and awards made over the previous five years for comparison.

2. It is considered important that the HFA have a transparent and detailed view of staff pay and how that is changing over time in order that they may contextualise other reports to the HFA in respect of efficiencies and new ways of working and be able to better place the Service in the wider public sector service providers in terms of their own and/or home Authority experience.

3. Members will separately receive the annual HFA Pay Policy Statement 2020/21 for approval at the March 2020 meeting, the pay policy statement is also published on the HFRS website as a requirement of the Localism Act 2011.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. That Members note:

   (a) That Grey book staff have accepted a pay increment of 2% for 2019/20 from the National Employers (NJC) Grey Book;

   (b) That Green book staff have accepted a pay increment equivalent to 2% for 2019/20 from the National Employers (NJC) Green Book;

   (c) That Gold book staff have accepted a pay increment of 2% for 2019/20 from the National Employers (NJC) Gold Book.

BACKGROUND

5. This report is an 'Annual Update' on pay matters ensuring that Members are sighted on the pay position of its staff groups, the negotiations around pay that take place annually and the mechanisms that exist for pay negotiations for each staff group.

6. Grey Book staff are those uniformed members of staff in the roles of Fire-fighter to Area Manager. They are represented at their national employer NJC by the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) and Fire Officers Association (FOA). In addition, there also exists a Middle Managers' Negotiating Body (MMNB) who have plenary powers to deal with the pay and conditions of middle managers (Station Managers, Group Managers and Area Managers) within the framework of the NJC. The NJC consists of 28 members appointed by representative bodies (14 employers' representatives and 14 Fire Brigades' Union representatives). The MMNB consists of 28 members (14 employers' representatives, 13 Fire Brigades' Union and 1 Fire Officers' Association representative). The mechanism for pay negotiation for Grey Book staff involves an

annual pay claim followed by an offer in response by their NJC employers' side. Any pay increments agreed are due for payment in July annually.

7. Green Book members of staff are all those members of staff who are non-operational. They are represented at their national employer NJC by UNISON, GMB and UNITE. The NJC consists of 70 members, 12 from employers' representatives, 31 from UNISON, 16 from GMB and 11 from UNITE.

8. Gold Book members of staff are those members of staff in the most senior management positions occupying the roles of Brigade Manager or similar. They are represented at their national employer NJC by the Association of Principal Fire Officers (APFO). The mechanism for pay negotiation for Gold Book staff involves an annual pay claim which is submitted in September/October annually followed by an offer in response by their NJC employers' side. Any pay increments agreed are due for payment in January annually.

9. However, in addition to the process described in the paragraph above Gold Book staff have, within their terms and conditions, negotiated a further mechanism to address pay described as the 'twin track' approach which states:

> *''There is a twin-track approach for determining levels of pay for Brigade Manager roles. At national level, the NJC shall review annually the level of pay increase applicable to all those covered by this agreement. In doing so, the NJC will consider affordability, other relevant pay deals and the rate of inflation at the appropriate date. Any increase agreed by the NJC will be communicated to fire authorities by circular."*

10. The 'twin track' approach allows Gold Book staff to negotiate pay awards locally with their employing authorities in addition to and/or separately from the national arrangements. This mechanism was originally introduced to allow for an opportunity to even out the wide variance in Brigade Manager pay around the country which often disadvantaged those at the lower end of the pay scales when accepting nationally negotiated, annual percentage increments.

11. This approach means that a report should be submitted to the employing authority, in this case the HFA, annually to outline the national position on pay and to make a recommendation to Members with regard to a pay award, if appropriate.

12. The table below summarises the pay awards for each staff group in HFRS since 2014.

Staff Group/Pay Award	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20
Green Book	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%
Grey Book	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%
Gold Book	1%	1%	1%	1%	2%	2%

13. It is the intent of the CFO/CE to submit a pay summary report to Members of the HFA annually. He will also incorporate, where considered necessary, a pay claim for Gold Book staff members under the 'twin track' approach as a supplement to the pay summary report.

14. As the NJC (Gold Book) offer for 2019 has been accepted by APFO it is not felt necessary to submit a pay claim for this staff group under the twin track approach for this year.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

15. This report is compatible with Strategic Objective 4: “Making the best use of the resources we have” and Objective 5: ‘’Continuing to develop a committed, skilled and safe workforce’’

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

16. A notional percentage pay award is added to the salary budget lines annually in order to anticipate and budget for pay awards. Pay awards that are less than those notionally added are shown as salary underspends in year.

LEGAL, EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR, CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT and HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

17. None arising

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

18. Pay Awards are communicated, once agreed, by the National Employers representing the various staff groups to the Fire Authority by circular.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION AND/OR COLLABORATION

19. Staff Pay is currently a matter of national negotiation with the exception of the ‘twin track’ approach to Gold Book pay described in paragraphs 8-10 of this report.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

20. None

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

21. That Members note:

(a) That Grey book staff have accepted a pay increment of 2% for 2019/20 from the National Employers (NJC) Grey Book;

(b) That Green book staff have accepted a pay increment equivalent to 2% for 2019/20 from the National Employers (NJC) Green Book;

(c) That Gold book staff have accepted a pay increment of 2% for 2019/20 from the National Employers (NJC) Gold Book.

M HEPPELL

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Director of People and Development

Humberside Fire & Rescue Service
Summergroves Way
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6 December 2019

Humberside Fire Authority
6 December 2019

Report by the Director of People and Development

ABSENCE MANAGEMENT UPDATE

SUMMARY

1. This report provides an update to Members with regard to absence management for the period 1 April 2019 to 30 September 2019. In keeping with the previous approach, absence remains a key area of focus for the Service.

RECOMMENDATIONS

2. That Members note the content of the report and take assurance that absence is being managed fairly, consistently and appropriately in the Service and necessary follow up actions are taken to address short and long term absence issues.

ABSENCE MANAGEMENT REPORTING

3. Table 1 below shows the performance during this period against target by staff group with 1 staff group being significantly below target and 1 area of focus above target due to long term absence in that area.

4. Whilst the level of absence in control is a concern as far as the headline figures refer in Table 1, this is due to small amount of staff having long term absence issues which we are progressively working through. As there are only 29.5 staff on the Control establishment, long term absence can quickly skew the figures disproportionately. The new Head of Occupational Health has now commenced and is already providing additional support to that area.

5. It is however important to note that during this quarter, as shown in Table 2, 95.7% Full Time Firefighters and 94.85% of Fire Staff achieved full attendance.

Table 1

	Sum of Days Lost	Establishment	Average Duty Days Lost per person	2019/20 annual target per person	YTD (annual divided by 12 x current month number
Control	317	29.5	10.75	8.70	4.35
Fire Staff	1175.43	174.82	6.72	10.00	5.00
On Call	556.20	343	1.62	7.00	3.5
Full Time	1846	468	3.94	7.00	3.5
total	**3894.63**	**1015.32**	**3.84**		

Table 2

	2nd Quarter	2nd Quarter	2nd Quarter	Target attendance
	2017/18	**2018/19**	**2019/20**	
Full time	95.86%	96.55%	95.69%	95%
Control	90.71%	97.75%	88.26%	95%
Fire Staff	94.21%	96.53%	94.85%	97%

6. Table 3 shows the reasons for absence for all staff groups during the period and shows that, once again, mental health conditions are the top reason for absence. This may be related to the significant work undertaken by the Service in raising awareness of mental health and encouraging staff to be open about the impact of mental ill health

on individuals. Staff may well be more prepared to declare that their ill health is related to mental conditions, rather than mask with other conditions due to stigma.

7. The Service continues to support staff experiencing mental health conditions with initiatives such as the Blue Light Champions, Critical Incident Support and publicising potential internal and external routes where staff may seek support. It is also anticipated that the recent training and promotion of the zero tolerance to bullying campaign may also help to identify and address situations which are leading to mental health issues in the Service.

8. Table 4 shows the comparison of long-term and short-term absence against medical condition and shows that mental ill health continues to account for the highest levels of long term absence. As referred to in para 6 above, work continues to address this issue.

9. Table 4 also shows current long term absences of a life threatening nature relating to cancer and cardiovascular issues. Added to which a number of staff are suffering from back, knee and lower limb musculoskeletal conditions which are often inherent in an aging workforce undertaking work of a physically demanding nature. All of these issues are being managed and supported as appropriate to each individual case.

Table 3

CLG Category	Total duty days lost
Mental Health Anxiety/Depression	809.52
Musculo Skeletal Lower Limb	612.40
Musculo Skeletal Back	462.07
Musculo Skeletal Knee	450.38
Cardiovascular Other	293.31
Musculo Skeletal Upper Limb	209.74
Gastro Intestinal	203.65
Neurological	185.06
Musculo Skeletal Shoulders	133.00
Respiratory Other	115.50
Musculo Skeletal Other	88.47
Other	85.00
Cancer	82.64
Endocrine	69.00
Dermatological	27.44
Mental Health Other	17.96
Urological	15.00
Musculo Skeletal Neck	10.99
Senses Hearing	9.68
Reproductive	8.82
Senses Vision	5.00
	3894.63

Table 4

CLG Category	Long Term days lost	Short Term days lost	Grand Total – days lost
Cancer	82.64	0.00	82.64
Cardiovascular Other	290.41	2.90	293.31
Dermatological	0.00	27.44	27.44
Endocrine	62.00	7.00	69.00
Gastro Intestinal	30.00	173.65	203.65
Mental Health Anxiety/Depression	756.71	52.81	809.52
Mental Health Other	15.54	2.42	17.96
Musculo Skeletal Back	337.20	124.87	462.07
Musculo Skeletal Knee	369.54	80.84	450.38
Musculo Skeletal Lower Limb	523.12	89.28	612.40
Musculo Skeletal Neck	0.00	10.99	10.99
Musculo Skeletal Other	75.27	13.20	88.47
Musculo Skeletal Shoulders	131.00	2.00	133.00
Musculo Skeletal Upper Limb	181.22	28.52	209.74
Neurological	141.00	44.06	185.06
Other	0.00	85.00	85.00
Reproductive	0.00	8.82	8.82
Respiratory Other	0.59	114.91	115.50
Senses Hearing	0.00	9.68	9.68
Senses Vision	0.00	5.00	5.00
Grand Total	2996.24	898.39	3894.63

CASE REVIEW BOARD

10. The Case Review Board continues to show real progress in encouraging consistent management of absence and empowering managers to both seek support and manage their own local absence issues more appropriately and effectively.

11. Managers are further supported in developing their absence management skills by HR Service Partners who provide assistance and coaching as necessary. This dual approach continues to provide consistency in managing absence cases and ensuring all parties are appropriately supported.

12. Occupational Health services, internal support for maintaining operational fitness and counselling services are all utilised according to individual need. This integrated approach seeks to make best use of all available health resources, support staff during periods of ill health and support their return to work (where possible) in the most effective way.

COMPARISON WITH THE SAME PERIOD LAST YEAR

13. Table 5 shows a comparison of absence in the same period last year with this year. Whilst there are concerns about the increase in long term absence, this is being addressed. Long term absence tends to be cyclical and is often complex to manage. At the point in the year with which we are comparing this data, a number of previous long term absentees had recently exited the Service on ill health grounds, thus improving the overall absence figures at that time. As referred to in para 9, we are now supporting a number of further staff through long term health issues; 70% of the absence issues during this period have been long term in nature.

Table 5

	2019/20 Sum of Duty Days Lost	Establishment as of 28/06/2019	2019/20 Average Duty Days Lost Per Person per Contract Type	2018/19 Sum of Duty Days Lost	Establishment as of 02/07/18	2018/19 Average Duty Days Lost Per Person per Contract Type	difference between contract groups 19/20 - 18/19
Control	317.00	29.5	10.75	60.00	25.29	2.37	257.00
Support Staff	1175.43	174.82	6.72	719.39	180.28	3.99	456.04
On-Call	556.20	343	1.62	630.60	343.00	1.84	-74.40
Full-Time	1846.00	468	3.94	1528.00	484.00	3.16	318.00
Grand Total	3894.63	1015.32	3.84	2937.99	1032.57	2.85	956.64
Number of sickness absence days difference to 18-19	**956.64**						

14. High levels of activity and focus continue to be placed on the management of absence. Recent developments with the zero tolerance to bullying campaign and mental health support mechanisms aim to address the mental health issues within the organisation. Similarly the biannual fitness testing process, which ran again in September 2019 aims to identify and support all operational staff with general fitness and muscular skeletal issues.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

15. Effective management of sickness absence is a key enabler towards achieving all of our Strategic Objectives and supports the Value Our People workstream.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

16. Management of sickness absence and the retention of personnel through effective attendance have a positive impact on both the finances of the Service and the resources available for deployment.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

17. The fair management of absence with a consistent approach to the management of cases and the use of reasonable adjustments to support staff back into the workplace decreases the risk of Employment Tribunals being brought against the Authority and the loss of these cases when they happen.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

18. The fair management of absence cases supports the delivery of equality of opportunity and ensures that staff suffering from ill health are treated equally regardless of gender, disability and other protected characteristics.

19. The introduction of new ways of consistently managing absence represents the use of HR best practice across the Service.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

20. Appropriate management of absence reduces the risk of related corporate issues being raised.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

21. Appropriate management of absence reduces the risk of negative health and safety implications.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

22. Managers are being regularly communicated with in relation to absence through a coaching approach by the HR Service Partners and regular meetings with the Director of HR and the DCFO.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION

23. None directly arising.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

24. None.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

25. That Members note the content of the report and take assurance that absence is being managed fairly, consistently and appropriately in the Service and that actions taken are having a positive impact on absence management figures.

M HEPPELL

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Agenda Item No. 16

Humberside Fire Authority
06 December 2019

Report by the Director of People and Development

WORKFORCE PLAN

SUMMARY

1. In 2018 a new Workforce Planning Framework was introduced. This laid out the mechanisms for developing and refreshing a robust and effective Workforce Planning system and process.

2. This Workforce Plan has been developed as a live, working document that will evolve over time. Members will be sent a link to the live document to enable them to comment on it as it evolves.

3. The Workforce Plan is reviewed quarterly and on an on-going basis, with an annual refresh of the document itself.

4. There are a number of key issues coming from the data as it is emerging in the developing plan, not least the impact of the McCloud pension case; the issues of which are described in the body of this report.

5. HMICFRS have highlighted some issues for workforce and succession planning, the solutions to which are considered in this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

6. Members are asked to consider the key issues described in this report from the developing Workforce Plan and consider the options described.

7. Members are requested to endorse the principle of re-engagement of staff as one methodology to support efficient workforce planning, and that papers will be brought back to the Authority seeking approval for re-engagement to specific posts whenever that option is recommended.

8. Members are asked to note the extension to the Chief Fire Officer and Chief Executive's contract of employment to 15th October 2022, as previously agreed by the Authority.

REPORT DETAIL

9. Since the Workforce Planning Framework was agreed, two full workforce planning cycles have been undertaken across the Service. The HR Service Partners have continued to meet with managers of every station and section and together they have interrogated the Establishment data for their area of work held on Firewatch, the Service HR system. In addition, they have looked at local planned and unplanned attrition rates and local context and developments.

10. Once this process was complete, the information was aggregated, analysed and inputted into the Workforce Planning spreadsheet, which acts as the Master System.

11. The information was then triangulated with station and section profiles, the retirement profile and financial budgeting information.

12. The updated narrative is currently being formulated with input from Human Resources, Organisational Development and the Strategic Leadership Team.

13. Key issues from the 2020-2023 Plan include:

- During 2019 the Service transitioned to an area-based leadership approach. The structure has been embedded throughout the year with a further change to portfolio allocation and management. The new structure provides increased effectiveness through more cohesive working arrangements and visible, accountable leadership locally for staff, partners and communities;
- Gender split remains an issue in the Service as a whole, with a particular issue in Firefighting roles;
- The most senior roles in the Service, specifically the Chief Fire Officer and the Deputy Chief Fire Officer, are held by individuals who could choose to leave the Service immediately.

14. Workforce developments during 2019 included:

- Hosting the first national HeForShe conference for Fire and Rescue Services. Attendees included a representative from the United Nations who we continue to work with on gender equality.
- The HMICFRS inspection and report highlighted several opportunities to develop our employment practices and a Service Improvement Plan (SIP) has been developed which seeks to address these areas;
- A new mobilising system (East Coast and Hertfordshire Control Room Consortium) has been successfully implemented. To achieve that a number of staff have been seconded into the Consortium who will return to the Service in the coming months.
- A collective agreement for the locally determined 42 hour duty system has been signed off for 2020.
- A joint Health and Safety function was established in collaboration with Humberside Police, which is led by the Service.
- The Grenfell Report was published 31st October 2019 detailing a range of findings and recommendations that the Service will be considering during the coming months. We are already implementing changes as a result of the report which impact on staff, including significant training for station based staff to undertake Business Safety activities.
- First ever National Cadets Course was run by HFRS where 15 young people completed a selection process and a 7-week course took place in November 2019.

ISSUES RELATING TO FIREFIGHTING STAFF

15. A significant anticipated attrition rate due to expected retirements of staff, at all levels and across all staff groups, over the period covered by the Workforce Plan. This is likely to be increased by the outcomes of the national Employment Tribunal on 18 December 2019 which is described in detail further in the report.

16. We continue to have recruitment challenges for On-Call staff, in rural areas where 5-minute response time to the station is geographically challenging.

ISSUES RELATING TO STAFF FROM OTHER PROFESSIONS

17. Previous issues related to the recruitment and retention of professionally qualified Occupational Health staff have been addressed and at the time of writing, this team is now fully established.

18. Recruitment and retention of ICT staff still remains an issue and consideration needs to be given to solutions to this issue, in order to be competitive with other employers.

19. Turnover in senior posts in HR has been high and consideration needs to be given as to the underlying reasons for this.

20. Business Safety staff numbers have been increased as vacancies have been filled and significant development of staff in that area has taken place including staff undertaking external professional qualifications in that area.

NATIONAL FIRE FRAMEWORK

21. The National Fire Framework published on 8th May 2018 sets out the government's priorities and objectives for fire and rescue authorities in England.

22. The Government has a duty under the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 to produce the Framework and keep it current. The Home Secretary reports every 2 years on fire and rescue authorities' compliance with the framework.

23. The Authority must 'have regard' to the National Framework, which means that the Framework must be taken into account by the Authority, but the Authority could decide to depart from the Framework where there are clear reasons to do so (clarified by the High Court in the ruling in R v Schools Adjudicator 2015). The Framework says that Fire and Rescue Authorities must not re-appoint fire officers of Area Manager and above after retirement to their previous, or a similar, post save for in exceptional circumstances, when such a decision is necessary in the interests of public safety. Members will be aware that there have been discussions as to whether there might be a challenge to the legality of that area of the Framework due to potential claims of age discrimination under the Equalities Act 2010, which might be made against the Authority.

24. The Framework also states that "while the above requirements only extend to principal fire officers, we expect fire and rescue authorities to have regard to this principle when re-appointing at any level."

CHIEF FIRE OFFICER / CHIEF EXECUTIVE

25. On 27 July 2018, the Fire Authority decided that Mr Chris Blacksell be offered the opportunity to be re-engaged in the post of Chief Fire Officer & Chief Executive, following his retirement, for a temporary period of between 2 and 4 years. Mr Blacksell subsequently accepted this offer and was re-engaged on 15th October 2018.

26. The Chair of the Authority has discussed the actual length of tenure, given the flexibility approved by the Authority, and it has been agreed that Mr Blacksell continue his appointment beyond the initial 2 years and remain in post for the maximum contractual period of 4 years until 15th October 2022.

PENSIONS ISSUE

27. In 2015 the Government introduced reforms to public sector pensions, meaning most public sector workers, including firefighters, were moved into new pension schemes in 2015. In December 2018, the Court of Appeal ruled that the 'transitional protection' offered to some members of the firefighters' schemes, as part of the reforms, amounted to unlawful discrimination.

28. The implications for recruitment over the coming 3 years will vary according to the outcome of the Remedy Hearing scheduled for December 2019, but it is likely to result in an increased volume of Wholetime Firefighters and more senior operational officers retiring across all ranks from now through to December 2023. This potential has been mapped into the Workforce Plan and it has been established that this could cause a significant issue with both the overall number of operational staff and the

potential to lose experienced and specialist staff much quicker than has previously been planned for.

29. A wider range of recruitment and succession solutions (to operational posts) will need to be developed over the next year to prepare the Service to maintain the current provision following potential increased volume in retirements.

Current options are as follows:

(a) Consideration of the re-engagement of retired or soon to retire staff across all staff groups and grades on temporary contracts to meet Service demand at short notice. These could particularly be of use to fill vacancies that do not warrant running a Wholetime Firefighters 14 week training school, eg. should there be less than 10 vacancies. Skills and fitness of returners would need to be maintained to ensure optimum service delivery and safety. The implications and financial impacts of this approach are detailed in Appendix 1.

(b) Wholetime Firefighter recruitment via a 'pipeline' process. All candidates would undertake the usual application and selection process short of medical and physical testing and be held on a list. Once the retirement picture is clearer, and perhaps having used option (a) above in the short term, an intake of Probationer Firefighters could be arranged within a 6 to 8 week period by conducting medicals, fitness tests and including a month's notice period to candidates exiting employers.

(c) External recruitment to continue to be utilised across all ranks, enabling candidates to come into the HFRS as transferees.

(d) Succession planning processes to be developed to identify 'who is ready to progress now' into known future vacancies supported by IDPs.

(e) A talent pipeline to be developed to enable individuals with high potential and aptitude to be fast tracked for development and progression; again, supported by IDPs.

(f) Wholetime Firefighter numbers could drop below the established 268 level. This will impact on ability to deliver services and will not allow for resilience in times of significant demand (eg. Flooding during November 2019) training or absence cover. This would also put remaining Firefighters at greater risk when carrying out their duties.

PROGRESS AGAINST THE 2018-2021 PLAN

30. Actions to date include:

- Active and continuous positive action is beginning to address the gender gap with seven women joining our Firefighter recruit training in March 2019;
- A new Recruitment policy has been developed and implemented to ensure that each specific post is advertised and replaces the methodology of recruiting for rank promotions.
- Retirement profiles are under closer review following the McCloud case with the aim to better anticipate skills and capacity gaps;
- Managerial operational roles from Crew Manager upwards were opened up for external recruitment during 2019;
- The Core Skills Framework has been implemented which identifies the basic skills required for all staff regardless of job role;
- The new Performance and Development Review (PDR) process ran for its second year across the Service including the identification of training needs.

A training needs analysis was conducted with needs met through appropriate training provisions;

- Individual Personal Development (IDP) plans continue to be used to support staff to improve their skills to the required level;
- The Leadership Forum continues to meet regularly to develop leaders;
- 3 apprenticeships commenced in 2019 and 17 were ongoing (form 2018) utilising the Services apprenticeship levy;
- Utilisation of the National On-Call Firefighter campaign through local and national coverage continued to generate a larger number of enquiries being received by the Service.
- The East Coast and Hertfordshire Consortium Control Project will go live in Humberside in November 2019.
- Provision of a 24/7 critical incident media and communications and critical ICT support for resilience from police to fire and provision of 24/7 aerial support via drone and Hazmat response from fire to police.

31. Future developments in the Plan include:

- Detailed strategic plans emerging on the Police and Fire Collaboration Agenda;
- Further development to transfer the PDR process onto an electronic format for greater analysis capacity.
- Wider focus on Wholetime Firefighter retirement profiles, subsequent to the McCloud remedy with a variety of recruitment responses as detailed in the options above.

32. Horizon scanning workshops are continuously planned over the course of each year to scope out our detailed position on future developments for the Service.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

33. The development of an effective Workforce Plan better enables the Service to have the accurate information to meet all its strategic objectives, but particularly Value Our People, Respond Effectively, Support Delivery and Making our Communities Safer.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

34. The effective establishment control and detailed understanding of our biggest asset; our Workforce, is essential in the effective management of our financial resources, ensuring value for money for local communities.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

35. Effective workforce planning gives a better understanding of the workforce position, which better enables the Service to manage its legal obligations; in this context, with particular regard to our Public Sector Equality Duty and employment legislation. We will also be better equipped to ensure we meet our statutory obligations to the communities we serve in providing a safe and effective Fire and Rescue Service.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

36. The development of the Workforce Plan has given us a more detailed understanding of our workforce position and enables us to better understand the negative implications of not being broadly representative of the communities we serve and will provide a basis on which to continue to develop our plans to encourage more women, BAME people and others with protected characteristics to join the Service.

37. The HR Service Partners continue to develop the “coaching” style to work alongside our managers to evolve and refresh the Plan regularly.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

38. The lack of effective workforce planning can present significant corporate risks if we do not have the right staff in the right place with the right skills at the right time. The development of this Plan presents mitigation to that risk.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

39. None arising directly.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

40. The Plan will be communicated and explained widely across the Workforce and will be published on the Service's website.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION AND/OR COLLABORATION

41. The Plan has been developed with collaboration across the full Service. Formal consultation is not necessary.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

42. None identified.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

43. Members are asked to consider the key issues described in this report from the developing Workforce Plan and consider the options described.

44. Members are requested to consider and endorse the principle of re-engagement of staff as a methodology to support efficient workforce planning, with regard to further papers which may be brought to agree its use for specific posts.

45. Members are asked to note the extension to the Chief Fire Officer and Chief Executive's contract of employment to the maximum date of 15th October 2022.

M HEPPELL

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Director of People and Development

Humberside Fire & Rescue Service
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MH
28 November 2019

Current Retirement Profile



In areas below the line these periods cause staff shortages and require overtime payments or reduction in resources for periods.

Areas above the line these are periods where we are paying for more operational staff than are needed. This is a good position as it provides resilience for availability issues caused by long term sickness and also enables full-time firefighters to assist on-call availability. However, it is very costly (recent periods around £50k per month).

Recruitment Profile if we choose to never go over establishment



If this method is used, then there are no permanent costs for over establishment full-time operational staff. However, there would be increased periods where overtime costs would be required which has the potential to be more costly than periods where the number of staff is at the optimum level.

Recommended Recruitment Profile



The recommended recruitment profile is to use fixed term, flexible contracts to maintain operational levels at the optimum level at all times. In effect, as operational staff leave the Service, we would look to re-engage competent staff to fill the gaps taking into account staff numbers, experience and specialist skills until the level of permanent operational staff drops to a level whereby a full recruit course is viable. Long term this will mean we recruit the same numbers of new firefighters, but the savings of not running over establishment would be significant and would reduce the likelihood of savings being required that would impact on Service Delivery to the public.

It would also mean that overtime requirements on permanent staff would be minimised, which is better for their wellbeing.

Agenda Item No. 17

Humberside Fire Authority
6 December 2019

Report by Director of Service Improvement

INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN (IRMP) 2018/21 CONSULTATION OUTCOMES

SUMMARY

1. At the Fire Authority meeting 29 July 2019 Members approved a six-week public consultation for the draft IRMP, focused around five specific questions. The time period was extended to eight weeks to incorporate engagement opportunities occurring over the summer period.

2. Members will note that the IRMP and Strategic Plan are key reference documents for the HMICFRS inspection team; specific reference is made to the IRMP throughout the 2018 Inspection Report.

3. A link to the refreshed draft IRMP has been provided in the Fire Authority report area of the HFRS Website.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. Members are asked to consider this report and approve the revised IRMP 2018-21 for publication on the HFRS Website at:
https://humbersidefire.gov.uk/uploads/files/IRMP_2018-2021.pdf

INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN

5. The production of an IRMP is a statutory requirement within the Fire and Rescue National Framework 2018. It is a living document which describes the risk in the Service area and details how the Service organises itself to manage and respond to those risks.

6. Members are aware that the IRMP is a comprehensive document which provides in depth information about our risks and service provision. It is hosted as an electronic document on the HFRS Website, enabling readers to 'drill down' into the information they require. As well as a general update for currency, new information was added pre-consultation in relation to:

- Our 'Optimum Availability Model';
- Over border exercises;
- Fire Severity definitions;
- Changes made to Dwelling Risk definitions;
- Inclusion of an up to date summary of our Emergency Response resources and emergency incident activity within each Local Authority area.

7. The IRMP is treated as a living document and members of the public, our employees and partners are encouraged to provide suggestions, or comments, regarding content.

CONSULTATION METHODOLOGY

8. Members are reminded that our HMICFRS inspection report identified that, as at November 2018, more should be done to improve how we engage with local communities in order to inform our risk profiling. Members can be assured that a substantial level of continuous

activity takes place in order to inform our risk profile, particularly from engagement with the Local Resilience Forum (LRF), Unitary Authorities, Partner Agencies, Community Profiling, District based community and business engagement and extensive use of risk modelling data and profiling tools. Cyclical consultation provides an additional potential source of data, particularly from our communities.

9. A targeted Social Media campaign, supplemented by District based personal engagement, Website publicity and collaboration with partner engagement teams therefore formed the basis of consultation and engagement for the 2019/20 refresh of the IRMP.

This approach, also taken for Precept consultation, led to notable increases in responses for public engagement and consultation, of note for Members and this Report:

Council Tax Precept Consultation		**IRMP Consultation**	
2018/19 responses	69	2018/19 responses	15
2019/20 responses	1079	2019/20 responses	956

CONSULTATION OUTCOMES

10. Due to the high number of responses (29 pages), consultation comments have been uploaded in full to the IRMP area of the HFRS Website for reference (https://humbersidefire.gov.uk/about-us/our-vision/our-plans).

High level summary against each question:

a) Question 1

Our vehicle fleet is currently diesel powered, including emergency response vehicles and general-purpose cars and vans. Whilst it would not currently be feasible to replace fire engines with electric or hybrid vehicles, there may be options as to what we use as general-purpose vehicles.

Do you support our aspiration to move to a carbon neutral fleet of vehicles, when and where it is practical and efficient to do so?

Yes	864
No	64
Not applicable	27

Total number of comments = 191

- There was overall support for investigating ways to reduce our carbon emissions from our fleet of vehicles.
- Caution that we should only do this as and when required to replace vehicles.
- Ensure we are still able to respond to emergencies, officers and first responders.
- Many felt there still isn't the infrastructure to support electric vehicles in our area and that sources of electricity still come from fossil fuels.

b) Question 2

We currently benefit from the support provided by a number of emergency services volunteers. Supported by professional public safety staff, our volunteers actively help us in managing risk within local communities, for example, by handing out safety information at public events.

Do you support us in developing and expanding the role of trained volunteers in the local communities?

Yes	860
No	78
Not applicable	18

Total number of comments = 164

- Overall support for using more trained volunteers.
- Not to replace other employees.
- They support the work our staff are doing in the communities.
- A number supported the question, but also suggested a paid reward or pay towards development as an incentive to remain a volunteer.

c) Question 3

We would like to explore whether, on a voluntary basis, any businesses or local communities would consider funding locality based Public Safety services, tailored specifically to meet the needs of particular communities. This would only be used to supplement our core safety and emergency response services.

Do you think this would be worth investigating further?

Yes	688
No	184
Not applicable	83

Total number of comments = 174

- Although the overall response was favourable, this question received the most No and Not Applicable responses.
- Agreement that the Fire and Rescue Service needs more funds, either by local businesses, community and/or from Government.
- Awareness that emergency services have had funding cuts.
- Concern that wealthier areas would benefit to the detriment of less wealthy areas.
- Concern that it could lead to privatisation of the Fire and Rescue Service, or buildings and vehicles having brand logos on them.
- Many raised the point that a process for risk planning and evaluation would need to be put in place in case the funding stopped.

d) Question 4

We are currently reviewing our risk inspection approach to give priority to buildings where people are most likely to become a casualty from fire. We are going to focus our specialist inspectors on high risk buildings and use our trained firefighters to inspect lower risk buildings. Specialist inspectors will continue to be used whenever this is appropriate to the risk.

Do you support this methodology for our risk-based inspection approach?

Yes	859
No	58
Not applicable	37

Total number of comments = 138

- Overall support for this method, many thought we already did this.
- Sensible approach and best use of resources.
- Concern was raised that Firefighters need to be as qualified as specialists. Are there costs to train firefighters and maintain this, would it be better spent on hiring more specialists.
- Questions raised on how we determine a building's risk and percentage of high risk to low risk and how much work is involved in investigation.

e) Question 5

Lastly, we would really welcome any suggestions that you may have about how we can support our communities more effectively and also, if there are any significant Fire and Rescue Service risks that you think we have not covered.

We think we already do a great job but would love to hear what you think.

Total number of comments = 281

This question was an opportunity to provide any comments regarding the IRMP and identify risks we may need to be aware of. We received the most comments for this question. The summary below highlights the key headline areas that were raised:

Themes:

- Shared emergency services buildings.
- Extra resources around flooding, such as specialist responders, do we need volunteer firefighters to support in incidents like this.
- Our response to extreme weather.

f) Location of respondents (where this information was provided):

East Yorkshire	371
Hull	209
North East Lincs	182
North Lincs	165
Outside area	14

ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO CONSULTATION

11. It was particularly pleasing to note that a high number of respondents had looked at the IRMP document and provided informed views and suggestions for consideration. Members can be assured that the rich level of information provided by respondents has been reviewed and a number of content changes have been made as a result.

This has included:

- Amended 'Future Risks' to 'Arising Risks' and included specific narrative in relation to the potential environmental impact from climate change. Environmental and weather-related issues were raised by a number of respondents.
- The position of a dedicated FRS Casualty Reduction Officer, within the Safer Roads Humber team, is now included in the road safety narrative to provide greater clarity of our collaborative road safety activity.

- The Service definition of High and Low Risk, in relation to the Risk Based Inspection Programme (RBIP), has been refined to clarify the types of property/business falling under each category.
- A fuller description of our Water Rescue, Flood Response and Maritime Emergency (Alongside, or within the Humber Estuary and Fire Authority Boundary) capability has been provided to better describe how we mitigate different risks within water-based environments.

12. In addition, the process of asking focussed questions regarding potential changes to delivery, or future planning considerations, provides Officers and Members with intelligence regarding the general views of our Community and something of a mandate should we decide to proceed. Members are already aware of the following actions:

- Trials of electric vehicles, to replace some support vehicles, are currently taking place.
- A Risk Based Inspection Model incorporating the skills and capacity of firefighters, matched to the more specialist skills of our Business Safety Inspectors has been trialled and will shortly be implemented.
- Whilst volunteers are used on a limited basis currently, we recognise that this is a resource that can provide meaningful support in many areas and this will be investigated further.
- More innovative changes to funding appear to have support from the community and will also be investigated further.
- A number of general responses relating to climate and environmental/weather related incidents were received, the content of our IRMP has been amended to better reflect our understanding of these arising risks and our capability to deal with such incidents. This re-enforces existing information in relation to our flood response arrangements.

13. Where contact details have been provided the Corporate Communications team will reply to respondents to thank them and provide a link to the final version of the IRMP.

ARISING CYCLICAL REVIEWS

14. The Strategic Leadership Team also consider the need for cyclical reviews of all Strategic Framework documents, plans and delivery arrangements arising from horizon scanning and changing service delivery environments. It is now considered timely to conduct an effectiveness and efficiency evaluation of our current Incident Command Structure and duty system(s). This will incorporate:

a) The effectiveness of risk and demand-based rota systems and arrangements, providing 24-hour capacity to respond to incidents for:

- Strategic Command (On-call Incident Commanders Area Manager to CFO).
- Flexible Duty System Tactical and Bronze Command (On-call Incident Commanders and Specialist Officers Station Manager to Group Manager).

b) The effectiveness of current Incident Command and support mobilising triggers, defining the level of response against incident scale and/or severity.

Further detail regarding the scope of evaluation, outcomes and recommendations will be reported to Members in due course.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

15. The Strategic Plan and IRMP are produced over a three-year cycle, with annual review but a fixed plan period. The Strategic Plan and associated workstreams are, effectively, the delivery action plan for the IRMP.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

16. The Strategic Plan describes the work to deliver, as a Service and in collaboration with partners, opportunities for improved efficiency and increased value for our communities.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

17. The Strategic Planning Framework will ensure the Authority's requirements under the Fire Services Act are met.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

18. An Equality Assessment will be completed for the final version of the IRMP in conjunction with the Equality Steering Group.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

19. The outcomes relating to delivery of the Strategic Plan are used when assessing and formulating strategic risks.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

20. None directly arising.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

21. The IRMP will be published on the HFRS website as an electronic document, with a PDF version that can be printed in hard copy.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION AND/OR COLLABORATION

22. Consultation activity is managed by the Corporate Communications team as described within this Report.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

23. Strategic Plan 2018-21.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

24. Members are asked to consider this report and approve the revised IRMP 2018-21 for publication on the HFRS Website at:
https://humbersidefire.gov.uk/uploads/files/IRMP_2018-2021.pdf

N MCKINIRY

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Head of Corporate Assurance

Humberside Fire & Rescue Service
Summergroves Way
Kingston upon Hull

6 December 2019

Agenda Item No. 18

Humberside Fire Authority
6 December 2019

Report by Director of Service Improvement

HER MAJESTY'S INSPECTORATE OF CONSTABULARY AND FIRE & RESCUE SERVICES (HMICFRS) CONSULTATION RESPONSE

SUMMARY

1. On 22 October 2019, HMICFRS opened a public consultation for the proposed Fire and Rescue Service inspection programme and framework for 2020/21, with a return date for responses of 29 November 2019.

2. Due to the date range for the consultation exercise, Members received a presentation of the draft consultation response to HMICFRS at the Member Day held 22 November 2019. Members subsequently approved the responses for submission to HMICFRS.

RECOMMENDATIONS

3. That Members formally endorse the Service's consultation response to HMICFRS, submitted 29 November 2019.

BACKGROUND

4. On 22 October 2019 HMICFRS opened a public consultation for the proposed Fire and Rescue Service inspection programme and framework.

5. The consultation pack includes details of HMICFRS's proposed approach for 2020/21 and asks for views as to whether the right areas of fire and rescue services activity have been covered.

6. The inspection framework retains the same structure used in 2018/19, which is based against the three pillars of effectiveness, efficiency and people. Detailed in the consultation pack (page 8) HMICFRS propose specific revisions to each pillar, summarised as follows:

   - Effectiveness; During the second cycle of inspections we will provide the public with more clarity on how well fire and rescue services are prepared to respond to major incidents with other fire services and agencies.

   - Efficiency; New questions have been added which focus on whether a service can demonstrate what savings it has made, the effect of these on its operational performance, and whether its use of reserves is sustainable.

   - People; The question sets have been altered slightly to reflect an additional focus on the behaviours within the workforce, and to also consider individuals' career pathways.

7. HMICFRS are seeking responses to six specific consultation questions:

   a. What do you think of the proposed approach to FRS inspection that HMICFRS proposes to conduct in the next cycle? How could this be improved?

b. *Does the draft inspection methodology (annex A) include the right questions to gather evidence for a rounded assessment of fire and rescue services? How could this be improved?*

c. *How best could HMICFRS report on the progress the service has made since the previous inspection?*

d. *What, if any, new or emerging problems for fire and rescue services should HMICFRS take into account in its inspections?*

e. *How else could HMICFRS adapt the way in which it acquires information to take full account of the circumstances of fire and rescue services and of risks to public safety?*

f. *What else should HMICFRS consider doing to make its fire and rescue service assessments as fair as they can be?*

CONSULTATION QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

8. HMICFRS are specifically seeking responses to six questions, which are contextually embedded within the consultation document:

a. ***What do you think of the proposed approach to FRS inspection that HMICFRS proposes to conduct in the next cycle? How could this be improved?***

Response:

Maintaining the three pillars of effectiveness, efficiency and people into the 2020/21 cycle helps to uphold both the consistency in approach and alignment to the Service's developed workstreams in response to the 2018 inspection outcomes. We agree with the introduction of new focus areas in each of the three pillars.

b. ***Does the draft inspection methodology (annex A) include the right questions to gather evidence for a rounded assessment of fire and rescue services? How could this be improved?***

Response:

- Yes overall, as the draft inspection methodology maintains the consistency from the 2018/19 inspection.
- Consideration could be given towards 'sense checking' wording and terminology used within questions, with the FRS Technical Advisory Group (TAG).
- Consideration should be given to further refinement of the HMICFRS Staff Survey questions and methodology, to remove ambiguities and reduce the likelihood of multiple individual responses. This should be carried out at the TAG.
- Consideration should be given to further refinement of the HMICFRS Staff Survey questions and methodology to remove ambiguities and reduce the likelihood of multiple individual responses. This should also be carried out at the TAG.
- An indication of the weighting applied to each diagnostic question would improve understanding of the assessment and graded judgement methodology.

c. ***How best could HMICFRS report on the progress the service has made since the previous inspection?***

Response:

- Each FRS should provide a direction of travel update as the focus for the Strategic Brief. The Strategic Brief should take place on Day 1 of Fieldwork week.
- Direction of travel should be recognised within the Inspection Report.
- Increased Service engagement with the HMICFRS Service Liaison Lead and HMICFRS Service Analytical Lead pre and post inspection.

d. ***What, if any, new or emerging problems for fire and rescue services should HMICFRS take into account in its inspections?***

In relation to potential changes to the National Framework 2020:

- Statutory changes arising from the Grenfell Inquiry.
- Future funding uncertainty challenges to delivery of the National Framework.

In relation to arising risks:

- Understanding of the local/regional impact of climate change on response capability and capacity.
- Contingency arrangements for the potential threat of industrial action.

e. ***How else could HMICFRS adapt the way in which it acquires information to take full account of the circumstances of fire and rescue services and of risks to public safety?***

- More consistent engagement through the SLL, including attendance at Fire Authority meetings to observe the reporting of items, governance/oversight and business planning and Member/Officer decision making.
- Review of the document request phase, including the type and context of information required, refined through the TAG group.

f. ***What else should HMICFRS consider doing to make its fire and rescue service assessments as fair as they can be?***

- Ensure time scales for pre-inspection phases are consistently applied to all Services.
- Engagement with the SLL to provide context during the pre-publication checking phase.
- Reduced inspection volume for SLLs to enable improved engagement.
- Reduce lag between the end of Fieldwork and pre-publication of the Report.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

9. The Service's response is compatible with the Strategic Plan 2018-21, Corporate objectives:

- Supporting independent scrutiny and audit of everything we do.
- Be transparent and accessible.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

10. There are no financial, resource or value for money issues at this time.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

11. Section 28A of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 states that any inspection programme and framework requires the approval of the Home Secretary before the inspectors act in accordance with it. The Home Secretary may, at any time, require HMICFRS to carry out an inspection of a fire and rescue authority in England. Such a requirement may limit the inspection to a particular matter. HMICFRS may also carry out an inspection of a fire and rescue authority in England even though that inspection has not been set out in an inspection programme and has not been required by the Home Secretary. Before doing so, the chief inspector must consult the Home Secretary.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

12. There are no current equality impact or HR implications at this time.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

13. There are no corporate risk management issues currently.

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

14. There are no Health and Safety implications at this time.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

15. An overview of the proposal from HMICFRS and the consultation response was provided at the Member Day 22 November 2019. The inspection methodology and Service's response has been communicated via Siren; a link to the consultation was provided on the HFRS Website.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION AND/OR COLLABORATION

16. Hyperlink on the HFRS website directed users to the HMICFRS website consultation document for responses.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

17. Proposed fire and rescue services inspection programme and framework 2020/21.

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

18. That Members formally endorse the Service's consultation response to HMICFRS, submitted 29 November 2019.

N. McKINIRY

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29 November 2019

Agenda Item No. 20

Humberside Fire Authority
06 December 2019

Report by the Director of Service Support Delivery

THE GRENFELL TOWER INQUIRY – NOVEMBER 2019

SUMMARY

1. The Prime Minister announced on 15 June 2017 a Public Inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on the night of 14 June 2017. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry will examine the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the fire. Sir Martin Moore-Bick was appointed as the Chair of the Inquiry by the Prime Minister on 28 June 2017. The Inquiry was formally set up on 15 August 2017 and the Prime Minister set the Terms of Reference (*appendix 1*) following a public consultation led by the Chair.

2. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report was published and released on 30 October 2019.

3. The Phase 1 report includes 46 specific recommendations (Part V - chapter 33), which are captured within a number of sub-headings.

4. Phase 1 of the Public Inquiry has taken 26 months from the formal set up to the report release, with Phase 2 starting in early 2020 and expected to be as detailed. There is no clear commitment at this stage as to a timescale for a Phase 2 final report.

5. The Phase 1 recommendations are wide reaching, with impacts across the whole of HFRS, as well as partner organisations. It is anticipated that there will be an increased level of workload across parts of the Service including (but not limited to):

    (i) Organisational Development;
    (ii) Operational Training;
    (iii) Health and Safety;
    (iv) Emergency Preparedness;
    (v) Public Safety and;
    (vi) Service Delivery.

6. It is envisaged that The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report will be included as a basis for content within any future HMICFRS inspection within all Fire and Rescue Services.

7. The National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC) have provided an update regarding their work in line with the Phase 1 report. The NFCC have asked that any FRS considering the recommendations, that any subsequent solutions are taken forward collectively to avoid duplication.

8. Some recommendations are already progressing at NFCC, for example a government led steering group on stay put and emergency evacuation, the NFCC Operations Committee looking at Smoke Hoods and a foundation document for Service Control Operations.

9. A Fire Authority member day presentation was given in November 2019 to update on The Grenfell Tower Fire: Phase 1 report and subsequent recommendations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. Members take assurance that HFRS are progressing with the work identified within the recommendations from The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report.

11. Members note the different organisations that the recommendations impact upon and the work required to progress:

    (a) Nationally through the Home Office and National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC);
    (b) through local partnerships, building owners and responsible persons and;
    (c) locally where appropriate and determined necessary in lieu of the above.

12. Members note the inevitable increased demand on Service resources and other in progressing the HFRS position in line with The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report recommendations. The outcomes from Dame Hackitts' Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety (May 2018) and future outcomes as a result Phase 2 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry in early 2020.

REPORT DETAIL

13. As outlined above, the Prime Minister announced on 15 June 2017 a Public Inquiry into the fire at Grenfell Tower on the night of 14 June 2017. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry was to examine the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the fire.

14. The Inquiry is investigating a "list of issues" (*appendix 2*). The Inquiry into the list of issues has been separated into two phases:

    (a) Phase 1 focuses on the factual narrative of the events and establishes what happened on the night of 14 June 2017. Hearings for Phase 1 began on 21 May 2018 and concluded on 12 December 2018.
    (b) Phase 2 of the Inquiry is focussing on the remainder of the list of issues and will concentrate on examining the circumstances and causes of the disaster. Phase 2 is reportedly commencing in January 2020. Following this, a final report will be written and published.

15. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report was published and released on 30 October 2019 (available here). The report is divided into 6 parts:

    (i) Background matters - a broad introduction to the events that took place during the early hours of 14 June 2017. It contains a description of Grenfell Tower itself and of the organisation of the London Fire Brigade (LFB).
    (ii) The events of 14 June 2017 - contains a detailed narrative account of the fire and the steps taken in response to it.
    (iii) Conclusions – contains conclusions about the origin and development of the fire and analysis of the response of the LFB and the other emergency services which attended the incident.
    (iv) Remembering those who died - the hearings commemorating those who died constituted an important part of the Inquiry's proceedings. A summary of the tributes paid to their loved ones by their families and friends.
    (v) Recommendations - recommendations arising out of the findings made earlier in the report.
    (vi) Looking ahead to Phase 2 - identifies some matters of particular importance on which the Inquiry will concentrate its attention.

16. The Phase 1 report includes 46 specific recommendations (Part V - chapter 33), which are captured within a number of sub-headings:

a) Fire and Rescue Services: knowledge and understanding of materials used in high-rise buildings;
b) Section 7(2)(d) of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004;
c) Plans;
d) Lifts;
e) Communications between the control room and the incident commander;
f) Emergency calls;
g) Command and control;
h) Equipment;
i) Evacuation;
j) Internal signage;
k) Fire doors and;
l) Co-operation between emergency services.

17. There are also comments within Part V which link to activities that are already being delivered within HFRS since the Grenfell Tower fire and Dame Hackitts' Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety (May 2018), for example, the presence of combustible cladding in high rise residential buildings.

18. The information contained within Part V of the report (recommendations), has been used to compile a learning log within the Service. The learning log will be used to capture information on the current HFRS position against each of the recommendations, as well as what actions are necessary to improve the HFRS position. The log will be a live document and link directly to the Service Improvement Plan.

19. Phase 1 of the Public Inquiry has taken 26 months from the formal set up to the report release, with Phase 2 starting in early 2020 and expected to be as detailed. There is no clear commitment at this stage as to a timescale for a Phase 2 final report.

20. The Phase 1 recommendations are wide reaching, with impacts across the whole of HFRS, as well as partner organisations. It is anticipated that there will be an increased level of workload across parts of the Service including (but not limited to):

(i) Organisational Development;
(ii) Operational Training;
(iii) Health and Safety;
(iv) Emergency Preparedness;
(v) Public Safety and;
(vi) Service Delivery.

21. It is envisaged that The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report will be included as a basis for content within any future HMICFRS inspection within all Fire and Rescue Services.

22. Existing HFRS arrangements in the management of information/demands related to the Grenfell Tower fire i.e. information requests, contributions, consultations, reports etc. has been daily business within the Public Safety Central team, with other sections contributing as and when appropriate. Moving forward, it is felt this position will be unsustainable and as a result dedicated resources will be assigned to progressing Grenfell related issues.

23. A Fire Authority Member Day presentation was given in November 2019 to update on The Grenfell Tower Fire: Phase 1 report and subsequent recommendations.

STRATEGIC PLAN COMPATIBILITY

24. The Grenfell incident and subsequent inquiry will have wide ranging implications for the sector that cut across every area of the Strategic Plan.

FINANCIAL/RESOURCES/VALUE FOR MONEY IMPLICATIONS

25. The recommendations are wide reaching, with impacts across the whole of HFRS, as well as partner organisations. It is anticipated that there will be an increased level of workload across parts of the Service including (but not limited to):

    (i) Organisational Development;
    (ii) Operational Training;
    (iii) Health and Safety;
    (iv) Emergency Preparedness;
    (v) Public Safety and;
    (vi) Service Delivery.

26. As considered within the Fire Authority Member Day presentation during November 2019, it is anticipated that costs associated with the continued work from the Grenfell Tower fire will be significant. This cost will be directly affected by any potential changes in legislation and any associated funding from Central Government. The cost of standing up a small project team to service these needs is also covered within the expected expenditure within this area.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

27. Any legal implications of The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report and the recommendations within, will be a feature of the future resourcing considerations within SLT papers.

EQUALITY IMPACT ASSESSMENT/HR IMPLICATIONS

28. Any equality impact implications resulting from work relating to The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report and the recommendations within, will be considered by the project team and be a feature of appropriate SLT papers.

29. Additional personnel will be seconded into a project team on a temporary basis for the duration of the project.

CORPORATE RISK MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS

30. In order to fulfil our statutory duties, it is necessary to consider the contents of The Grenfell inquiry and respond/react accordingly to mitigate any corporate risk(s).

HEALTH AND SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

31. The Service has an explicit responsibility to comply with relevant Health and Safety legislation which needs to be considered.

COMMUNICATION ACTIONS ARISING

32. An HFA Member Day presentation was provided during November 2019.

33. Communication across HFRS commenced on the 30 October 2019, to coincide with The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report being released. An external press release was also provided.

34. There has been a continual and sustained number of Freedom of Information requests since the Grenfell Tower fire, with a route for external communication being used through these requests.

35. Subsequent internal and external communications will be a feature of the future resourcing considerations within SLT papers.

DETAILS OF CONSULTATION

36. Appropriate internal and external consultation as a result of The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report and the recommendations within, will be undertaken as necessary and be a feature of the future SLT papers.

BACKGROUND PAPERS AVAILABLE FOR ACCESS

Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety – Dame Hackitt (May 2018)
HFA paper – Grenfell Update (June 2018)
SLT report – Aluminium Composite Material (August 2019)
The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report (October 2019)
Member Day Presentation (November 2019)

RECOMMENDATIONS RESTATED

37. Members take assurance that HFRS are progressing with the work identified within the recommendations from The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report.

38. Members note the different organisations that the recommendations impact upon and the work required to progress:

    a) Nationally through the Home Office and National Fire Chiefs Council (NFCC);
    b) through local partnerships, building owners and responsible persons and;
    c) locally were appropriate and determined necessary in lieu of the above.

39. Members note the inevitable increased demand on Service resources and other in progressing the HFRS position in line with The Grenfell Tower Inquiry: Phase 1 report recommendations. The outcomes from Dame Hackitts' Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety (May 2018) and future outcomes as a result Phase 2 of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry in early 2020.

S TOPHAM

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24 November 2018

The Inquiry's Terms of Reference are:

1). To examine the circumstances surrounding the fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017, including:

(a) the immediate cause or causes of the fire and the means by which it spread to the whole of the building;

(b) the design and construction of the building and the decisions relating to its modification, refurbishment and management;

(c) the scope and adequacy of building regulations, fire regulations and other legislation, guidance and industry practice relating to the design, construction, equipping and management of high-rise residential buildings;

(d) whether such regulations, legislation, guidance and industry practice were complied with in the case of Grenfell Tower and the fire safety measures adopted in relation to it;

(e) the arrangements made by the local authority or other responsible bodies for receiving and acting upon information either obtained from local residents or available from other sources, (including information derived from fires in other buildings) relating to the risk of fire at Grenfell Tower, and the action taken in response to such information;

(f) the fire prevention and fire safety measures in place at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017;

(g) the response of the London Fire Brigade to the fire; and

(h) the response of central and local government in the days immediately following the fire; and

2). To report its findings to the Prime Minister as soon as possible and to make recommendations.

Appendix 2

UPDATED LIST OF ISSUES

GENERAL NOTE

This list is intended as a guide to the issues on which the Inquiry's investigations will focus. It is not a prescriptive list and is not to be understood as a pleading or statement of case. The Inquiry's investigations may uncover the need to address further issues within its terms of reference but not contained in this list. Accordingly, the issues in this list may be subject to revision during the course of the Inquiry.

THE ISSUES

1) Grenfell Tower's original design, construction, composition (completed 1974)

(a) What was its design, construction and composition?

(b) What were the relevant contemporaneous building regulations, fire regulations, other legislation, guidance and industry practice?

(c) Did Grenfell Tower, as originally constructed, comply with all such relevant regulations, legislation, British Standards, guidance and industry practice?

(d) What assessments and decisions were made about such compliance and by whom?

2) Subsequent modifications prior to the most recent

(a) In respect of each relevant later modification:

(i) What was the nature and extent of the modification?
(ii) What was the purpose of the modification?
(iii) What was the design and construction of the modification?
(iv) What were the relevant contemporaneous building regulations, fire regulations, other legislation, guidance and industry practice?
(v) Did Grenfell Tower, as modified, comply with all such relevant contemporaneous regulations, legislation, British Standards, guidance and industry practice?
(vi) What assessments and decisions were made about such compliance and by whom?

3) Modifications to the interior of the building 2012-2016

(a) What modifications were made to the inside of the building?

(b) Who made these modifications?

(c) What was the reason for the modifications?

(d) What were the regulations, legislation, British Standards, guidance etc. that applied to the modifications throughout the period from initial design to completion and approval?

(e) Were the modifications compliant with such regulations, legislation, British Standards (including testing requirements), guidance etc.

(f) If so, were any of those inadequate and if so in what respects?

(g) If not, what elements or aspects of the interior of the building at the time of the fire failed to comply with what elements or aspects of what regulations, legislation, British Standards, guidance, industry practice, and in each case to what extent?

(h) Why did each such failure occur?

(i) Who was responsible for such failures?

(j) To what extent did the design and construction of the modifications to the interior of the building take account of the design and construction of the modifications to exterior of the building? If it did not, in what respects did it not and why not?

(k) What advice or information was available, and what assessments were made, about the components that comprise the interior of the building, their fire safety, fire-resistance and compliance with safety standards (including information or advice from manufacturers of relevant components)?

(l) Was specific consideration given to the combination of the interior components (e.g. fire-doors, other fire-breaks, ventilation systems, dry or wet risers or the absence of the same, stairways and access) and the fire safety, fire-retardancy and compliance with safety standards of the same?

(m) What decisions about the interior of the building were made, by whom and when?

(n) What was the chain of decision-making, communication and responsibility about those matters?

(o) What factors or motives influenced the decisions about the interior of the building?

(p) What if any assessments were carried out to balance such factors or motives with the safety of the residents?

(q) If such assessments were carried out, who carried them out, when and what did they conclude?

4) Modifications to the exterior of the building 2012-2016 (including cladding and insulation)

(a) What was the purpose of the cladding/insulation to the exterior of the building?

(b) What was its design, manufacture, composition and method of fixing to the building?

(c) To what extent did the design and construction of the modifications to the exterior of the building take account of the design and construction of the interior of the building? If it did not, in what respects did it not and why not?

(d) Was the exterior of the building (including the cladding, insulation, fixings and windows) compliant with relevant building regulations, fire regulations, other legislation, British Standards (including testing requirements), guidance and industry practice?

(e) To the extent that it was compliant with such regulations, legislation, British Standards, guidance etc. were any of those inadequate and if so in what respects, so far as relevant to the nature and immediate causes of the fire and its spread?

(f) If not compliant in any respect, what elements or aspects of the exterior of the building at the time of the fire failed to comply with what elements or aspects of what regulations, legislation, British Standards, guidance, industry practice, and in each case to what extent?

(g) Who was responsible for such failures?

(h) What advice or information was available, and what assessments were made, about the components that comprised the exterior of the building, their fire safety, fire-resistance and compliance with safety standards (including information or advice from manufacturers of relevant components)?

(i) Was specific consideration given to the combination of the exterior components (e.g. cladding, insulation, windows, and methods of fixing) and the fire safety, fire-retardancy and compliance with safety standards of the same?

(j) How commonly used are:

(i) these particular cladding panels;
(ii) this type of insulation;
(iii) any other relevant parts of the exterior e.g. fixings/windows in the UK and elsewhere and are there relevant lessons to be learned from the use/regulation of such matters elsewhere?

(k) What decisions about the exterior of the building (i.e. cladding, insulation, fixings and windows) were made, by whom and when?

(l) What was the chain of decision-making, communication and responsibility about the cladding, insulation, windows and fixings?

(m) What factors or motives influenced the decisions about the exterior of the building?

(n) What if any assessments were carried out to balance such factors or motives with the safety of the residents?

(o) If such assessments were carried out, who carried them out, when and what did they conclude?

4a. Testing, certification and classification – exterior wall materials

(a) What testing and/or certification and/or classification had occurred in respect of the exterior wall materials at Grenfell Tower, including the cladding and insulation?

(b) Was any such testing and/or certification and/or classification adequate and appropriate?

(c) Is the testing, certification and classification regime for external wall materials fit for purpose?

5) The fire and safety measures within the building at the time of the fire

To the extent that the following issues are not covered by the issues set out under Section 4 above:

(a) What were the fire resistance, prevention, mitigation, evacuation and other fire safety measures ("fire safety measures") in place at the time of the fire?

(b) Were the fire safety measures compliant with relevant building regulations, fire regulations, British Standards, other legislation, guidance and industry practice?

(c) To the extent that the fire safety measures were compliant with such regulations, legislation, British Standards, guidance etc. were any of those inadequate and if so in what respects, so far as relevant to the nature and immediate causes of the fire and its spread?

(d) If the fire safety measures were not compliant, what elements or aspects of the fire safety measures in place in the building at the time of the fire failed to comply with what elements or aspects of what regulations, legislation, British Standards, guidance, industry practice, and in each case to what extent?

(e) Why did each such failure occur?

(f) Who was responsible for such failures?

(g) What fire risk assessments had been made in relation to Grenfell Tower in the period January 2012-June 2017, including specifically at all times during the most recent modifications?

(h) What reports or conclusions are available concerning the same and what do they say?

(i) In what ways was the building intended to be resistant to the spread of fire?

(j) What was assumed (if anything) about the resistance of the building to the spread of fire?

(k) Were any checks or assessments or inspections made as to whether the actual condition of the building matched any assumptions made?

(l) What was the nature of such checks or assessments or inspections and who carried them out?

(m) What decisions about fire safety measures were made, by whom and when?

(n) What was the chain of decision-making, communication and responsibility about those matters?

(o) To what extent did the relevant persons or organisations responsible for the fire safety of occupants of Grenfell Tower communicate with one another about their knowledge of the building and the decisions they were making?

(p) Was any consideration given to the evacuation of disabled and other vulnerable residents, and if so, was adequate provision made for them?

(q) What factors or motives influenced the decisions about the fire resistance, prevention, mitigation and safety measures?

(r) What, if any, assessments were carried out to balance such factors or motives with the safety of the residents?

(s) If such assessments were carried out, who carried them out, when and what did they conclude?

(t) What advice was given to those responsible for fire safety in Grenfell Tower and how did they respond to that advice?

6) Inspections

(a) What fire and other relevant inspections (including building control inspections) were carried out:

(i) During the recent renovations; and
(ii) Between the completion of the recent renovations and the fire?

(b) What were the relevant conclusions/reports from those inspections and by whom were they carried out?

(c) Pursuant to what criteria were such inspections carried out, how frequently and by what personnel?

(d) Were the inspections compliant with all relevant standards?

(e) Were the fire and other safety inspections system (including any criteria applied) reasonably fit for purpose?

(f) Who carried out the inspections, how were they trained and were they competent to do so?

(g) What was the system for implementing conclusions/recommendations following such inspections?

(h) Was that system operated properly or at all?

7) Governance/Management

(a) What was the legal relationship between the different persons and organisations who were responsible for fire safety at Grenfell Tower as at 14 June 2017?

(b) As at that date, how did the relationships between the different persons and organisations who were responsible for fire safety at Grenfell Tower work in practice?

(c) As at that date, had any other fires taken place at Grenfell Tower or other similar buildings under the authority of RBKC?

(d) If so, were any investigations, reports or lesson-learning exercises carried out? What did they conclude?

(e) Were any recommendations made? If so, were they implemented? If they were not implemented, who was responsible for that decision and what reasons did they have?

8) Communications with residents

(a) What system was there, if any, for residents to express their concerns and views about fire safety?

(b) What channels of communication did it provide?

(c) Was there a formal system for recording concerns and addressing them?

(d) What concerns, warnings and other statements were expressed about the fire safety of Grenfell Tower by its residents or any other person before, at the time of or after the recent renovations?

(e) How and to whom were any such complaints expressed?

(f) What was done in response to such expressed concerns?

(g) What provisions, if any, were put in place to ensure that those with language or other special needs could send and receive communications to and from the TMO and the Council about matters of fire safety, or safety more generally?

9) Fire advice to residents 2012 to 14 June 2017

(a) What advice was given to residents about fire precautions?

(b) How was that advice communicated and by whom?

(c) What provisions were in place to ensure that that advice had been received and understood by residents?

(d) What was the basis of the advice?

(e) Was the advice appropriate and consistent with the then current fire safety standards and practice for high-rise residential buildings in general, and in particular where used for social housing?

(f) Was the advice periodically reviewed and if so by whom and on what basis?

(g) What were the conclusions resulting from any such review and were they implemented?

(h) Were there any evacuation plans in place and, if so, what were they?

(i) Who drew them up?

(j) Were they independently reviewed, and if so, by whom, when and with what conclusions?

10) Response to Recommendations

(a) What recommendations, including from inquiries, inquests, investigations, experts, professional and trade bodies and Parliamentary Committees were relevant to the risk of fire at Grenfell Tower as at 14 June 2017 given its composition and occupancy?

(b) Were appropriate steps taken by central and local government and other relevant bodies to act upon such recommendations insofar as they were relevant to the risk of fire in high-rise residential buildings?

(c) Specifically, what steps were taken by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the London Fire Brigade or any other body to implement the recommendations of the Coroner following the Lakanal House inquest?

(d) If and to the extent that any such recommendations were not implemented, what were the reasons for not implementing them?

(e) To what extent did any failure to implement any of these recommendations cause or contribute to the manner and speed of the spread of the fire at Grenfell Tower, the extent of the damage and the number of casualties?

11) The fire

(a) What was the cause and seat of the fire?

(b) How did the fire progress and what contribution to its progress was made by

(i) the construction of the exterior walls and surfaces, openings to them and internal structures abutting them,
(ii) the internal structure and condition of the building (including, for example, stairwells, shafts, vents, cavities, fire-stopping, and pipework), or
(iii) other factors, including the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of fire safety measures?

(c) What information can be obtained from the experience of fires in high-rise residential buildings in other countries? In particular:

(i) Have there been comparable fires in high-rise buildings in other countries?
(ii) If so, what was the nature of the construction of those buildings?
(iii) Did the extent of the loss of life or damage to property in those cases differ?
(iv) If so, why?

12) The response of the emergency services

(a) What plans and strategies did the fire and rescue service have for dealing with a major fire in a high-rise residential building?

(b) What training and equipment did fire officers have for dealing with a major fire in a high-rise residential building?

(c) Did the fire service have adequate access to the building?

(d) What actions were taken on the night of 14 June 2017 to fight the fire, including:

(i) First calls and responses;
(ii) Assembly of strategy, command and control;
(iii) Co-ordination with occupants of Grenfell Tower and other services during and immediately after the fire, including the establishment of radio communication channels;
(iv) The application of any “stay-put” policy and any change to a “get out and stay out” policy;
(v) The methods of rescuing individual residents;
(vi) Steps taken to communicate with residents in the Tower.

(e) Were the fire services hampered in their fire-fighting plans and strategies, and if so by what and to what extent? In particular, to what extent was water pressure adequate to allow the LFB to fight the fire effectively?

(f) What, if any, aspects of the access to and construction and fire prevention features of Grenfell Tower affected the proper execution of the (or any) fire-fighting, rescue and evacuation strategy?

(g) The adequacy of the LFB's actions (including the application of the "stay-put" policy) respectively referred to in (a), (b) and (d) above.

13) The aftermath

(a) What policies, procedures and plans were in place on the part of the Tenant Management Organisation, central and local government for dealing with a major emergency such as the Grenfell Tower fire?

(b) What was the response of the Tenant Management Organisation, central and local government by way of the provision of emergency relief in the days immediately following the fire?

(c) Was the response adequate and if not, in what respects was it inadequate?

Dated September 2019