Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy

Mid-year Review Report

Cambridgeshire Police And Crime Commissioner
2017/18

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1 Background

The Police and Crime Commissioner (the Commissioner) operates a balanced budget, which broadly means cash raised during the year will meet its cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operations ensure this cash flow is adequately planned, with surplus monies being invested in low risk counterparties, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering optimising investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Commissioner's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Commissioner, essentially the longer term cash flow planning to ensure the Commissioner can meet the capital spending operations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses, and on occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet the Commissioner's risk or cost objectives.

Accordingly, treasury management is defined as:

> "The management of the local authority's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks."

2 Introduction

The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management (revised 2011) was adopted on 2nd February 2006.

The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:

1. Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Commissioner's treasury management activities.
2. Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Commissioner will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
3. Receipt by the Commissioner of an annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement - including the Annual Investment Strategy and Minimum Revenue Provision Policy - for the year ahead, a Mid-year Review Report and an Annual Report (stewardship report) covering activities during the previous year.
4. Delegation by the Commissioner of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions.
5. Delegation by the Commissioner of the role of scrutiny of treasury management strategy and policies to a specific named body. For this Commissioner the delegated body is the Finance Sub Group with reports subsequently being presented to the Joint Audit Committee.

This mid-year report has been prepared in compliance with CIPFA's Code of Practice on Treasury Management, and covers the following:

- An economic update for the first part of the 2017/18 financial year;
- A review of the Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy;
- The Commissioner's capital expenditure (prudential indicators);
- A review of the Commissioner's investment portfolio for 2017/18;
- A review of the Commissioner's borrowing strategy for 2017/18;
- A review of any debt rescheduling undertaken during 2017/18;
- A review of compliance with Treasury and Prudential Limits for 2017/18.

Recommendations

The Finance Sub Group is asked to recommend that the Commissioner notes the report and the treasury activity.

3 Economics and interest rates

There are no policy changes to the Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2017/18; the details in this report

3.1 Economics update

UK. After the UK economy surprised on the upside with strong growth in 2016, growth in 2017 has been disappointingly weak; quarter 1 came in at only +0.3% (+1.7% y/y) and quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.5% y/y) which meant that growth in the first half of 2017 was the slowest for the first half of any year since 2012. . The main reason for this has been the sharp increase in inflation, caused by the devaluation of sterling after the referendum, feeding increases in the cost of imports into the economy. This has caused, in turn, a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power and so the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 75% of GDP, has seen weak growth as consumers cut back on their expenditure. However, more recently there have been encouraging statistics from the manufacturing sector which is seeing strong growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year. However, this sector only accounts for around 11% of GDP so expansion in this sector will have a much more muted effect on the average total GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole.

The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting of 14 September 2017 surprised markets and forecasters by suddenly switching to a much more aggressive tone in terms of its words around warning that Bank Rate will need to rise. The Bank of England Inflation Reports during 2017 have clearly flagged up that they expected CPI inflation to peak at just under 3% in 2017, before falling back to near to its target rate of 2% in two years time. Inflation actually came in at 2.9% in August, (this data was released on 12 September), and so the Bank revised its forecast for the peak to over 3% at the 14 September meeting MPC. This marginal revision can hardly justify why the MPC became so aggressive with its wording; rather, the focus was on an emerging view that with unemployment falling to only 4.3%, the lowest level since 1975, and improvements in productivity being so weak, that the amount of spare capacity in the economy was significantly diminishing towards a point at which they now needed to take action. In addition, the MPC took a more tolerant view of low wage inflation as this now looks like a common factor in nearly all western economies as a result of increasing globalisation. This effectively means that the UK labour faces competition from overseas labour e.g. in outsourcing work to third world countries, and this therefore depresses the negotiating power of UK labour. However, the Bank was also concerned that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU would effectively lead to a decrease in such globalisation pressures in the UK, and so would be inflationary over the next few years.

It therefore looks very likely that the MPC will increase Bank Rate to 0.5% in November or, if not, in February 2018. The big question after that will be whether this will be a one off increase or the start of a slow, but regular, increase in Bank Rate. As at the start of October, short sterling rates are indicating that financial markets do not expect a second increase until May 2018 with a third increase in November 2019. However, some forecasters are flagging up that they expect growth to improve significantly in 2017 and into 2018, as the fall in inflation will bring to an end the negative impact on consumer spending power while a strong export performance will compensate for weak services sector growth. If this scenario were to materialise, then the MPC would have added reason to embark on a series of slow but gradual increases in Bank Rate during 2018. While there is so much uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, consumer confidence, and business confidence to spend on investing, it is far too early to be confident about how the next two years will pan out.

EU. Economic growth in the EU, (the UK's biggest trading partner), has been lack lustre for several years after the financial crisis despite the ECB eventually cutting its main rate to -0.4% and embarking on a massive programme of QE. However, growth picked up in 2016 and now looks to have gathered ongoing substantial strength and momentum thanks to this stimulus. GDP growth was 0.5% in quarter 1 (2.0% y/y) and 0.6% in quarter (2.3% y/y). However, despite providing massive monetary stimulus, the European Central Bank is still struggling to get inflation up to its 2% target and in August inflation was 1.5%. It is therefore unlikely to start on an upswing in rates until possibly 2019.

USA. Growth in the American economy has been volatile in 2015 and 2016. 2017 is following that path again with quarter 1 coming in at only 1.2% but quarter 2 rebounding to 3.1%, resulting in an overall annualised figure of 2.1% for the first half year. Unemployment in the US has also fallen to the lowest level for many years, reaching 4.4%, while wage inflation pressures, and inflationary pressures in general, have been building. The Fed has started on a gradual upswing in rates with three increases since December 2016; and there could be one more rate rise in 2017 which would then lift the central rate to 1.25 – 1.50%. There could then be another four more increases in 2018. At its June meeting, the Fed strongly hinted that it would soon begin to unwind its $4.5 trillion balance sheet holdings of bonds and mortgage backed securities by reducing its reinvestment of maturing holdings.

Chinese economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.

Japan is struggling to stimulate consistent significant growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.

3.2 Interest rate forecasts

The Commissioner's treasury advisor, Capita Asset Services, has provided the following forecast:

	Dec-17	Mar-18	Jun-18	Sep-18	Dec-18	Mar-19	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20
Bank rate	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.25%	0.50%	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%
5yr PWLB rate	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%	1.80%	1.90%	1.90%	2.00%	2.00%
10yr PWLB rate	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%	2.40%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%
25yr PWLB rate	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%
50yr PWLB rate	2.70%	2.70%	2.80%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%

Capita Asset Services undertook its last review of interest rate forecasts on 9 August after the quarterly Bank of England Inflation Report. There was no change in MPC policy at that meeting. However, the MPC meeting of 14 September revealed a sharp change in sentiment whereby a majority of MPC members said they would be voting for an increase in Bank Rate "over the coming months". It is therefore possible that there will be an increase to 0.5% at the November MPC meeting. If that happens, the question will then be as to whether the MPC will stop at just withdrawing the emergency Bank Rate cut of 0.25% in August 2016, after the result of the EU withdrawal referendum, or whether they will embark on a series of further increases in Bank Rate during 2018.

The overall balance of risks to economic recovery in the UK is currently to the downside but huge variables over the coming few years include just what final form Brexit will take, when finally agreed with the EU, and when.
Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:

- UK economic growth and increases in inflation are weaker than we currently anticipate.
- Weak growth or recession in the UK's main trading partners - the EU and US.
- Geopolitical risks in Europe, the Middle East and Asia, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.
- A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis.
- Weak capitalisation of some European banks.
- Monetary policy action failing to stimulate sustainable growth and to get inflation up consistently to around monetary policy target levels.

The potential for upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates, especially for longer term PWLB rates include: -

- The pace and timing of increases in the Fed. Funds Rate causing a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds as opposed to equities and leading to a major flight from bonds to equities.
- UK inflation returning to significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

4 Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy update

There are no policy changes to the Treasury Management Strategy Statement (TMSS) for 2017/18; the details in this report update the position in the light of the updated economic position and budgetary changes already approved.

Prudential Indicator	**2017/18 Original £m**	**2017/18 Revised £m**
Authorised Limit	13.9	13.9
Operational Boundary	10.9	10.9
Capital Financing Requirement	25.5	25.5

5 The Commissioner's Capital Position (Prudential Indicators)

This part of the report is structured to update:

- The Commissioner's capital expenditure plans;
- How these plans are being financed;
- The impact of the changes in the capital expenditure plans on the prudential indicators and the underlying need to borrow; and
- Compliance with the limits in place for borrowing activity.

5.1 Prudential Indicator for Capital Expenditure

This table shows the revised estimates for capital expenditure and the changes since the capital programme was agreed at the Budget.

Capital Expenditure	2017/18 Original Estimate £m	2017/18 Current Position £m	2017/18 Revised Estimate £m
Total capital expenditure	8.1	3.8	11.2

The estimated increase results from a mixture of in-year additions to the Capital Programme and specifically agreed 2016/17 schemes being carried over for completion in 2017/18. The most significant areas of capital spend for 2017/18 will be land and buildings and fleet replacement costs.

5.2 Changes to the Financing of the Capital Programme

The table below draws together the main strategy elements of the capital expenditure plans (above), highlighting the original supported and unsupported elements of the capital programme, and the expected financing arrangements of this capital expenditure. The borrowing element of the table increases the underlying indebtedness of the Commissioner by way of the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), although this will be reduced in part by revenue charges for the repayment of debt (the Minimum Revenue Provision). This direct borrowing need may also be supplemented by maturing debt and other treasury requirements.

Capital Expenditure	2017/18 Original Estimate £m	2017/18 Current Position £m	2017/18 Revised Estimate £m
Total capital expenditure	**8.1**	**3.8**	**11.2**
Financed by:			
Capital receipts	0.0	0.0	0.0
Capital grants	0.7	0.3	0.6
Capital reserves	0.0	0.4	1.6
Revenue	3.9	3.1	5.5
Total financing	**4.6**	**3.8**	**7.7**
Borrowing requirement	**3.5**	**0.0**	**3.5**

5.3 Changes to the Prudential Indicators for the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) and External Debt

The table below shows the CFR, which is the underlying external need to incur borrowing for a capital purpose. It also shows the expected debt position over the period.

We are on target to achieve the original forecast Capital Financing Requirement.

Capital Financing Requirement and External Debt	2017/18 Original Estimate £m	2017/18 Current Position £m	2017/18 Revised Estimate £m
Total CFR	25.5	22.1	25.5
Net movement in CFR	**2.7**	**(0.8)**	**2.7**
Borrowing	12.3	9.3	12.3
Other long term liabilities*	0.1	0.1	0.1
Total debt (year end position)	**12.36**	**9.4**	**12.36**

** Includes finance leases*

5.4 Limits to Borrowing Activity

The first key control over the treasury activity is a prudential indicator to ensure that over the medium term, net borrowing (borrowings less investments) will only be for a capital purpose*. This is the

Operational Boundary. Gross external borrowing should not, except in the short term, exceed the total of CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2017/18 and next two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years. The Commissioner has approved a policy for borrowing in advance of need which will be adhered to if this proves prudent.

** The management of transferred debt should be excluded from net borrowing.*

Operational Boundary for external debt	**2017/18 Original Estimate £m**	**2017/18 Revised Estimate £m**
Borrowing	10.9	10.9
Other long term liabilities*	0.1	0.1
Total debt	11.0	11.0
CFR* (year end position)	25.5	25.5

** Includes finance leases*

The Chief Finance Officer reports that no difficulties are envisaged for the current or future years in complying with this prudential indicator.

A further prudential indicator controls the overall level of borrowing. This is the Authorised Limit which represents the limit beyond which borrowing is prohibited, and needs to be set and revised by Members. It reflects the level of borrowing which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term. It is the expected maximum borrowing need with some headroom for unexpected movements. This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003.

Authorised limit for external debt	**2017/18 Original Indicator £m**	**2017/18 Revised Indicator £m**
Borrowing	13.9	13.9
Other long term liabilities*	0.1	0.1
Total	14.0	14.0

** Includes on balance sheet PFI schemes and finance leases etc.*

6 Investment Portfolio

In accordance with the Code, it is the Commissioner's priority to ensure security of capital and liquidity, and to obtain an appropriate level of return which is consistent with the Commissioner's risk appetite. It is a very difficult investment market in terms of earning the level of interest rates commonly seen in previous decades as rates are very low and in line with the current 0.25% Bank Rate. The continuing potential for a re-emergence of a Eurozone sovereign debt crisis together with other risks which could impact on the creditworthiness of banks, prompts a low risk strategy. Given this risk environment and the fact that increases in Bank Rate are likely to be gradual and unlikely to return to the levels seen in previous decades, investment returns are likely to remain low.

The Commissioner held £22.2m of investments as at 30 September 2017 (£16.5m at 31 March 2017) and the investment portfolio yield for the year to date is 0.35% against a benchmark (overnight LIBOR -.25%) of 0.0%, noting overnight LIBOR remained below 25 basis points throughout the first six months of this year.

The Commissioner's budgeted investment return for 2017/18 is £114,000, and performance for the year to date is £19,700 below budget.

Investment Counterparty criteria

The current investment counterparty criteria selection approved in the TMSS is meeting the requirement of the treasury management function therefore there are no proposed changes at this point.

7 Borrowing

The Commissioner's capital financing requirement (CFR) for 2017/18 is £25.5m. The CFR denotes the Commissioner's underlying need to borrow for capital purposes. If the CFR is positive the Commissioner may borrow from the PWLB or the market (external borrowing) or from internal balances on a temporary basis (internal borrowing). The balance of external and internal borrowing is generally driven by market conditions. Table 5.3 shows the Commissioner has borrowings, including finance leases, of £9.4m and is under-borrowed by £12.7m. This is a prudent and cost effective approach in the current economic climate but will require ongoing monitoring in the event that upside risk to gilt yields prevails.

Whilst there is an underlying need to borrow for capital purposes (the capital financing requirement - CFR), no external borrowing has been undertaken.

8 Debt Rescheduling

No debt rescheduling was undertaken during the first six months of 2017/18.